Heidegger

> GEVANS613 at aol.com writes:
>> Any beginner will tell you that the properties of a being are not DIFFERENT
>> from it - they make up the compendium of the human descriptions of the
>> perceivable characteristics of the manner in which the adjectivally
>> described object exists. They form the Gesamtsumme (the grand total or sum
>> total) of the humanly perceived features of an object - its colour,
>> size, smell, taste, weight, mass, etc. as filtered through the human
>> somesthesis - the faculty of bodily perception; the sensory systems
>> associated with the human body; including the skin sensors and
>> proprioception and the internal organs if you ingest some of the material.

BernX:

> Jud, whose or what “sensory systems” are you talking about? That of a
> cockroach? Wake up, man, to human being.

….and what manner of sensorial corporeal {etc} being ‘perceives’ {for
example only, a million possibilities could come next} the weight/mass of a
star or the electrical charge on a single electron (since they are not
distinct from the star-as-star or the electron-as-electron {etc} according
to the dictum of the LMatiste)? And is this sensorial corporeal being that
‘perceives’ the weights and the charges in its self distinct from its manner
of be-ing or ‘existence’, its sensorially corporeality, its perceiving? I
just wondered…

….and these “ways” that an entity exists as that entity (and are not
distinct from that entity), do these “ways” “exist” for the Lmatiste?

1a) If so, then these “ways” are them selves entities, i.e., “material
objects” for the LMatiste; thus such and such a “property” (shape, colour,
etc) of some or all object(s)(in fact, all “properties”) or somesuch mode of
appearing (e.g., the lunar phases), etc, is its self a “material object” (or
consists in more or less bundled conglomerations or heaps of “material
objects”).

1b) Or, such “ways” are an other form of existing entity that is not a
“material object”, and thus the LMatiste definition of what exists (and
doesn’t) needs to be extended to include other than “material objects”. In
either case, the LMatiste definition of existence (that which exists is a
“material object” and only such) must be altered, can not stand (along with
the dictum that the “ways” a “material object” “exists” is not distinct from
that object).

2) Or, if such “ways” do not exist for the LMatiste, then entities (that are
not distinct from their “ways” of existing as the entities that exist), then
these entities are not distinct from that which does not exist for the
LMatiste, and thus them selves do not exist (i.e., precisely “material
objects” do not exist, which reduces LMatiste statements to silence if not
nonsense, because totally contradictory).

rear guards

mP (m[erely] P[erceiving])

Posted on Friday, October 5th, 2007 at 6:25 am
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