Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>That’s why I added below that one *in principle cannot* detect
>>>anything of your type 3, since any form of human detection will be by
>>>definition phenomenal (whether a mental or sensory phenomenon), and
>>>therefore of type 2. Type 3 realities are therefore undetectable *in
>>>principle* and not merely in practice. The brain, on the other hand,
>>>can be detected simply by cracking open the skull and holding up a
>>>mirror.

>>you seem to have a double standard when it comes to evidence of the
>>physical universe.

>>you objected to my statement that it has been proven beyond a
>>plausible doubt that the I-2 has an I-1 made of the same stuff as the
>>rest of the physical universe; and, yet, here you are relying on
>>phenomenal evidence to prove that Hume had a brain (I-1) after all.

>Yes, *phenomenal* evidence - the one I *see* when I hold up the mirror.
>So what I see in the mirror is still only of your type 2, not 1. If you
>can think of any way to *see* anything other than a type 2 reality, I
>be curious to know how.

I agree that whatever I see (or otherwise experience) will be a type 2
(phenomenological) reality.

what I don’t understand is how cracking open Hume’s skull to see his
brain provides evidence for your belief that Hume actually had a brain
(as opposed to the mere illusion of having a brain); but, does not
provide evidence for my belief that Hume actually had a brain (as
opposed to the mere illusion of having a brain).

>>>It’s not merely that evidence for type 3 reality is lacking; rather,
>>>it’s that it’s an inherently *inconceivable* idea, since any claim to
>>>such a conception would be, as conceived, phenomenal by definition
>>>(whether mental or sensory). So the idea that I-2 is instantiated by
>>>a type 3 reality is utterly inconceivable.

>>square circles are inconceivable by definition; but, it is a matter of
>>empirical fact that people, for thousands of years, have been
>>conceiving the idea that an I-3 may generate the I-2.

>>on the other hand, the idea that the I-2 could be self-instantiating
>>is another matter. can you give a plausible explanation of how this
>>could possibly be the case?

>No I can’t, but only because I’ve never *seen* that happen.

my point is that no one has seen an I-2 instantiated by an I-1 or by an
I-3 either. that is a fundamental question for psychophilosophical
inquiry: what generates the I-2.

>The problem with I-2 being instantiated by an I-3 reality, however, is
>much deeper, because I’ve not only never *seen* that happen, but I
>can’t conceive of what it could possibly mean for that to happen, since
>I by definition cannot *conceive* an I-3 reality. That’s not just a
>lack of empirical evidence; that’s the utter impossibility of any such
>concept.

I am not aware of any definition which made you incapable of conceiving
an I-3.

since I-2 have the concept of an I-3 it is obviously possible to have
such a concept.

>>if Hume can support his claim that he has a brain (as opposed to the
>>illusion of having a brain) by the procedure you suggested; then, how
>>do you explain why biologists can’t claim that there is fossil
>>evidence (as opposed to the illusion of fossil evidence) supporting
>>the theory of evolution?

>because Hume’s experience of his brain would be entirely phenomenal
>(type 2). Same with *empirical* proof of a fossil record.

precisely; so, how come phenomenal experience of Hume’s brain is
evidence that he had an actual brain; but, phenomenal experience of
fossils is not evidence that there are actual fossils?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Wednesday, November 28th, 2007 at 11:00 am
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