Escape From the Quagmire of SIS
March 30th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Who has Doomed Philosophy to the Quagmire of SIS? :: Who has Doomed Philosophy to the Quagmire of SIS? :: The Quagmire of SIS and Other Philosophical Catastrophes :: Who has Doomed Philosophy to the Quagmire of SIS?
is the philosophy professor unable to answer a simple question that
could be posed by anyone — irregardless of what previous conversations
you’ve had with them or anyone else? the question is: is ‘the Nothing’
(as defined by the Heidegger) able to assert ‘I have not proven by
evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>in your last post you admitted that the skeptical conclusion, ‘I have
>>not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’
>>could be asserted by any I irregardless of reality type.
>Then either prove “by evidence based logical deduction that I am not
>nothing” WITHOUT appealing (explicitly or implicitly) to your first law
>of reality that “nothing unreal is self aware,” or if you can’t
>disprove it without presupposing to that law, then see my previous
>Humean argument against that law.
I showed that, given your own definitions, the skeptical conclusion you
derived from your set of premises is ‘I have not proven by evidence
based logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
I have argued that any I which can can assert this skeptical conclusion
can continue ‘the fact that I can assert this proposition is itself
evidence from which I conclude that the proposition is false; and,
hence, I *have* proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not
nothing.
that is the argument you must contest — once you stop dancing in the
shadows of your own denial system.
this version of my argument does not appeal explicitly or implicitly to
the first law of reality, ‘nothing unreal is self-aware’; and, indeed,
does not mention self-awareness at all.
if it is not intuitively obvious that the not nothingness of the I is a
necessary condition of the I’s ability to assert any conclusion at all;
then, the I may reason as follows:
* it is assumed by predicate logic that one can not attribute predicates
to nothingness.
* hence the predicate ‘not nothing’ is attributable to any x to which
any predicate at all may be attributed.
* from Crifasi’s set of three premises, I conclude ‘I have not proven by
evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
* the fact that I have drawn this (or any other) conclusion is evidence
that proves that I am capable of drawing conclusions.
* ‘capable of drawing conclusions’ is a predicate attributable to the I;
hence, the predicate ‘not nothing’ may also be attributed to the I.
* (therefore) I am not nothing.
Voila!
Joe
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
