Heidegger

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>>1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
>>>that I exist.

>>>2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>>>remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
>>>throughout all my perceptions.

>>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.

>>>5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.

>>>Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.

>>As before, you have reached a self-refuting conclusion. the fact that
>>you draw conclusion 5 proves ‘I am capable of drawing conclusions’.
>>this statement contains a predicate. which proves that I attribute
>>predicates to the referent of ‘I’.

>which is the antecedent in premise 1. which therefore leads to an
>endless logical paradox, unless and until you address premise 3. which
>you haven’t done yet.

there is no logical paradox; just a blatant contradiction that is
removed by rejecting one or more of your premises.

I have addressed your premise 3. I have expressed my skepticism of it.
let me summarize and extend my critique of this premise.

1: it is *your* premise; and, therefore, *you* need to support it. you
have not told us anything about your attempts (if any) to look for
evidence. what was your evidence detection criteria? did you do a
complete census of a certain domain or did you just search a
representative sample of that domain? did you calculate a confidence
interval for your conclusion; and, if so, what is it?

2: you treat the absence of evidence of Q as evidence of absence — as
proof of -Q for purposes of perpetrating a modus tollens on premise 2.

if this is allowed, anyone can prove anything using the Crifasi manuver.

A -> B
claim there is no evidence of B
(therefore [and this is the Crifasi maneuver]) -B
(therefore) -A

like this:

If JFK is dead then there is something which remains identical
throughout all my perceptions.

there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout all my
perceptions.

therefore [and this is the Crifasi maneuver], it is not the case that
there is something which remains identical throughout all my
perceptions.

therefore JFK is alive

3: as flawed as is your attempt to justify -B for purposes of
perpetrating a modus tollens on premise 2, premise 2 is itself absurd.

you have justified premise 2 by the claim it is a “necessary condition
of My existence - i.e., that I remain self-identical throughout all my
perceptions”.

>>existence is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition of
>>perceiving. a stone exists but does not perceive. for you to claim the
>>reverse, that perceiving is a necessary condition of existing, you
>>would have to show either that stones perceive or that stones do not
>>exist.

>I see that you have now accepted Heidegger’s demand to transcend all
>logic.

I see that you are trying to pass off an obvious logical fallacy as
compliance with a supposedly Heideggerian philosophy of transcending all
logic.

even the Heidegger himself was not *that* foolish.

toward the end of his career, Heidegger makes a startling admission. in
discussion Descartes, Heidegger writes: “The formula which the
proposition sometimes has, ‘Cogito ergo sum’, suggests the
misunderstanding that it is here a question of inference. … The sum is
not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground of
thinking, the fundamentum.” [1]

this is, of course, all that Descartes needs to prove ‘I experience;
therefore, I am’.

Heidegger is using ‘being’ as his root predicate (ie to carry the
meaning ‘not nothing’) while we have been using ‘exists’ or ‘existence’;
so, we must translate back and forth.

once we notice experiencing anything at all, we deduce that the logical
preconditions of experiencing have been satisfied; and, thus, we can say
either: ‘I experience; therefore, I am’ or ‘given that I experience; it
is necessarily true that I am’.

4: In your post of 2008-04-03, you acknowledged that you were trying to
disprove the assumption that one may not attribute predicates to
nothingness.

for the benefit of future googlers, the relevance of this assumption is
quite simply this: having established ‘I am’ have I established ‘I am
not nothing’? well, yes — provided that when attributing predicates to
‘I’ (eg that I experience or that I am capable of experiencing) I am
attributing predicates to something rather than to nothing.

So, Anthony, if you want to claim that I have not proven that I am not
nothing; then, you have to *either* admit assuming that *you* can
attribute predicates to nothingness, *or* present your proof that this
is possible.

how is it possible that in the total absence of any existent (of any
mode of existence whatsoever); in the total absence of any being (of any
mode of being whatsoever); in the total absence of any reality (of
any reality type whatsoever) there is nevertheless … experiencing?

can ‘the Nothing’ assert ‘I am’?

Joe

[1]: Heidegger, Martin. “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics” an
except from _What is Thinking_ contained in _Martin Heidegger: Basic
Writings_ by David F. Krell. p. 279

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Wednesday, April 16th, 2008 at 10:15 am
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