Heidegger

That Pete wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>okay, so ‘I am’ remains true for both Descartes and Heidegger; but,
>>you are saying that, when dasein say ‘I am’, it means something
>>different than when Descartes says it.

>Once B&T gets underway, it makes this distinction. Descartes’s “I” is
>some imaginary imp in the pineal gland, looking out at a world out
>there and wondering if it is real. Dasein cannot be separated from the
>world it is in. It is really always already in imaginary, symbolic and
>real realities.

you are missing the point: Descartes is just another dasein, is he not?
you are. I am. Heidegger would even admit, however grudgingly, that Jud
is a dasein, would he not?

so, the phenomenological destruction of the ‘cogito sum’ that Heidegger
promised and which you say Heidegger delivered is really targeted
against certain daseins.

how could it be otherwise, if we’re all daseins?

which daseins are being targeted by Heidegger? well, ironically enough,
you seem to be suggesting that Heidegger would disapprove of any dasein
who spouted Heidegger’s own philosophy in the first person.

how does Heidegger’s phenomenological destruction of the ‘cogito sum’
spare the dasein who agrees with the Heidegger who wrote:

“Thinking *is* always an ‘*I* think’, *ego cogito*. therein lies: I am,
*sum*. *Cogito, sum* — this is the highest certainty … In ‘I posit’
the ‘I’ as the positer is co- and pre-posited as that which is already
present, as the being. The Being of beings is determined out of the ‘I
am’ as the certainty of the positing.”

[Heidegger, Martin. “Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics” an
except from _What is Thinking_ contained in _Martin Heidegger: Basic
Writings_ by David F. Krell. 278-9 (emphasis in original)]

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Saturday, February 16th, 2008 at 2:20 am
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