Heidegger

In a message dated 05/10/2007 07:22:48 GMT Standard Time,
michael at sandwich-de-sign.co.uk writes:

> GEVANS613 at aol.com writes:
>> Any beginner will tell you that the properties of a being are not
DIFFERENT
>> from it - they make up the compendium of the human descriptions of the
>> perceivable characteristics of the manner in which the adjectivally
>> described object exists. They form the Gesamtsumme (the grand total or sum
>> total) of the humanly perceived features of an object - its colour,
>> size, smell, taste, weight, mass, etc. as filtered through the human
>> somesthesis - the faculty of bodily perception; the sensory systems
>> associated with the human body; including the skin sensors and
>> proprioception and the internal organs if you ingest some of the material.

BernX:

> Jud, whose or what “sensory systems” are you talking about? That of a
> cockroach? Wake up, man, to human being.

….and what manner of sensorial corporeal {etc} being ‘perceives’
Jud:
Corporeal *Being* in metaphysical moonshine. Only sensorial beings exist and
perceive.

MichaelP:

{for
example only, a million possibilities could come next} the weight/mass of a
star or the electrical charge on a single electron (since they are not
distinct from the star-as-star or the electron-as-electron {etc} according
to the dictum of the LMatiste)?
Jud:
*They* i.e. weight, mass, charge etc do not exist per se - only the heavy
or light object, massive and charged star or particle exist.
Likewise energy, [dynamism] and movement are sheer abstractions - only the
energised moving object exists.

I am presently conducting a survey, with the cooperation of the heads and
members of staff, regarding the opinions of pupils in the 6 to 16 age groups
in a number of local schools in my area. The simple, very basic, very quick
ontological questionnaire, which is couched in a deliberately lighthearted
manner is designed to reveal a young person’s instinctive attitude towards
aspects of the existence of material objects. It questions their perception as
to what exists and what does not exist in relation to the phenomenon we know
as ‘movement.’ I am interested to discover if our notion of abstractions is
a natural, instinctual human trait or if it is acquired through the
inhabituation which follows from our exposure to brainwashing in infancy and early
youth.
As ell as testing across different age groups, I am also testing to see
whether young females being more subjective than males, might be more susceptible
and impressionable than young males.

The pupils are handed a prepared answer-slip (supplied.) After being
requested not to confer, they are asked to move their right hand then complete the
answer-slip by placing a tick against one of the four possible answers.
The only important thing is to establish that they are not led as to their
replies.

SUGGESTED TEACHER’S MINI SCRIPT
‘We are going to do a little experiment. It will only take a minute.
Hands up who hasn’t got a hand on the end of their right arm?
That’s fine. We all agree then that we have an existing right hand?
Good. Now please raise your hand in front of you and look at it.
Now remain looking at it and put it down very slowly on the desk.
OK. Class, keep looking at your hand and then very slowly lift it up.
Fine, OK, you can stop now – and fill in the slip with a single tick.’

–––-–––––––––––––––– OPINION SLIP
–––––––––––––––––––––––
Please tick whichever of the four answers you think best describes
your opinion of what happens or what exists when your hand moves.
These are not ‘Trick Questions.’ It is not a test. Nobody is trying to ‘
catch you out.’

1) I think ‘just the movement of my hand’ exists when I
move it….
2) I think ‘movement doesn’t exist – only my moving hand’ exists….
3) I think ‘that movement and my hand’ exists when I move it….
4) I’m sorry, I do not really understand what the question is about….
My age is…. I am a girl …. I am a boy….

MichaelP:

And is this sensorial corporeal being that
‘perceives’ the weights and the charges in its self distinct from its manner
of be-ing or ‘existence’, its sensorially corporeality, its perceiving? I
just wondered…
Jud:
No, there is no distinction, because there is no *ontological difference.*
The ontological difference* is a neurological and lingual
process which confuses us into believing in such self-deluding myths as
*difference,* be-ing, ‘existence’, sensorial corporeality, and *perception,.*
when only the differentialising, existential, sensorial, corporeal,
perceiving human exists.

MichaelP:
….and these “ways” that an entity exists as that entity (and are not
distinct from that entity), do these “ways” “exist” for the Lmatiste?

Jud:
No, *ways, manners, modes, fashions, styles, bearings, comportments, life
style, modus vivendi, experience, presence, appearance - none of those
linguistic abstractions exist. Only the humans who are characterised by human
speakers by such descriptions actually exist.

1a) If so, then these “ways” are them selves entities, i.e., “material
objects” for the LMatiste; thus such and such a “property” (shape, colour,
etc) of some or all object(s)(in fact, all “properties”) or somesuch mode of
appearing (e.g., the lunar phases), etc, is its self a “material object” (or
consists in more or less bundled conglomerations or heaps of “material
objects”).

Jud:
1a is negated by the paragraph of mine that precedes it.

MichaelP:
1b) Or, such “ways” are an other form of existing entity that is not a
“material object”, and thus the LMatiste definition of what exists (and
doesn’t) needs to be extended to include other than “material objects”. In
either case, the LMatiste definition of existence (that which exists is a
“material object” and only such) must be altered, can not stand (along with
the dictum that the “ways” a “material object” “exists” is not distinct from
that object).

Jud:
1b is also negated by the paragraph of mine that precedes it.

MichaelP:
2) Or, if such “ways” do not exist for the LMatiste, then entities (that are
not distinct from their “ways” of existing as the entities that exist), then
these entities are not distinct from that which does not exist for the
LMatiste, and thus them selves do not exist (i.e., precisely “material
objects” do not exist, which reduces LMatiste statements to silence if not
nonsense, because totally contradictory).

Jud:
A good attempt but flawed.

(A) As *ways* or *existential modes* do not exist, entities have nothing to
be distinct FROM.
There are no *to mae on-ic (or to mae ontic) *ways of existing* to act as
some bizarre Platonic - Eldreadean ontological grotesquerie of a
*determinate negation,* *namely, the OPPOSITE (_antithesis_ 257e) of truth, i. e.
truth’s _mae on_.

Bottom line? *Life’s way* or *One’s way of life* does not exist - only the
human wayfarer towards dying exists.
In fact neither *life* nor *death* exists either -that is why Hamlet was on
a bum ontological riff - only living/dying objects exist, for the moment a
living object is born it is already a dying object.

Regards,

Jud
Personal Website: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…

“In nuclear war all men are cremated equal.”
Dexter Gordon

Posted on Friday, October 5th, 2007 at 2:05 pm
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