Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>>>putting all these definitions together, it is clear that you are
>>>>>>claiming that, from your set of premises, you deduce the skeptical
>>>>>>conclusion, Q: I have not proven by evidence based logical
>>>>>>deduction that I am not nothing.

>>>>>left unaddressed and unquoted, my explicit argument against your
>>>>>first law of reality in my last post as well as two posts before
>>>>>that:

>>>>it’s your argument I’m contesting; so, it is up to *you* to state
>>>>which reality type(s) you are talking about. what is the reality
>>>>type of that which asserts the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by
>>>>evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

>>>Any of them.

>>>that covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3
>>>are not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal.

>>okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we
>>don’t have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the
>>referent of the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by
>>evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’.

>>now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
>>Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
>>how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
>>proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

>Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous
>post regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as
>well as Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then
>get back to me.

wrong. it is a self-contained question. the question, Anthony, is simply
this: is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not proven by evidence
based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

in your last post you admitted that the skeptical conclusion, ‘I have
not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’
could be asserted by any I irregardless of reality type. consequently,
the relevance of previous commentary involving pronouns subscripted by
reality type is suspended *until* we advance to a consideration of the
voices of the ‘is’; at which point, the question of whether such a
pronoun has a referent will surely be raised again.

>>if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that
>>skeptical conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that
>>I have just asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from
>>that fact (which is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.

>Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous
>post regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as
>well as Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then
>get back to me.

wrong again. the skeptical conclusion any I may deduce from your stated
premises is self-refuting. the case for this conclusion is stated in
language that is independent of any previous discussion we have had
involving subscripted pronouns.

>>consequently, one of your premises is false. here they are:

>>P1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>P2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>>remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>P3. I have no evidence that anything remains identical throughout all
>>my perceptions.

>>which one do you wish to reject?

>None.

you have chosen not to contest the case against your set of premises,
the case based on showing the self-refuting properties of your alleged
conclusion; and, consequently, I declare that you have suffered a
containment break of truely cataclysmic proportions. your efforts to
contain first-person Heideggerian psychophilosophy to the quagmire of
SIS has ended in utter failure.

I hereby escape from the quagmire of SIS; and, I advance my case to
section 20 of BaT, where the Heidegger writes:

“The Being of that substance whose distinctive proprietas is presented
by extensio thus becomes definable in principle ontologically if we
clarify the meaning of Being which is ‘common’ to the three kinds of
substances, one of them infinite, the others both finite. … Here
Descartes touches upon a problem with which medieval ontology was often
busied — the question of how the signification of ‘Being’ signifies
any entity which one may on occasion be considering. In the assertions
‘God is’ and ‘the world is’, we assert Being. This word ‘is’, however,
cannot be meant to apply to these entities in the same sense, when
between them there is an infinite difference of Being; if the
signification of ‘is’ were univocal, then what is created would be
viewed as if it were uncreated, or the uncreated would be reduced to the
status of something created. But neither does ‘Being’ function as a mere
name which is the same in both cases: in both cases ‘Being’ is
understood.”

your next challenge, should you decide to accept it, is to prove that
the Heidegger’s recognition that ‘is’ has more than one ‘voice’ or sense
can not be used to classify any x that is according to the sense of the
‘is’ that is invoked by an assertion that x is.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Saturday, March 29th, 2008 at 7:00 pm
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