Heidegger

Existential Constructions

Michael Eldred wrote:

>Joseph Polanik schrieb Sat, 12 Jan 2008 10:24:35 -0500:

>>JP: interestingly enough, the 4 ’significations’ of the verb to be
>>listed in the OED/O [Online] are:

>>I. absolutely: To have or take place in the world of fact, to exist,
>>occur, happen.

>>II. With adverb or prepositional phrase: stating where or how, ie. in
>>what place or state a thing is.

>>III. With adjective, substanctive or adjective phrase; acting as
>>simple copula” stating of what sort or what a thing is.

>>IV. With participles and infinitives, serving as an auxiliary and
>>forming periphrastic tenses.

>>Although the so-called ‘absolute’ signification is listed first, the
>>OED/O notes: “The primary sense appears to have been that of branch II
>>below … thence the more abstract branch I was derived by abstracting
>>the notion of particular place, so as to emphasize that of actual
>>existence. … Branch III was derived from II by weakening the idea of
>>actual presence, into the merely intellectual conception of ‘having a
>>place’ in a class of notions. … Branch IV is an obvious extension of
>>III …”

>>JP: I take this to mean that the original use indicated the presence
>>in a specific place of a physical object; that the ‘absolute’ usage
>>weakened only the notion of a specific place (not the notion of
>>physicality); and, that the copular usage abstracted away the notion
>>of a specific place and suspended the assumption of physicality as
>>well.

>>it seems to me that the notion of ‘pure presence’ and the notion of
>>absolute significance under discussion on this list is a further
>>abstraction from the copular use. not only are the notions of place
>>and physicality suspended; but, the ability to say *what* it is
>>(beyond *that* it is) is also suspended.

>>under the entry for predicate, the OED/O has a derivative entry for
>>”predicateless adj. rare of which nothing can be predicated; lacking a
>>predicate or predicates”. Among the examples given: “the Absolute is
>>conceived as predicateless” and “There is no such dark predicateless
>>ground; there is no such Gnostic abyss”.

>ME: The online OED, as you have quoted it, retains the “absolute
>signification” of the verb ‘to be’ to mean “To have or take place in
>the world of fact, to exist, occur, happen” — and you call that a
>”myth”, presumably implying that it is a kind of untenable fantasy. At
>the same time, however, you cite the OED’s elaboration of the absolute
>signification as meaning that “the more abstract branch I was derived
>by abstracting the notion of particular place, so as to emphasize that
>of actual existence.” So do you want to contest “actual existence”?

I suppose that would depend on how you define ‘actual’ and ‘existence’.

consider these statements:

1: the tree is in the garden.
2: the tree is a tall, pine tree.
3: the tree is.

[1] is an example of signification II, which the OED says is primary;
meaning, that the other formats are derived from it.

[1] is an example of an existential/locative statement; meaning, that
it combines an uncomplemented inflection of the verb to be with a
locative word or phrase, ‘in the garden’, which is an adverbial adjunct
that describes *where* the existential statement is true. as we saw in
our discussion of the definition of ‘predicate’, this is not a
complement and, some would say, not even a predicate.

because a specific location is explicitly stated, it is clear that the
reality type asserted of the subject is existential: only physical
objects have a location in space and time.

now chop off the locative phrase to create [3]. no specific location is
asserted; but, from our knowledge of what a tree is, we know that it is
not being asserted that the tree has no location — only that the
location is indefinite and (probably) unimportant. the subject is still
assumed to be within the physical world. the statement asserts *that*
the tree is and *where* the tree is.

hence, the example from Byron in the OED: tyrants and sycophants have
been and are. we know that tyrants and sycophants are people; and,
therefore, that they are within the physical world somewhere. where is
not important. indeed, the force of the statement is increased by
suggesting that there are tyrants and sycophants everywhere not just in
countries we don’t like at the moment.

* * *

[2] is an example of format III, ‘is’ is a copula and ‘tall’ and ‘pine’
are predicates. the statement tells us *that* the tree is and something
more (than is contained in the term ‘tree) about *what* the subject is;
but, not *where*.

now, we could chop off the predicates to create [3].

are we saying the same thing now as when we created [3] from [1] by
chopping off the locative phrase? probably we are; because, from what we
know of trees, we know that we are talking about a physical object.

thus, the format of the statement (which scholars call an ‘existential
construction’) can be derived in two ways.

* * *

as I indicated previously, statements of the type that are important to
the present discussion (I am; it is; God is; all that is, is; and, so
on) derive from signification II by a different route — indirectly,
from signification III. location is unimportant (I may have a definite
location; but, God’s location could be anywhere or nowhere).

the importance of the existential format for the present discussion is
not that location is unspecified; but, that predication is unspecified.

particularly with words that can be the subject of apophatic inquiry
(’I', ’self’, ‘God’ and so on), all predicates (except the necessarily
implicit complement or root predicate) are either suspended or denied.

thus, the existential construction asserts that x is without stating
what x is — that I am; but, not what I am.

* * *

all that having been said, I can only respond to your question (’So do
you want to contest “actual existence”?’) by asking for clarification:

do you mean by ‘actual’ what I mean by ‘metaphenomenal’ — not merely
phenomenal?

consider again the case of the number two: ‘there is an even prime
number’ is an existential construction equivalent to ‘an even prime
number is’.

when I assert ‘there is an even prime number’, I do so agnostically;
meaning, I know that the number 2 is; but, not what it is. specifically,
I don’t know whether the number 2 is a phenomenological reality (has
conceptual existence only) or is an ontological reality living up
alongside the perfect triangle up there in Plato’s heaven of ideal
forms.

would the ‘actual’ in the phrase ‘actual existence’ apply to all reality
types; or, if your root predicate is existent, all modes of existence;
or, if your root predicate is being, all modes of being?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Tuesday, January 15th, 2008 at 11:40 am
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