[Epistemology3] Interpretation of Symbolic Forms/Logical Quantification
September 21st, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Interpretation of Symbolic Forms :: Interpretation of Symbolic Forms :: Translating Existentially Quantified Symbolic Forms :: Translating Existentially Quantified Symbolic Forms
mikebispham at aol.com wrote:
>jPolanik@nc.rr.com writes:
>>The real point is that the so-called existential quantifier is
>>entirely dependent upon the ontological assumptions of predicates; it
>>cannot ‘prove’ the existence of anything whose existence hasn’t
>>already been assumed by the discourse within which it is used.
>statements (whether existentially or universally quantified) are about
>a universe of discourse. if that universe of discourse is the set of
>all physical objects; it will look like the existential quantifier is
>asserting physical existence. is this due to some assumption built into
>the predicate(s) being applied or due to the rule used to construct the
>set that is the universe of discourse?
>Joe
>As I understand it, these are the fundamentals:
>The universe of discourse is that specified by a) the quantifier AND b)
>the statements following the Quantifier.
I would say that the universe of discourse [UoD]is the set of entities
that one is talking about; and, is (implicitly or explicitly) specified
before one quantifies over it.
given a UoD consisting of all motorcycles, one can then quantify
statements.
(x)(Tx) - for any x, x has two wheels
(Ex)(Hx) - there is at least one x that is made by Honda.
any presumptions about the reality type or existential mode of the topic
of discussion are likely built into the rule for constructing or
composing the UoD. when the construction of the UoD is itself the topic
of discussion, these presumptions may become contentious.
for example, if the UoD is the set of all that is not an element of the
empty set, we’d get what Suber calls the default UoD..
>These statements are, first (a), given two forms, according to the type
>of quantifier given.
>1) The Universal (which I’ll write E[ ) says ALL ….
>In other words, ‘the following statement is predicated of EVERYTHING in
>this domain’
>2) The Existential (V[ )says SOME…
>In other words, ‘the following statement is predicated of AT LEAST
>ONE’, ‘There exists in this domain at least one”
>Its important to be clear about that much, first.
I suggest you use ‘A’ (or ‘A[’) for ‘All’ and ‘E’ or ‘S’ (’E[’ or ‘S[’)
for ‘Some’. ‘E’ is often used for the existential quantifier. and the
symbol for the universal quantifier is an upside down ‘A’ that is often
omitted (particularly in ASCII email). this would make it easier to
translate from one set of symbols to another; but, that’s only a
suggestion.
>Now, (b) if, for example, we wish to state of our domain that only
>matter-energy can be regarded as existing, we must make the statement:
>E[ “things are mass-energy objects”
>Or something of that kind. That much restricts entities possible in
>that domain to ME entities.
>If on the other hand we wish to allow for both these kinds of objects
>and other kinds of ‘objects’ we will state:
>V[ “things are mass-energy objects”
>What we’ve done here is state that at least one thing in the domain
>controlled by the quantifier is a ME-object. Everything else about that
>domain is open. There is, as yet no commitment either for or against
>other kinds of object.
>If we wanted to say of our domain that there definately ARE ‘ME’ AND
>other objects, there are several ways of doing so.
>We could use the existential and say:
>V[ (SOME) “things are ME objects AND some things are ¬(NOT) ME objects”
>or
>E[ “things are Me objects OR ABstract objects.
>(Both these statements will prompt discussion of the WFT-do-you-mean
>variety.)
it seems like you are using an implicitly specified UoD; for example:
‘given a UoD consisting of mass-energy objects, (x)(Tx), any x is a
thing’
or ‘given a UoD consisting of all that is, (Ex)(Mx), there is at least
one x that is is a mass-energy thing’
or ‘given a UoD consisting of all that is, (Ex)(Mx) & (Ey)(-My), there
is at least one x that is is a mass-energy thing and at least one y that
is not a mass-energy thing’
or ‘given a UoD consisting of all that is, (Ex)(Mx) & (Ey)(By), there
is at least one x that is is a mass-energy thing and at least one y that
is not an abstract thing’
>NOW
>IF we are want our domain to be representative of the ‘ordinary world’
>THEN we HAVE to specify what kinds xObjects xExist within that domain
>BEFORE we start trying to have frigging discussions!
>That is: we have to REACH AGREEMENT about the TERMS OF DISCUSSION
>BEFOREHAND
that covers about 99.9% of all discussions. the remaining .1% includes
discussions about what kinds of entities are contained in the UoD —
where the UoD is defined in the widest possible sense. if UoD is the set
of all that is not an element of the empty set; what does it contain?
it also follows from this that the members of the empty set are not
within the UoD — because there are no such members. it’s empty. hence,
the attempt by some philosophers (eg Heidegger) to attribute predicates
to ‘the Nothing’ is guaranteed to be gibbereish.
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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