Is it merely Trivially True?
November 25th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Is it merely Trivially True? :: Is it merely Trivially True? :: Is it merely Trivially True? :: Is it merely Trivially True?
>>Michael Eldred wrote:
>> >ME: If one has already accepted predicate logic as given, then Axiom 0
>> >is trivially true. But I do not accept predicate logic as given, nor
>> >the concept of truth/falsity that pertains to predicate logic. For the
>> >sake of argument, I have shown that even allowing Axiom 0 to stand
>> >still leads to being. But more philosophically, I have already
>> >indicated why Axiom 0 cannot be accepted as a self-evident axiom: one
>> >has to go back to the originary phenomena. There it can be seen that
>> >the subject/predicate structure breaks down and that the question,
>> >”what?”, let alone the question, “what am I?”, again becomes malleable,
>> >full of mystery.
Joe repeats:
>>the question ‘what am I?’ never ceased to be full of mystery. why?
>>because I know that I am; but, not what I am.
Allen clarifies:
> An oversimplification:
>
> How can you know “that” you are without presuming a “what” standing
> behind or inside the “that”? And, it seems to me, that the
> presumption of substance inevitably undermines the mystery, which
> then remains only a pose. The only means of actually preserving the
> mystery in its most entertaining form( so we can be sure it’s the
> real thing) is simply to keep to the question: Why is there
> something rather than nothing? Almost every time I remind my
> introductory class of that question, we are able to immediately, for
> the moment, once again, discover philosophy. And then we can go on.
Exactly, Allen. Being a that(ness), that something is, [is] a kind of what
(what something is) that distinguishes, differences its self not so much
from another what(ness) but from nothing, non-being, and as such [is] be-ing
its self and nothing else. That I (or anything else) am [is] an irruption of
be-ing within nothingness; the logos discloses this in (for example, and in
this very example) predicational speech (I am, the tree is, Joe is, etc); it
uncovers the irruption of somethingness in the face of nothingness: nothing
less. The question then arises as to how predicational speech (as an example
of the logos) can perform this ‘magic’, how (merely?) human (what other kind
is there?) speech can be so explosively disclosive. I am insofar as I speak
(think) — a crude rendering of Cartesian metaphysics; and what do I say in
my be-ing (as a speaking (thinking) thing): simply, that I speak. Where is
the knowing being that knows that I speak (and says that I speak)? Is such a
knowing being behind or underlying or overlooking the speech that says that
I speak (that I am qua speaking thatnesses, that I am rather than nothing
{silence})? Is it a matter of ‘knowledge’ at all (that I am insofar as I
speak)? Disclosure (logos) discloses: is that enough for thinking to begin
thinking? Thinking what? Logos its self? Is it what we speak of (about),
what we sub-ject, or from whence such speech irrupts the silence (to what we
are sub-ject) that matters in philosophical speech? What we disclose or that
we disclose; or are they (the what and the that) bound together in an other
unity that is hidden or sheltered or encrypted by the very thatness of
speech?
and another very good morning to you all
michaelP
