[epistemology] Discovery vs Disclosure
October 27th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: [epistemology] Discovery vs Disclosure :: [epistemology] Discovery vs Disclosure :: Symptoms as Evidence :: Discovery vs Disclosure
In a message dated 27/10/2007 21:13:43 GMT Standard Time, Bernx at aol.com
writes:
In a message dated 10/27/2007 8:46:46 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
jPolanik at nc.rr.com writes:
Georges Metanomski wrote:
> No being _is_ without showing itself _as_
> such-and-such
> =============
> G:
> Some people say that “being” (noun) is an illegal
> and meaningless inflection of the copula “be”.
>
> Still, how would an Arab or a Hebrew say “No being
> _is_
> without showing itself…” when their languages lack
> the verb “to be”?
a good question Georges; but, remember that this comment occurred in a
context (Heideggerian philosophy) in which there are reasonable grounds
for saying that ‘being’ is used as the root predicate (as defined by
Axiom 0 with which you are familiar).
[Axiom 0: there is a predicate, P, such that: for any x that is, x is P.
further analysis: http://what-am-i.net/lor_foundation.htm]
in any event, Georges, you seem to have some knowledge of these
languages; so, tell us, in all these centuries, has no one found a way
to translate ’si fallor, sum’ or ‘cogito; ergo, sum’ into arabic and hebrew?
Joe
Joe:
The fallacy here is to confound “thinking” with “experience,” the
speculation that Descartes didn’t know the difference between thinking and experience
and “really” intended *experience* when he used the term *cogito.* The
evidence to this is the lack of *is* and the predicate of being in Hebrew and
Arabic that is active when experience rather than thinking serves consciousness.
As a result there are some 5000 separate words in Arabic to indicate “camel”
in all its possible states simply because the predicate of being is abscent
linguistically qua consciousness. “Thinking” remained dormant and whose first
signs of expression was that of the pre-Socratic philosophers and
*physiologoi.* Hence, *prosus* (”right on” as the extention of logic to abstraction)
displaced the mode of mythopoeic expression whose ground was experience.
“Thinking” was thus a Greek invention epitomized as Nous or world mind, qua
Anaxagoras, to accommodate the new found process of “thinking” and the displacement
of mythopoeic “experience” whose emphasis is in feeling and sensation. But
it is only in the mode of thinking that logical abstraction is possible if not
displacing experience (to this day!). Thus, it is sort of cluckish to assume
the Cartesian cogito was really intended to express experience, more so that
the philosopher was not *thinking* in either Hebrew or Arabic. It is not
possible to *experience* the predicate of being although that seems to be the
intent of the notion of dasein whose attempt is to compromise the exclusivness
of *Thinking* and find onself “out there” in the world of feeling, sensation
and that old time experience couched as it is in mythopoeic experience.
Indeed, the idea of dasein incomfortably has its ground and mode of abstraction in
*prosus.*
Bernard
Jud:
Purely as information Bernard ad as you are not a member of the list in
question Georges answered thus to Joe.
G:
Hebrew:
“ani hoshev mashmy ani kiim”
Back to English:
“I think means I live/exist”.
That’s the verbatim translation. The meaning of
Cogito ergo sum, whether in Latin, English, Hebrew
or Ruritanian, is for anybody slightly familiar with
Descartes:
“sole awareness of thinking is certain”.
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…
“In nuclear war all men are cremated equal.”
Dexter Gordon