Heidegger

Self-Indentity Over Time — Is It Undeniable?

The Crifasi Argument:

>1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
>that I exist.

>2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>remains identical throughout all my perceptions.

>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
>all my perceptions.

>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.

>5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.

>Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.

you claim that you have a ‘FURTHER’ argument for the proposition ‘I
remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’. according to you
this proposition (your original premise 1) is true because “Denying that
would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
born, I am now X, I will die).”

you claim that I have not replied to this argument; but, I have. in
fact, I’ve given you two counter-arguments that you have yet to deal
with.

the first counter-argument challenges the assumption that the
proposition in question is undeniable. I will summarize that argument
below.

the second counter-argument challenges the assumption that your first
person statements support your conclusion irregardless of the reality
type of the referent of ‘I’. I summarize that argument in the thread
titled ‘Self-Indentity Over Time — True for All Reality Types?’.

[JP, 2008-03-23]:

“you have correctly identified the major consequence of denying [I
remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions]. the referent of a
first person pronoun used at time t1 is not necessarily identical to the
referent of the same first person pronoun used at time t2. however, you
have failed to explain why this is a problem.”

[JP, (new material)]:

you still haven’t responded to that objection.

since you seem to misunderstand that the burden of proving your claims
is on you, I hasten to point out that I’m not claiming to know for a
fact that the referent of ‘I’ does not remain self-identical over time.
I’m only challenging your claim that the proposition in question (’I
remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’) can not logically
be denied because doing so would have consequence that the referent of
‘I’ does not remain self-identical over time.

I gave you my reason for doubting that the proposition in question is
self-evidently true: the counseling profession is devoted to breaking
this assumed self-identity over time. often, a counselee is helped to
understand that “I am not the person I once was” or “I can change”.

given that people grow and develop physically, emotionally and mentally,
how do you know that the referent of ‘I’ remains self-identical over
time? why would there be a problem if it did not?

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

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Posted on Monday, April 21st, 2008 at 9:50 am
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