Heidegger

Jud,

I don’t think you responded to this, so I thought I’d resend it.

Kevin Winters

_____

From: heidegger-bounces at soca.ecu.edu.au
[mailto:heidegger-bounces@soca.ecu.edu.au] On Behalf Of Kevin Winters
Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 9:31 PM
To: ‘Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger’
Subject: RE: Heideggerian Truth

Jud,

An interesting response, though not very surprising as I anticipated many of
your responses in my post. Let me demonstrate:

“Hi Kevin, What you have written is an excellent and well polished
description of how an westernised, observing human being exists whilst
observing a baseball bat and absolutely zilch concerning the *being* of a
baseball bat. An Amazonian native who had never encountered a *baseball-bat*
before would no doubt characterise the *Being* of the object as some sort of
weapon, whilst an employee of a New Caledonian brothel on Port Arthur’s
waterfront would perhaps regard it in awe as some monstrous imported
American dill-doll brought ashore by some randy US seaman and initiate an
instant modification of their former assessment of American manhood and
womanhood.””

[Kevin Winters]

But a “baseball bat” *is* a Western phenomena? When I say, “This *is* a
baseball bat,” it includes all the (Western) considerations (and more) that
I mentioned; they are positive constituents of the being of the baseball bat
such that it would not *be* a baseball bat without that relevant context.
Now, in the case of the “Amazonian native,” what they are seeing *is* not a
baseball bat, as the world of baseball would be foreign to them. Hence, they
would see something else: as you say, perhaps as a weapon or an erotic
object. But I already included this fact in my statements (i.e. I have
already answered this objection): the object that is the baseball bat can
appear in different ways *as* a baseball bat, namely as an instrument to be
used in the game or as a museum piece, each including the important context
of baseball that determines its being *as* a baseball bat. Furthermore, it
can appear *as* different things: a weapon, an erotic object, a door stop,
etc., none of which require the context of baseball in their being what they
are. The important fact is that we use the copula in every single case–it
*is* this or that–and this is meaningful for us, it is not “nothing” in the
sense of the empty set/nihil. I don’t believe that your reply adequately
accounts for this positive fact.

“In other words human perceptions of existential modalities are very much in
the eye of the beholder [remember the Hottentot woman’s bum?] It is NOT just
the abstractions of *Beauty, dependability, honour* and to quote a famous
one Socrates’ *piety* which is very much in the eye [or the mind-eye] of the
beholder it is the same with any other human attribution or label that
mankind slaps upon his fellows and the objects both living and insentient
with which he shares his world. In other words it is only a base-ball bat or
a weapon or a dill-doll for the human who happens to be regarding it and NOT
for the object it self.”

[Kevin Winters]

Ah, and here we come to the smoking gun, or better put the smoking
assumption: that there, apparently, *is* only one thing, and that is the
“object itself,” everything else being a “subjective projection” of man on
the meaningless object. But does this stand up to scrutiny? The “object
itself” is a necessary component of our understanding of it. For example, in
what I wrote I mentioned that the bat had to be constituted in a particular
way: it would need to be a certain kind of wood, it could not have a cork
core (according to the norms of baseball), it could not be made of jello
(which would simply be ineffective), etc. Are you saying that this fact,
which is utilized and in fact necessary for the being of the bat, is also
simply a human concoction with no reference to the bat “in itself”? While I
do not reject the fact that the “eye of the beholder” is also necessary, we
cannot reduce the being of the baseball bat *solely* to that eye; the being
of the bat, including its excess (the baseball player is not under the
illusion that his intention includes every possible aspect of the bat, even
within that context; thus, his intention necessarily includes that which he
has not uncovered), includes that which you mention and, in fact, is a
necessary aspect of being able to play baseball at all.

“It is not surprising that you have not been able to say anything about the
bat for if you have been reading my dialogue with Dr. Eldred you will see
that we both agreed that *Being* does not exist whether that *Being* is the
*Being* of a bat, or a batty philosopher like Heidegger. how do beings
appear? What makes the bat anthropocentrically *what it is*, is the human
being that selected the wood, set it upon the lathe and shaped, polished and
sold it. - the igneous material simple exists in the existential modality in
which it exists independent of any human-centred attributions of what it is
TO THE HUMAN”

[Kevin Winters]

The issue, though, is whether adding the human component necessarily covers
over the “being itself” (or replaces it?), in this case the bat. I have made
the case above that it does not: that the bat in itself is a necessary
component not only of my human intention but also of its being *as* a
baseball bat. To say otherwise is rather solipsistic (and our ‘discussion’
is really a sham): that our understanding of the baseball bat *as* a
baseball bat is entirely subjective, internal (for the typical inner-outer
distinction), anthropomorphic. Let me ask you this, in the hopes of
solidifying this fact: when I take the bat and I hit it against the ground,
is my feeling of the bat’s solidity completely subjective or does it reveal
something about the constitution of the bat itself?

“You appear to have an unconscious and instinctive understanding of my
approach, even though you do not actually manifest such awareness, for above
you make the point that it is OUR UNDERSTANDING of the object and therefore
the way THAT WE exist that instantiates OUR OWN internalisation of such
attributions to the object AND NOT the way in which the object actually
exists - for noumenally the object simply lies there under our
identificational, descriptional observation – featureless, and
insignificant, is-nesslessly and non-essentially existing in it’s noumenal
in-itselfness..”

[Kevin Winters]

No, I have a direct grasp of your understanding because it is probably the
most common (supposed) counter-argument to this view, and the one that stems
most easily from your reductionistic assumptions. The issue I am raising is
whether “our understanding” is necessarily “subjective” or “solipsistic.” I
am arguing that it is not; indeed, that it cannot be without becoming
incoherent or meaningless. Let me look at this from the museum context: are
you saying that when I see the bat in its particularity (i.e. as Babe Ruth’s
bat, as having this kind of grain, etc.) that I see *absolutely nothing* of
the bat in itself? If not, then what do I see?

“No, Kevin. Inanimate objects NEVER appear - we perceive them.”

[Kevin Winters]

Could you please clarify the distinction? Until you do I do not know how to
respond. As for “secondary qualities,” please refer to what I’ve already
said above, including my questions to that effect.

“You are cute when you are being humourous Kevin - I love it - MORE please!”

[Kevin Winters]

I’m trying to consciously include some Nietzschean humor in my philosophical
writings.

Next you mention again the “human-centric” aspect of the bat’s appearing as
a weapon or a dildo. I’ve already addressed those above, so I won’t repeat
myself.

“Correction/reminder - Rather, the baseball bat now appears - to the
anthropo-centric human attributant - in its singularity–it is *the* bat
that Babe Ruth used to hit his last home run; it has a particular grain with
nicks and imperfections here, here, and here. The *bat* doesn’t know about
*Babe Ruth* or is oblivious to its *imperfections* which are only perceived
as imperfections to the perfectionist human observer.”

[Kevin Winters]

It doesn’t matter whether the bat is ‘aware’ of any of these things. Unless
you are going to completely abolish history, the bat’s association with Babe
Ruth is correct. As for the issue of “imperfections,” yes, such can only
appear with a human being who has values of form for the bat; but, again,
are you saying that I really see *nothing* of the bat itself when it appears
in its imperfections? That seems rather fantastical.

“This is NOT because the bat exists that way, but because the human valuer
of the bat exists in the existential modality of valuation with regard to
the object. The bat remains the same whether it is tossed unwanted into a
cupboard or arranged on display in the grasping hands of a waxwork model of
Babe Ruth.”

[Kevin Winters]

Yes, I already addressed this in referring to the bat’s excess: that bat is
genuinely “the same” in those situations (though even there we delved into
the supposedly “subjective” aspects that you seem to champion). The
question, though, is whether in its appearing we are actually seeing the bat
itself, even if not in *all* its modalities of appearing. Again, if you say
no then we must conclude that *I do not see the bat at all*, but instead
some solipsistic internal representation or something, which doesn’t seem
true to the phenomena.

“You are unconsciously arguing my anti-transcendentalist object [rather than
subjective] case for me and making a good job of it too. You are emphasising
that the assessment or appreciation is to be found in the way the human
exists and not the bat. The human observer may change, the circumstances of
ascription may change but the bat remains the same - it is NOT EVEN A BAT -
it is a nameless, propertyless lump of * that which exists.*”

[Kevin Winters]

No, I am not doing such, but simply emphasizing a fact that you have not yet
addressed in all your response: that the assessment or appreciation is to be
found in the human uncovering of the bat, not simply in the human itself. As
for the “nameless, propertyless lump,” that sounds dangerously close to
Heidegger’s understanding of the excess of all beings, that it necessarily
exceeds every uncovering of them and, hence, we cannot describe it except
for largely negative terms—the ‘nothing’—or in positive terms—the ‘excess.’
The major disagreement, it seems, is whether our “assessment or
appreciation” actually reveals an (albeit limited) aspect of the bat. Again,
to argue otherwise seems to teeter on solipsism.

“As for Heidegger’s crude misunderstanding of the existential modalities of
entities it characteristically hinges on his clumsy use of the abstract noun
[gerund] *presencing.* Linguistically is one unbolts the word *presencing*
what does one find? There are two ways of examining this ontological
jiggery-pokery.

[…]

“(B) The moon, suddenly appearing from behind a cloud IS NOT PRESENCING
itself for it is an inanimate object bereft of the human intentional ability
to make themselves available to the detection of the sensorial equipment of
those that it wishes to present itself to - i. e., the eyes, ears, nose and
touch of the prospective parents in law or the judge and jury of the court
etc.

“(C) Sometimes a human or an animal however may wish to present itself [be
seen] for many reasons - just as it may intend not to be seen and conceal
itself.”

[Kevin Winters]

I thought you said “two ways”? But let me go ahead and stop right here, as
everything else doesn’t add anything to your objection. The question of
presencing has direct relevance to the phenomena of inattentional blindness,
namely that attention (or intention, as the case may be) acts as a ‘filter’
of sorts in relation to what appears. In my example, the difference between
the intentions of “using” the bat and “seeing” the bat has positive effects
on how it appears (or doesn’t appear, as the case may be), how I presence
it. To put it one more way, the horizon in which it appears determines what
aspects of the object become salient in my perception. *The* question is
whether, in all these filterings and presencings, the object appears, even
in a limited way (i.e. as it relates to humans). Again, to think otherwise
falls into solipsism.

“I have CHALLENGED the so-called *Tympan* to display a copy of his passport
or birth certificate on my website [I could tell him how to do it] and I
will display mine”

[Kevin Winters]

Keep your petty wards with Tympan out of this; he is not relevant to the
discussion.

“BUT HOWEVER MUCH I got to know you or you me we would NEVER EVER discover
all of the existential modalities that form the everchanging nexus of our
neurological and corporeal reality. Most is hidden. It is for this reason
that one can never merge completely with the one you love, for like an
iceberg the main mass of an objects ontological existential reality is
noumenally inaccessible and closed off completely not only to the would be
modalic explorer but to THE HUMAN ENTITY ITSELF. In other words one is a
noumenal object ONESELF in relation to that part of the neurological network
which [imperfectly] coordinates the data which nature deems to be important
correlatively to humans in order to monitor the entity in relation to its
surrounding environment.”

[Kevin Winters]

True, and (yet again) I’ve included this in my response: there is *always*
an excess of “existential modalities” (to use your term) that is not
uncovered. The question (yet again) is whether this means that we do not
capture some part of the being, even if only in one ‘modality.’ As for your
neurological reductionism, I see little reason to accept it or the unproven
assumption that drives it.

“However none of this phenomena in relation to the way others sensorially
perceive us has ANYTHING TO DO WITH *BEING.* It is the beings called Jud and
Kevin that exist - NOT the* fact* or the *perception* or the *existence* of
those creatures which exists. as perceived, felt or sensed by either Jud or
Kevin or anybody else involved.”

[Kevin Winters]

So, you readily admit to the charges of being solipsistic?

“The fact that you lack [we lack] the sensorial equipment to understand the
precise manners in which the bat exists does not mean that those
inaccessible aspects of the bat are noumenally or ontologically any
different from those aspects which ARE accessible, and that the hidden ones
are caused by your inability to perceive them to migrate to another
transcendental level of *ontological difference,* for no such thing exists
for you are being neurologically FOOLED by the feed-back loop, not realising
that it is YOU that is existing in modalities of conceptualising
*ontological differences* where non exist.”

[Kevin Winters]

That’s a nice claim, but I’m afraid I will need an argument, and one that is
true to the phenomena itself.

“This is no more than a physiological necessity. The brain can only deal
with a limited amount of incoming data at one time. Familiarity can help.
Competent car drivers can handle the car one handed and glance at a map at
the same time etc. We suppress many of our incoming information streams in
order to concentrate on that which is at hand and which is considered more
important. Whilst I have been typing this to you - all thought of the
Lebanon peace process has been shuttered off from what I am concentrating on
-which is the text that I percieve on the screen as I type.”

[Kevin Winters]

True, but I don’t see how this refutes that I’ve provided as it can easily
be interpreted in line with Heidegger’s claim.

“But that aside humans have […] unravelled the very dna code or
existential prescription which determines the sort of entity a human will
be”

[Kevin Winters]

Forgive me, but I have failed to see such a claim proven in the scientific
literature. Rather, it is an assumption, one that many respectable
scientists have rejected. Your reductivistic assumption is not an argument.

“What is MUCH MORE important is educating people regarding the fantasies of
the *ontological argument* and disabusing folk of the nonsense that this God
or that God exists who wants us to kill those who believe differently”

[Kevin Winters]

But you have not educated me at all. Rather, you have thrown the
reductivistic assumption in my lap and then proclaimed victory. Scientific
reductionism is a methodological assumption, not a proven fact. Or, to put
it in Heidegger’s terms, it is a specific attunement that may cover over
more than it uncovers.

Kevin Winters

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Posted on Thursday, September 28th, 2006 at 1:10 pm
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