Heidegger

Kevin writes:

Jud,
Heidegger’s understanding of truth rests on a simple fact: that beings must
appear before we can say anything about them. In other words, there is
something that we may call a truth (because it is more originary and the basis of
‘propositional’ truth) that is inherently necessary for the traditional notion.
In fact, the very possibility of ‘correspondence’ is predicated on the
appearing of a being that is somehow adequately ’similar’ to my proposition
(though, of course, this adequatio is seen differently).

But the appearing of a being is a complex phenomena, one that was incredibly
important for all of Heidegger’s work: how do beings appear? Let’s take a
simple example, that of a baseball bat. Part of the ‘being’ of a baseball bat,
what makes the bat *what it is*, is determined by the context, by its being
found in a nexus of practices, rules, motivations, and other objects. For
example, the baseball bat’s being, in its appearing as a baseball bat, is
understood in tandem with the practices of pitching, hitting the ball, and running
bases; it is understood within the norms that it must be made of a certain
kind of material (and not others), that it cannot be used against other players,
that one has certain limits on where one can stand in the batter’s box; it
is understood with the motivation of hitting the ball in order to score points
and perhaps with the greater motivation of being the best team (or, more
personally, the best hitter); it is understood in a relationship to a baseball
field, to a baseball, and to certain physical boundaries. All of these are part
of our understanding of the being of the baseball; when I say, “This *is* a
baseball bat,” I do not mean some meaningless mass of atoms, but an object
that is understood within a certain context that makes it a baseball bat.

Jud:
Hi Kevin, What you have written is an excellent and well polished
description of how an westernised, observing human being exists whilst observing a
baseball bat and absolutely zilch concerning the *being* of a baseball bat. An
Amazonian native who had never encountered a *baseball-bat* before would no
doubt characterise the *Being* of the object as some sort of weapon, whilst an
employee of a New Caledonian brothel on Port Arthur’s waterfront would perhaps
regard it in awe as some monstrous imported American dill-doll brought
ashore by some randy US seaman and initiate an instant modification of their
former assessment of American manhood and womanhood.

In other words human perceptions of existential modalities are very much in
the eye of the beholder [remember the Hottentot woman’s bum?] It is NOT just
the abstractions of *Beauty, dependability, honour* and to quote a famous one
Socrates’ *piety* which is very much in the eye [or the mind-eye] of the
beholder it is the same with any other human attribution or label that mankind
slaps upon his fellows and the objects both living and insentient with which
he shares his world. In other words it is only a base-ball bat or a weapon or
a dill-doll for the human who happens to be regarding it and NOT for the
object it self.

It is not surprising that you have not been able to say anything about the
bat for if you have been reading my dialogue with Dr. Eldred you will see that
we both agreed that *Being* does not exist whether that *Being* is the
*Being* of a bat, or a batty philosopher like Heidegger. how do beings appear?
What makes the bat anthropocentrically *what it is*, is the human being that
selected the wood, set it upon the lathe and shaped, polished and sold it. -
the igneous material simple exists in the existential modality in which it
exists independent of any human-centred attributions of what it is TO THE HUMAN

Kevin:
To better understand this, consider our understanding of the baseball bat
within another nexus of significations: that of a museum, like the Baseball Hall
of Fame.

Jud:
You appear to have an unconscious and instinctive understanding of my
approach, even though you do not actually manifest such awareness, for above you
make the point that it is OUR UNDERSTANDING of the object and therefore the way
THAT WE exist that instantiates OUR OWN internalisation of such attributions
to the object AND NOT the way in which the object actually exists - for
noumenally the object simply lies there under our identificational, descriptional
observation – featureless, and insignificant, is-nesslessly and
non-essentially existing in it’s noumenal in-itselfness..

Kevin:
Here the baseball bat appears as something different.

Jud:
No, Kevin. Inanimate objects NEVER appear - we perceive them. It is WE who
exist in a corpo sensitivo relational spatio-temporal contiguity with them
when we sense them. I am not the first by any means to understand this
human-based modal-switch - Lockean-type secondary qualities did not exist for
Galileo either, who writes:

‘I think, therefore, that these tastes, odours, colours, etc., so far as
their objective existence is concerned, are nothing but mere names for something
which resides exclusively in our sensitive body (corpo sensitivo), so that if
the perceiving creatures were removed, all of these qualities would be
annihilated and abolished from existence. [Galileo, pp. 720] see my article

_*http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/eva
ns_descartes-and_locke.htm_
(*http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/evans_descartes-and_locke.htm)

And…

Two Kinds Of Properties by Galileo Galilei from Il Saggitore (The Assayer)
1623 at:

_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/galileo.htm_
 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

Kevin:
While it still appears within the nexus of the game of baseball, it is no
longer seen as something that I can take up and use, as the norms and
motivations of the museum context would decry such a move (I can see the headline now:
“Disgruntled Reductionistic Philosopher Desecrates Babe Ruth’s Bat, Claims
it is ‘Really’ Just a Mass of Atoms”).

Jud:
You are cute when you are being humourous Kevin - I love it - MORE please!

Kevin:
There is something significant in this shift: the baseball bat is no longer
seen as one possible object that I can use to hit a ball in order to hit a
home run.

Jud:
I am glad that you recognise it Kevin for you neatly demonstrate that these
*essences* and *attributions* or Gallilean corpo sensitivo attributions are
made very much on the anthropocentric hoof and can change completely
depending upon the human-centric circumstances. Thus the bat is used in the jungle as
an instrument to bash a monkey’s brains out and in the Port Arthur brothel
for other more pleasurable purposes. These human-centred attributes to the
object are individually and societally attributed, and it is highly unlikely
that you will come across such an object in Wallmart labelled *Monkey’s
Head-Basher $30 or *Jumbo Dill-Doll $50-ass.

Kevin:
Rather, the baseball bat now appears in its singularity–it is *the* bat
that Babe Ruth used to hit his last home run; it has a particular grain with
nicks and imperfections here, here, and here.

Jud:
Correction/reminder - Rather, the baseball bat now appears - to the
anthropo-centric human attributant - in its singularity–it is *the* bat that Babe
Ruth used to hit his last home run; it has a particular grain with nicks and
imperfections here, here, and here. The *bat* doesn’t know about *Babe Ruth*
or is oblivious to its *imperfections* which are only perceived as
imperfections to the perfectionist human observer.

Kevin: When I’m in the batter’s box the bat does not appear as this singular
object: I could just as easily have used another one with roughly similar
heftiness and utility (I don’t really care how much it *really* weighs
according to physics, as long as I can ‘heft’ it well); it is “just a bat.” But now
it appears as a singular object, one that cannot be replaced with some mere
mass-produced replica that has the same significance; such a replacement would
change its significance.

Jud:
This is NOT because the bat exists that way, but because the human valuer of
the bat exists in the existential modality of valuation with regard to the
object. The bat remains the same whether it is tossed unwanted into a cupboard
or arranged on display in the grasping hands of a waxwork model of Babe Ruth.

Kevin:
The point here is that the baseball bat cannot appear as both: the museum
context does not allow for it appear as an object that I can ‘really’ pick up
and use (or else it would no longer *be* a museum piece) nor does the baseball
game context allow for it to appear as a singular object (as it is merely
seen as something ‘in order to’ do something else; its singularity is not my
concern, even if it is my ‘lucky bat,’ which would require another
phenomenological analysis). Furthermore, there are practically an infinite number of
other contexts where the bat’s being would be understood differently, both by
human and non-human beings. It is because of the multiplicity of ways that the
baseball bat’s being can be constituted that it is at bottom an enigmatic
object: it need not appear in any particular way, but could always appear in a
way that can surprise me or rupture my preconceptions of ‘what it is.’

Jud:
You are unconsciously arguing my anti-transcendentalist object [rather than
subjective] case for me and making a good job of it too. You are emphasising
that the assessment or appreciation is to be found in the way the human exists
and not the bat. The human observer may change, the circumstances of
ascription may change but the bat remains the same - it is NOT EVEN A BAT - it is a
nameless, propertyless lump of * that which exists.*

Kevin:
This, of course, is the basis of Heidegger’s understanding of being as the
‘nothing’–it is that which escapes all attempts to make a being present, as
for any given ‘presencing’ (forgive the ‘obscure’ Heideggerian term) there are
still an indeterminate number of ways that it can still be presenced. As for
(forgive the ‘obscure’ Heideggerian term *presencing* and the claim that
there are still an indeterminate number of ways that it can still be presenced.

Jud:
Cosmically speaking it is PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for any object in the
universe not to be present SOMEWHERE. It is ontologically impossible for any object
NOT TO EXIST for if an object ceased to exist as the object it was it would
merely exist as another object - any physicist will tell you that.

As for Heidegger’s crude misunderstanding of the existential modalities of
entities it characteristically hinges on his clumsy use of the abstract noun
[gerund] *presencing.* Linguistically is one unbolts the word *presencing* what
does one find? There are two ways of examining this ontological
jiggery-pokery.

(A) To present oneself to someone or something is to intentionally make
somebody aware that you are in their company often by drawing their attention to
the fact that your share the same space, meeting your respect parents in law -
keeping an appointment for a court hearing, or walk on stage and present
oneself to an audience. In these days of the internet it is not actually
necessary to present oneself physically in the flesh and one could present oneself
as part of a video conferencing hook-up too. If concealed in some bushes one
could suddenly rush out and present oneself as a police detective who had been
monitoring someone’s behaviour surreptitiously etc.

In this way - this sort of presencing is usually an INTENSIONAL act.

(B) The moon, suddenly appearing from behind a cloud IS NOT PRESENCING
itself for it is an inanimate object bereft of the human intentional ability to
make themselves available to the detection of the sensorial equipment of
those that it wishes to present itself to - i. e., the eyes, ears, nose and touch
of the prospective parents in law or the judge and jury of the court etc.

(C) Sometimes a human or an animal however may wish to present itself [be
seen] for many reasons - just as it may intend not to be seen and conceal
itself.

(D) Every object in the universe exists as a noumenal object - YOU are a
noumenal object - I am a noumenal object - ALL HUMANS are noumenal objects, for
your intellectual conception of me is as a thing in itself, not as it is known
through perception, for the sensorial tools and instruments that you have at
your disposal in order to gain a knowledge of what I am and in what
existential modes I exist is limited and handicapped by the almost complete absence
of opportunities to operate the faculty of sentience through which the
external world is apprehended. What little you know about me you have gained through
this list - I COULD BE Michael Pennamacoor for all you know, though I would
have hardly gone to the trouble of fabricating a complete like story,
inventing a biography, wives, children, forged marriage certificates, birth
certificates death certificates ownership deeds of art firms, aircraft, ships,
yachts, hotels, houses - forged curricula vitae, senior citizen bus passes and all
National Health Service numbers had I been Michael Pennamacoor, who lives in
the south of my country nearly 400-miles away just so I could pretend to be
him?

I have CHALLENGED the so-called *Tympan* to display a copy of his passport
or birth certificate on my website [I could tell him how to do it] and I will
display mine - though why he doesn’t simply visit my website on which he will
find everything out about me that he wishes [for I do not hide behind
fictions - my catweasle days are well over] BUT HOWEVER MUCH I got to know you or
you me we would NEVER EVER discover all of the existential modalities that form
the everchanging nexus of our neurological and corporeal reality. Most is
hidden. It is for this reason that one can never merge completely with the one
you love, for like an iceberg the main mass of an objects ontological
existential reality is noumenally inaccessible and closed off completely not only to
the would be modalic explorer but to THE HUMAN ENTITY ITSELF. In other words
one is a noumenal object ONESELF in relation to that part of the
neurological network which [imperfectly] coordinates the data which nature deems to be
important correlatively to humans in order to monitor the entity in relation to
its surrounding environment.

However none of this phenomena in relation to the way others sensorially
perceive us has ANYTHING TO DO WITH *BEING.* It is the beings called Jud and
Kevin that exist - NOT the* fact* or the *perception* or the *existence* of
those creatures which exists. as perceived, felt or sensed by either Jud or Kevin
or anybody else involved.

Kevin:
This is also important for Heidegger’s understanding that being is not a
being; any being is understood within a context, but being itself transcends
all possible contexts and is hidden behind every context. I cannot give a final
pronouncement on “this is what the bat ‘really’ is in its full transparency”
because I do not know all the ways that the bat can appear, ways that are
perhaps inaccessible to me at this time (or at all times).

Jud:
The fact that you lack [we lack] the sensorial equipment to understand the
precise manners in which the bat exists does not mean that those inaccessible
aspects of the bat are noumenally or ontologically any different from those
aspects which ARE accessible, and that the hidden ones are caused by your
inability to perceive them to migrate to another transcendental level of
*ontological difference,* for no such thing exists for you are being neurologically
FOOLED by the feed-back loop, not realising that it is YOU that is existing in
modalities of conceptualising *ontological differences* where non exist.

The *ontological difference* is no more than a neuro-modality of your own
network and is not something which inheres in the poor old bat which is no more
than wood fibres and varnish.

Kevin:
There are other important matters having to do with Heidegger’s notion of
‘attunement’: that when I am in certain states of mind/moods, when my body has a
certain tension in its limbs, when I am concerned in a particular way within
the world (e. g., fear) then objects appear in different ways. A better way
to put it, and one that is more in line with Heidegger’s thought and the
extensive psychological work done in inattentional blindness, is that the way I
set myself within my world (my poise) makes certain aspects of the objects
within that world salient and ‘covers over’ other aspects. In a real sense, I
see what I set myself to see, or perhaps what I want to see (put in more ontic
terms). In Heidegger’s terms, I see what I attune myself to see, I make
present what is in line with my attunements. Thus, when playing baseball I do not
have the same poise as when I’m interacting with the baseball bat in the
museum, which then influences how the bat appears.

Jud:
This is no more than a physiological necessity. The brain can only deal with
a limited amount of incoming data at one time. Familiarity can help.
Competent car drivers can handle the car one handed and glance at a map at the same
time etc. We suppress many of our incoming information streams in order to
concentrate on that which is at hand and which is considered more important.
Whilst I have been typing this to you - all thought of the Lebanon peace process
has been shuttered off from what I am concentrating on -which is the text
that I percieve on the screen as I type.

Kevin:
“But,” you will no doubt say, “the bat really is just a mass of atoms and
you are merely projecting a subjective meaning onto it.” But let’s examine that
claim: the very concept of “atoms” that you employ itself depends on a
particular context, namely that of physics. The appearing of atoms (in line with
your understanding of them) depends on various practices, rules, motivations,
and other objects: practices related to ’scientific methods’
(which differ depending on what kind of being they are examining); rules
that dictate ‘what one is looking for’ prior to any given experiment (one of
Heidegger’s seminal breakthroughs in “The Thing”); motivations to understand the
world of subatomic particles; and objects like electron microscopes,
particle accelerators, and other kinds of atoms (depending on what kind of atom we
are currently examining). Each of these are important for how the atom
appears, and how it does not appear: who is to say that our current method is
exhaustive or that another method may not reveal some hitherto unknown aspect of
the atom (the history of science is rife with such examples)? Who is to say
that the rules/norms that determine that we are looking for mass, spin, and
velocity really nail what is essential to the atom, whereas some other norm would
reveal it in an entirely new light
(again, the history of science is rife with such examples)?

Jud:
The history of science is full of such occurrences of improvements in modes
of operandi an methodologies - but that is the nature of science and the
inquisitorial nature of humanity. Old paradigms prove adequate only until the
next more improved version comes along. But that aside humans have landed
spacecraft on most of the planets of the solar system, unravelled the very dna code
or existential prescription which determines the sort of entity a human will
be etc. Heidegger? Breakthrough? Give ME a break! The only break that he
made was to break the human code of common humanity, but as I promised not to
talk about that - I will keep my word and not go into any detail.

Kevin:
Lastly (yes, I know I passed up motivation, but that is secondary to my
point), who’s to say that our current technology or our understanding of the
multiple types of atoms is itself correct or exhaustive (especially when physics
itself is in a period of crisis on such matters:

Posted on Thursday, August 31st, 2006 at 7:10 pm
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