Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>Since all human “evidence” and “explanation” is derived from sense
>>>experience, which is obviously phenomenal, then I-2 has *never* had
>>>any evidence or experience of *anything* being instantiated by I-1 or
>>>I-3, much less I-2 itself.

>>this is a very much under appreciated insight into the value of Hume’s
>>experiential effort to detect his own Self by means of introspection.
>>he noted various perceptions but did not ’see’ his Self. his argument
>>is usually taken to mean that if he did not detect the I-3 (Self) then
>>there is no I-3. most people fail to realize that he did not perceive
>>his own brain (I-1) either.

yet, we are not obligated to consider Hume brainless.

>That’s why I added below that one *in principle cannot* detect anything
>of your type 3, since any form of human detection will be by definition
>phenomenal (whether a mental or sensory phenomenon), and therefore of
>type 2. Type 3 realities are therefore undetectable *in principle* and
>not merely in practice. The brain, on the other hand, can be detected
>simply by cracking open the skull and holding up a mirror.

you seem to have a double standard when it comes to evidence of the
physical universe.

you objected to my statement that it has been proven beyond a plausible
doubt that the I-2 has an I-1 made of the same stuff as the rest of the
physical universe; and, yet, here you are relying on phenomenal evidence
to prove that Hume had a brain (I-1) after all.

>>>In other words, experience is by definition phenomenal, so it is not
>>>an argument to say “there is no evidence” or “explanation” of I-2
>>>being self-instantiating, since there neither is *nor can possibly
>>>be* evidence to the contrary. This is Hume’s argument.

>>which of Hume’s arguments are you referring to?

>Several, but here’s one:

>”We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and
>is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really
>present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas,
>and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions
>they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this
>is nothing but to perceive. Now since nothing is ever present to the
>mind but perceptions … it follows that it is impossible for us so
>much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically
>different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of
>ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the
>heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really
>advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of
>existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow
>compass.” (Treatise of Human Nature, very end of Part II)

it seems to me that you have refuted Hume’s argument by cracking open
his skull and holding a mirror up to his brain. were you, perhaps,
inspired by Johnson kicking the stone?

>>also, can you explain how you can define ‘evidence’ and ‘explanation’
>>as phenomenal (because derived from sense experience) without created
>>an impasse in which there is no evidence either for or against the
>>claim that the I-2 is not self-instantiating?

>It’s not merely that evidence for type 3 reality is lacking; rather,
>it’s that it’s an inherently *inconceivable* idea, since any claim to
>such a conception would be, as conceived, phenomenal by definition
>(whether mental or sensory). So the idea that I-2 is instantiated by a
>type 3 reality is utterly inconceivable.

square circles are inconceivable by definition; but, it is a matter of
empirical fact that people, for thousands of years, have been conceiving
the idea that an I-3 may generate the I-2. I’m not saying they’re right
or wrong; but; only that the idea is conceivable; and, therefore, the
most you can claim is that the idea is unprovable.

on the other hand, the idea that the I-2 could be self-instantiating is
another matter. can you give a plausible explanation of how this could
possibly be the case?

>if there were no evidence concering the physical universe, how would a
>philosopher decide either that there is fossil record indicating that
>life on earth evolved over billions of years; or, that the earth popped
>into awareness 5 milliseconds ago complete with an illusionary fossil
>record and a set of false memories for each person?

>>If you distinguish types 1,2, and 3 realities, then there would indeed
>>be no way to decide the above, as Hume showed. That’s why philosophers
>>since Hume reconsidered making such distinctions.

if Hume can support his claim that he has a brain (as opposed to the
illusion of having a brain) by the procedure you suggested; then, how do
you explain why biologists can’t claim that there is fossil evidence (as
opposed to the illusion of fossil evidence) supporting the theory of
evolution?

>>I said that I accept as proven that the human body is made of the same
>>’stuff’ as the rest of the physical universe. that’s reality type 1,
>>existential. reality type 3, ontological reality, is any non-physical
>>metaphenomenal reality. that there are any realities of type 3 is very
>>much in dispute. that is why I posed the question of being as: is
>>there an I-3?

>Hume’s objections work for types 1 or 3, since if type 2 includes all
>that is phenomenal, then by definition, any type 1 reality is utterly
>inconceivable.

an argument you have refuted by showing that there is evidence that Hume
had a brain after all.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Wednesday, November 28th, 2007 at 2:00 am
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