Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe
December 1st, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Claim 2 :: The Relationship between Axiom and Translation :: Standard(s) of Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe :: Evidence Concerning the Physical Universe
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
>>> what I don’t understand is how cracking open Hume’s skull to see his
>>> brain provides evidence for your belief that Hume actually had a brain
>>> (as opposed to the mere illusion of having a brain); but, does not
>>> provide evidence for my belief that Hume actually had a brain (as
>>> opposed to the mere illusion of having a brain).
>> because you were talking about something other than a type 2 brain. I
>> mean nothing but a type 2 brain.
>
> it sounds to me like your universe consists of 1 experiencing subject
> (you) and any number of experienced phenomena — some of which
> phenomena are claiming to be experiencing subjects also;
not my universe, but yours … that is, if you continue to make the
distinctions that you have been making between types 1,2,3.
> but, I suppose
> that your experience of hearing an experienced phenomenon claim to be
> another experiencing phenomenon is just another exerienced phenomenon.
That would follow from your distinctions, yes.
>>>>> on the other hand, the idea that the I-2 could be self-instantiating
>>>>> is another matter. can you give a plausible explanation of how this
>>>>> could possibly be the case?
>>>> No I can’t, but only because I’ve never *seen* that happen.
>>> my point is that no one has seen an I-2 instantiated by an I-1 or by an
>>> I-3 either. that is a fundamental question for psychophilosophical
>>> inquiry: what generates the I-2.
>> no it’s not. It’s not just about whether anyone has ever seen an I-2
>> instantiated by an I-1, but whether it’s even a conceivable concept in
>> the first place. That’s a more fundamental question.
>
> Okay, you can’t give a plausible explanation of how an I-2 could be
> self-instantiating; and, I-2 can’t give you a plausible account of how
> an I-1 can instantiate an I-2.
wrong. I can’t give a plausible explanation of how an I-2 can be
self-instantiating, and I-2 can’t give a plausible account of how an I-1
can instantiate an I-2 OR EVEN EXPLAIN WHAT THAT COULD POSSIBLY MEAN AT
ALL. So it’s not even; it’s lopsided in my favor.
> that leaves us with the fundamental
> question: is there an I-3 (which might somehow account for the presence
> of experiencers within a field of experiences)?
That would be no less inconceivable than an I-1.
