Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> >That’s why I added below that one *in principle cannot* detect anything
> >of your type 3, since any form of human detection will be by definition
> >phenomenal (whether a mental or sensory phenomenon), and therefore of
> >type 2. Type 3 realities are therefore undetectable *in principle* and
> >not merely in practice. The brain, on the other hand, can be detected
> >simply by cracking open the skull and holding up a mirror.
>
> you seem to have a double standard when it comes to evidence of the
> physical universe.
>
> you objected to my statement that it has been proven beyond a plausible
> doubt that the I-2 has an I-1 made of the same stuff as the rest of the
> physical universe; and, yet, here you are relying on phenomenal evidence
> to prove that Hume had a brain (I-1) after all.

Yes, *phenomenal* evidence - the one I *see* when I hold up the mirror.
So what I see in the mirror is still only of your type 2, not 1. If you
can think of any way to *see* anything other than a type 2 reality, I be
curious to know how.

> >It’s not merely that evidence for type 3 reality is lacking; rather,
> >it’s that it’s an inherently *inconceivable* idea, since any claim to
> >such a conception would be, as conceived, phenomenal by definition
> >(whether mental or sensory). So the idea that I-2 is instantiated by a
> >type 3 reality is utterly inconceivable.
>
> square circles are inconceivable by definition; but, it is a matter of
> empirical fact that people, for thousands of years, have been conceiving
> the idea that an I-3 may generate the I-2.

“People” in general don’t make the distinctions that you make here
between your type 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., people are generally naive realists
who don’t make your distinction between everyday sensations and
reality). So it’s hardly surprising that “people” in general talk about
“realities” all the time without stopping to examine whether their
*entire* conception of that is really just phenomenal from the start.

> on the other hand, the idea that the I-2 could be self-instantiating is
> another matter. can you give a plausible explanation of how this could
> possibly be the case?

No I can’t, but only because I’ve never *seen* that happen. The problem
with I-2 being instantiated by an I-3 reality, however, is much deeper,
because I’ve not only never *seen* that happen, but I can’t conceive of
what it could possibly mean for that to happen, since I by definition
cannot *conceive* an I-3 reality. That’s not just a lack of empirical
evidence; that’s the utter impossibility of any such concept.

> if Hume can support his claim that he has a brain (as opposed to the
> illusion of having a brain) by the procedure you suggested; then, how do
> you explain why biologists can’t claim that there is fossil evidence (as
> opposed to the illusion of fossil evidence) supporting the theory of
> evolution?

because Hume’s experience of his brain would be entirely phenomenal
(type 2). Same with *empirical* proof of a fossil record.

Posted on Wednesday, November 28th, 2007 at 2:30 am
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