Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>* it is assumed by predicate logic that one can not attribute
>>>>predicates to nothingness.

>>>Please prove that assumption without appealing to your first law of
>>>reality.

>>no can do. the first law of reality rests on the assumption that one
>>can not attribute predicates to nothingness.

>>>(lol - adding this “assumption” just repeats the problem!)

>>no. acknowledging this assumption as an assumption solves the problem.

>>I admit that the skeptical conclusion derived from your set of three
>>premises can only be shown to be self-refuting if one assumes that
>>that one can not attribute predicates to nothingness.

>>so, unless you can find a flaw in every argument that is based on this
>>assumption and which shows that your premises lead to a self-refuting
>>conclusion; then, your only options are:

>>1. retract your skeptical conclusion until you revise your set of
>>premises; or,

>>2. deny the assumption.

>>but, there is no way to save your argument in its present form without
>>denying the assumption that one can not attribute predicates to
>>nothingness.

>>if it is so important to save your argument; then, just deny this
>>assumption.

>>go ahead. make my day.

>Done.

>So now, why do you assert it rather than deny it? (without appealing to
>your first law of reality, of course)

I’ve told you why. this assumption is built into predicate logic.

why do you deny it rather than assert it?

what is so important about your set of three premises that you are
willing to assume the power to assign predicates to nothingness in order
to preserve them?

>>>>* hence the predicate ‘not nothing’ is attributable to any x to
>>>>which any predicate at all may be attributed.

>>>>* from Crifasi’s set of three premises, I conclude ‘I have not
>>>>proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’.

>>>>* the fact that I have drawn this (or any other) conclusion is
>>>>evidence that proves that I am capable of drawing conclusions.

>>>>* ‘capable of drawing conclusions’ is a predicate attributable to
>>>>the I; hence, the predicate ‘not nothing’ may also be attributed to
>>>>the I.

>>>>* (therefore) I am not nothing.

>>Anthony,

>>you have yourself pointed out that anyone who googles our names will
>>likely notice our respective argumentative behavior. do you really
>>want your professional collegues to find you claiming the power to
>>assign predicates to nothingness?

>You’re right. I’d better fix that now:

>Philosophy requires reasons or evidence for what one asserts.
>Therefore, until further reasons or evidence are given for said
>assertion, Polanik’s acceptance of it is unphilosophical.

philosophy also requires reasons or evidence for what one denies.

right now you are either asserting a set of three premises that lead to
a self-refuting conclusion or you are denying an assumption that is
built into predicate logic.

why don’t you tell us which choice you’ve made and what your reasons for
it are?

I predict that you will continue dancing in the shadows of your own
denial system; so, let us explore some of the consequences of trying to
maintain that the skeptical conclusion derived from the three Crifasi
premises is not self-refuting. if the I that asserts ‘I have not proven
by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’ is in fact
nothing; then, there are further questions.

could this I be put into the empty set; and, if so, would the set still
be empty? how would you justify claiming that a member of the empty set
can assert skeptical conclusions about itself.

if the I that asserts your skeptical conclusion about itself can not be
put into the empty set without making that set non-sempty; then, it is
not nothing. would you not agree?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Monday, March 31st, 2008 at 10:00 am
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