Heidegger

Conceptual Existence

20/01/2009 jPolanik at nc.rr.com writes:

Jud: (originally) Puleeeese don’t waste my time and the list’s with
prevaricative flim-flam - you KNOW I mean that the mention of the word
*cat* triggers a CONCEPTUAL instantiation of the nominatum of the term
*cat.* I have written about the automatic conceptual instantiation of
the sentential subject in those terms for the last 10 years. That is the
reason why *is* is reduced to pointing to existentially modalic states
of subjects rather than the fact that they are extant.

Joe: what I know is: 1. that you’ve said that uttering the word
instantiates the existence of the object.

Jud: I have said many times that uttering the word instantiates the
conceptual existence of the object

Joe: 2. you define ‘existent’ so that only a matergic object can be an
existent.

Jud: Yes.

Joe: 3. you’ve specifically said that nothing exists in any other sense
of existence (because there is no other sense).

Jud: I have said many time that *existence* does not exist and that only
concrete objects (matergy*) exists

Joe: 4. there is a gaping contradiction somewhere in the first there
items above.

[Joe (new)]:

now that you’ve indicated that “uttering the word instantiates the
conceptual existence of the object” we can see that there is a
contradiction between

1. your claim that there is conceptual existence and physical existence
(and that they are not the same)

2. your claim that only concrete objects exists.

you have to be using exists and cognate terms in at least two senses
(contrary to your oft-repeated denials) in order to claim that uttering
a word instantiates the conceptual existence but not the physical
existence of the object.

Joe

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
 http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

Posted on Sunday, January 25th, 2009 at 7:02 am
comment | rss 2.0 | trackback