Heidegger

The Experientio Part Two.

There is no need to denude our language of such useful fictions if we can
accommodate ourselves to their employment as useful linguistic tools. For me
such abstractions and reifications are vitally important linguistic elements
that enable us to talk about our world. That certain inferior forms of
transcendentalist philosophy and religious doctrine accept such linguistic
conveniences as being real is regrettable – but it is surely too much to ask that
anyone who studies and practices philosophical enquiry is automatically wise? Some
come to philosophy already attenuated and weighed down with the baggage of a
bygone inhabituation.

I am sure that Parmenides would be up in arms at the following suggestion,
but It has been posited that non-existent opposites can be instantiated by
using the ‘to mae on’ or otherness ‘of or to’ an existent as a cognitive device
which enables us to instantiate such concept and refer to it. It has been
claimed as:

‘…one of Plato’s most important discoveries.’ — how otherness enables a
non-being to ‘be’ in a certain way, namely, as the opposite (antithesis) of
something else (e. g. the ugly as the non-being of the beautiful). [8] (Eldred.
heidegger. an-archos.)

But the final denouement is yet to come…

The concept of heteron or ‘the other’ as a ‘facet of being’ which enables
the conceptual instantiation of ‘to mae on’ in order to off-set ‘that which
exists’ with ‘that which is not’ is a valuable conceptual tool’ though some
recalcitrant eliminativists might argue that technically ‘to mae on’ is NOT ‘an
other’ or ‘the other’ of ‘being’ or ‘that which is’ but, on the contrary it is
A NON OTHER of ‘Being.’ Why? Because as the explanation of the myth of pure
existence makes clear – predicationless ‘being’ cannot not exist [only
individual beings do that] and a non-existent itself it cannot HAVE ‘another..’
The notion that there exists a thing called ‘otherness’ [difference] which
allows one non– object to be ‘different’ from another non-existent is
ontological non-sense.

Thus for ‘Plato’s Greatest Discovery’ his breakthrough revelation means that
the negation of the non-existent ‘non-being’ or ‘one being’ does not lead to
‘nothing,’ (i. e. no being at all,) but to the existentialisation of the
‘other’ non-being. This prompts two inevitable questions:

1. How can the refutational negation of nothing [or ‘one non-being’]
instantiate a ‘holeron’ when ‘to mae on’ ‘ is not a holeronistic opposite of that
which does not exist anyway?

2. Surely (within the opposite of he other WHAT?’ The answer can only be …
gasp…’the ‘other other.’
To suggest that there is an opposite [a holeronic ‘no-apple’] of an apple,
which is automatically instantiated when we mention the word ‘apple,’ is
indeed a curious belief, but to go further and suggest that to negate the
existence of one apple and believe at the same time that this instantiates the
existence of an opposite ‘to mae on’ is as Alice cried, ‘Curiouser and curiouser!’

It is time to leave the instantiation of nothing and examine the grammatical
processes which allow reification to be expressed linguistically. We will
therefore turn to consider the philosophicalisation of abstraction in general
and the gerund in particular.

To Be or not To Be?
Such abstractions are the stuff of literature, philosophy and poetry as the
phrase from Hamlet demonstrates,
‘To be, or not to be,’ that is the question?

Considered from a strict ontological point of view Hamlet’s consideration
whether to commit suicide is a non-question.
In spite of Heideggerian opinion to the contrary ‘being’ does not exist. The
aspirational state of moving towards a new state which the sign of the
infinitive ‘to’ case of the verb stem ‘be’ in the infinitive ‘to be’ is a
existential bluebird which flutters away the nearer we get to it.

Compare: ‘She is going to be a dental technician.’

It never happens. She is either studying to be a dental technician She is
either waiting to be a dental technician, she is on her way to be a dental
technician or she has arrived in London AND IS a dental technician.
We are NEVER going to be anything – like every other object in the cosmos
nothing is definite until we exist in some new state – whether that modality is
desired or undesired. As Parmenides and Einstein both agreed we either are
or we are not something. If we are not one form of entity we are always
something else – we are either a butcher or a baker, a living human being or a pile
of bleaches bones or grey ash or blowing about the cosmos like the cosmic
dust that we originally were. The only exception to the existential rule is in
the case of some object that has never and will never come into existence. As
it has never been something – it can never be anything else. Plato was
signally and dramatically wrong. The ‘has been’ [something] and the ‘is’
[something] are synonymous – such entities simply exist in different existential
modes.

Hamlet decides against suicide, since he cannot be certain it will really
deliver him from his existence and his troubles. In fact for Hamlet, strictly
from an ontological point of view it is a non-question, because there is no
’state’ of ‘to on’ (being) and there is no state of ‘to mae on’ (not being)
there is only Hamlet. Sadly for Plato this ontological fact demolishes his well
intentioned attempt to prove that ‘that which is not’ exists as is a
holeronistic opposite of that which does exist.

What has all this got to do with philosophy and the reification of the
unreal? Everything. The entification of ‘nothing’ using the conceptual
instantiation of the opposite is so much a part of our daily lives - we do not even
notice it.
‘What’s that you say? ‘There’s nothing in the fridge!’ ‘OK, show me this
‘nothing.’
But there is more on this very important theme later in this chapter.

The Aggregation of Existential Properties.
The expression, ‘The cat is black’ selects one just ONE existential mode of
the cat’s existence – it’s blackness.
Moses asked God for a name in order that he might tell the Children of
Israel who sent him. God replied – ‘Tell them ‘I am’ sent you.’ The verb ‘am’ can
be thought of as having a missing, unverbalised, blanket, non-specific,
compendium of predicates to be ‘filled in’ by the believer.
In other words, for the Jew or for the Christian, such essences and
properties of God were not particularised individually by God on the mountain top to
Moses. Christians and Jews were expected to understand, that for Him to be
said to exist is to automatically include all of his modalities, of lovingness,
patience, concern, power, omniscience and holiness etc., of which the
believer is, or should be, already aware etc. Therefore God’s use of ‘am’ in the
context in which it was used in the expression: ‘I am,’ was to use the words
linguistically to existentialise God, with all of His properties [existential
modalities] grouped together or considered as a whole.

Now I grant that for the average person such a concept is difficult to
grasp, so in seeking a simpler way of explaining this existential phenomena we
could express it thus:

God to Moses: ‘I am… [insert my total existential predicates here] which
are already known to you.]
Priest to believer: ‘God is… [insert God’s total existential predicates
here] – those you do not know ask and I will tell you.]
Now all that is quite clear to me theologically, though more wise and
knowledgeable theologians might think somewhat differently, but what does this mean
ontologically?

The predicationally orphanic [unspoken] more comprehensive, multi-categorial
predicative nature of God is left open, or unsaid, to be completed by the
addressee.

Many languages have the same sort of ‘nominal sentences,’ which are called
copula depletive sentences, where a copula verb (is) is not even used. In
Russian for example it is quite normal to say: ‘Ivan soldat.’ (Ivan is a
soldier.) minus a copula. In the same way that the sentence ‘God is’ is
‘predicationally depletive.’ The present continuous conjugation of the verb ‘be’ is
omitted on the presumption that everyone knows what a soldier is or God is, and
what existential modalities may be predicated of both of them. In the case of
God’s answer to Moses, it is not the copula that undergoes depletion, it is the
predicate.

If we apply our new-found existential analysis to Descartes’ famous cogito
what do we get?
‘I think therefore I am’ becomes a redundancy. Why? Because the mere
utterance of the personal pronoun ‘I’ is sufficient to existentialise the subject.
Even without Descartes’ choice of his ’special’ existential modality ‘think’
the one word ‘I’ statement is enough to introduce a being who:

1. Speaks English.
2. Is educated to such a standard that he or she is aware of the function of
the pronoun ‘I’ which is a function-word that is used in place of a noun or
noun phrase and is a highly specialised self-referential which refers to a
human speaker or writer.

Therefore Descartes; original intention which was to begin in the manner of
a tabula rasa could have been accomplished simply be thinking of or opening
his mouth and saying the word ‘I.’ The implicature contained in the both
predicationally depleted sentences provides us with:

(a) DESCARTES: ‘I think therefore I am.’
(b) GOD: ‘I am.’

Both of which with the predicational depletion restored read:

(a) DESCARTES: ‘I use the word ‘I’ therefore I am an English speaker who is
aware of the pronoun ‘I’ as a specialised self-referential function-word that
is used in place of a noun or noun phrase when it refers to a human speaker
or writer.’ A human speaker or writer of English is almost always equipped
with arms and legs and the normal properties of a human being therefore it is
fairly safe to provisionally attribute these existential properties to me as
the utterer of the pronoun ‘I.’

(b) GOD: ‘I use the word ‘I’ because as a Being who speaks all languages, I
am an English speaker who is aware of the pronoun ‘I’ as a specialised
self-referential function-word that is used by humans in place of a noun or noun
phrase when it refers to a human speaker or writer. I have deliberately
withheld a long list of my existential modalities because I expect all of my
faithful followers to be aware of this information as a feature of their love for
me.’

The Myth of ‘Being’ and Being a Being.
So what is the existential bottom-line in all this? The fact is there IS NO
existential BE or BEING of ‘mere presence.’ It is physically impossible to
exist totally purely - bereft of any existential modality at all. It is
impossible to be present in the world and physically propertyless at the same time,
in the absence of a single characteristic, attribute, or state. The very idea
of ‘being’ is a reification – a misnomer for two very good reasons.

(a) To exist with such a lack of essence, property or modality is even
beyond that of our God. God is often accused of having no essence distinct from
his existence - as pure existence. This is not true. Even the Supreme Being
cannot escape from the existential modality of being loved, adored, worshipped
and feared or even scorned. In fact God is himself making a predicational
statement of his existential nature as that of a unity rather than of the
Christian God’s triadic nature, by the very fact of saying to Moses; ‘Tell them I am
sent you, ‘ rather than ‘Tell them we are sent you.’

(b) ‘Being’ as a state is physically and ontologically utterly impossible.
‘Beings’ would never make it as a cosmic object, which means it would have
been impossible for them to have come into existence. Only objects that are
constantly changing and ‘becoming’ slightly different versions of themselves with
each passing nanosecond could ever exist. Therefore the conceptualisation of
‘being’ is the conceptualisation of ‘to mae on’ (that which is not.)
These attributes are irredeemable in view of the relationship of God between
Him and His flock. Every entity in the cosmos needs to exist in a certain
manner AS something – God is an powerful entity who exists AS the Father of all
mankind.

Plato and the many people who have followed him, (for he initiated a trend
of misidentification) confused what he thought was a verb of ‘pure existence’
(or ‘mere presence’) with the present continuous versions of the ‘be verb’
(’is’ and ‘am.’) which it can now be claimed ALWAYS refers to that which exists
as an ongoing existential modality and NOT an ontologically impossible The
golden existential rule therefore is ‘ Never except the notion of *Pure
Presence* (existence of *Being* as being in anyway ontologically meaningful.
Such a conceptualised reification can be *thinkable* and *sayable* but can
never be existentialised in anyway whatsoever.

Regards,

Jud
Personal Website: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…

“In nuclear war all men are cremated equal.”
Dexter Gordon

Posted on Monday, October 1st, 2007 at 9:50 pm
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