Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> I agree that whatever I see (or otherwise experience) will be a type 2
> (phenomenological) reality.
>
> what I don’t understand is how cracking open Hume’s skull to see his
> brain provides evidence for your belief that Hume actually had a brain
> (as opposed to the mere illusion of having a brain); but, does not
> provide evidence for my belief that Hume actually had a brain (as
> opposed to the mere illusion of having a brain).

because you were talking about something other than a type 2 brain. I
mean nothing but a type 2 brain.

> >>on the other hand, the idea that the I-2 could be self-instantiating
> >>is another matter. can you give a plausible explanation of how this
> >>could possibly be the case?
>
> >No I can’t, but only because I’ve never *seen* that happen.
>
> my point is that no one has seen an I-2 instantiated by an I-1 or by an
> I-3 either. that is a fundamental question for psychophilosophical
> inquiry: what generates the I-2.

no it’s not. It’s not just about whether anyone has ever seen an I-2
instantiated by an I-1, but whether it’s even a conceivable concept in
the first place. That’s a more fundamental question.

> I am not aware of any definition which made you incapable of conceiving
> an I-3.

Can you point out any human concept that is not phenomenal (mental or
sensory)?

> since I-2 have the concept of an I-3 it is obviously possible to have
> such a concept.

That begs the question. Hume argued precisely that our supposed concepts
of I-3 are actually phenomenal.

> >>if Hume can support his claim that he has a brain (as opposed to the
> >>illusion of having a brain) by the procedure you suggested; then, how
> >>do you explain why biologists can’t claim that there is fossil
> >>evidence (as opposed to the illusion of fossil evidence) supporting
> >>the theory of evolution?
>
> >because Hume’s experience of his brain would be entirely phenomenal
> >(type 2). Same with *empirical* proof of a fossil record.
>
> precisely; so, how come phenomenal experience of Hume’s brain is
> evidence that he had an actual brain; but, phenomenal experience of
> fossils is not evidence that there are actual fossils?

because, once again, you were talking about more than just a type 2
fossil record, whereas that’s all I’m talking about. Do we have actual
empirical (and therefore *phenomenal*) experience of a fossil record?
Yes. But that’s type 2, not 1 or 3.

Posted on Saturday, December 1st, 2007 at 12:35 am
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