Heidegger

In a message dated 10/27/2007 8:46:46 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
jPolanik at nc.rr.com writes:

Georges Metanomski wrote:

> No being _is_ without showing itself _as_
> such-and-such
> =============
> G:
> Some people say that “being” (noun) is an illegal
> and meaningless inflection of the copula “be”.
>
> Still, how would an Arab or a Hebrew say “No being
> _is_
> without showing itself…” when their languages lack
> the verb “to be”?

a good question Georges; but, remember that this comment occurred in a
context (Heideggerian philosophy) in which there are reasonable grounds
for saying that ‘being’ is used as the root predicate (as defined by
Axiom 0 with which you are familiar).

[Axiom 0: there is a predicate, P, such that: for any x that is, x is P.
further analysis: http://what-am-i.net/lor_foundation.htm]

in any event, Georges, you seem to have some knowledge of these
languages; so, tell us, in all these centuries, has no one found a way
to translate ’si fallor, sum’ or ‘cogito; ergo, sum’ into arabic and hebrew?

Joe

Joe:
The fallacy here is to confound “thinking” with “experience,” the speculation
that Descartes didn’t know the difference between thinking and experience and
“really” intended *experience* when he used the term *cogito.* The evidence
to this is the lack of *is* and the predicate of being in Hebrew and Arabic
that is active when experience rather than thinking serves consciousness. As a
result there are some 5000 separate words in Arabic to indicate “camel” in all
its possible states simply because the predicate of being is abscent
linguistically qua consciousness. “Thinking” remained dormant and whose first signs of
expression was that of the pre-Socratic philosophers and *physiologoi.*
Hence, *prosus* (”right on” as the extention of logic to abstraction) displaced
the mode of mythopoeic expression whose ground was experience. “Thinking” was
thus a Greek invention epitomized as Nous or world mind, qua Anaxagoras, to
accommodate the new found process of “thinking” and the displacement of
mythopoeic “experience” whose emphasis is in feeling and sensation. But it is only in
the mode of thinking that logical abstraction is possible if not displacing
experience (to this day!). Thus, it is sort of cluckish to assume the Cartesian
cogito was really intended to express experience, more so that the philosopher
was not *thinking* in either Hebrew or Arabic. It is not possible to
*experience* the predicate of being although that seems to be the intent of the notion
of dasein whose attempt is to compromise the exclusivness of *Thinking* and
find onself “out there” in the world of feeling, sensation and that old time
experience couched as it is in mythopoeic experience. Indeed, the idea of dasein
incomfortably has its ground and mode of abstraction in *prosus.*
Bernard

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Posted on Saturday, October 27th, 2007 at 8:10 pm
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