Heidegger

Kant on Predicates

Hi Joe,
A few comments.
Kant considered the role of the predicate in a statement of predication; and,
found it necessary to classify predicates according to the dichotomy
determining / non-determining. as will be seen, this viewpoint can be applied too
simplistically.
Jud:
It is refreshing that he did not start by talking about ontological no-goers
like *the is of predication* and the *is* of this and that…but we had to
wait a bit after Kant I suppose to have to deal with copula-based
predicational catergorisation.
§1: Kant’s Taxonomy of Predicates
for Kant the class of logical predicates is co-extensive with the class of
all predicates. he says:
Everthing [sp]can become a logical predicate, even the subject itself may be
predicated of itself. _1_
 http://what-am-i.net/kant_on_predicates….)
Jud:
Yes. I find it strange that tautology has such a bad press nowadays. The
accusation of *tautologism* is a term of abuse, when one would think that in
fact such a statement being necessarily true when so many statements are not
would mean it would be welcomed.
thus, any word/phrase that is a predicate is a ‘logical’ predicate.
the class of logical (ie ‘all’) predicates is subdivided into two
subclasses:
1: those which are not contained in the subject and which, when predicated of
the subject, enlarge the subject. these are determining predicates; also
known as ‘real’ predicates.
2: those which are non-determining. one could also say that a non-determining
predicate is not a real predicate; provided, that this did not mean ‘not a
predicate at all’. a non-determining predicate is still a ‘real’ (in the sense
of genuine) predicate.
a predicate can fail to meet the criteria for a determining predicate by
failing to convey no information not already contained in the subject; or, by
failing to enlarge the subject; or, both (IMHO, the usual case).
Jud:
Nice to see that Kant recognised that the subject nearly always contains
information (see my auto-instantiation) and it is also nice to see that you
appear to agree in that you note that IYHO such is the usual case.
Joe:
as an example of a logical but non-determining predicate, consider ‘a house
is a house’ — a clear case of predicating the subject of the subject. it’s a
true statement; but, the predicate conveys nothing beyond what the subject
says; and, it fails to enlarge the subject. the statement ‘a house is a house’
simply fails to convey any useful information at all.
Jud:
Very true - but again the subject says different things to different people
and such statements often set folk a-thinking along the lines of *a house is
not a house - its a home, slum, abode of unhappiness, a collection of
galvanised iron sheets etc.,* and other themes in this connection.
§2: Is Existence a Predicate?
Kant now considers the classification of ‘existence’ as a predicate within
this taxonomy of predicates. _2_
 http://what-am-i.net/kant_on_predicates….) Kant concludes that ‘existence’ is not a real predicate; however,
it would remain a logical predicate within his taxonomy.
Jud:
I agree with Kant. For me the term *existence* is a reification of the fact
that something (or everthing) exists. Yes, it is an actual fact that The
Eiffel Tower exists - but it is The Eiffel Tower that exists - not the actual
fact that the Eiffel Tower exists which exists or exists too.
§2.1: The Black Swan
consider the statement ‘black swans exist’. what information, if any, this
statement contains or conveys depends on how ‘exists’ or ‘existent’ is defined.
if ‘existent’ is defined as the root predicate of the linguistic frame of
reference in which it is spoken; then, the statement conveys minimal
information — by definition (of ‘root predicate’) the statement would contain no
information beyond that which is asserted by saying ‘there are black swans’. to
say ‘a black swan is an existent’ asserts only that a black swan is not
nothing at all. it exists (in some sense) or it is an existent (of some sort).
Jud:
An AITist rendering of *Black swans exist* is not that of pure presence but
existential modality. Swans can be found in the existential modality of being
black. You see I do not accept exist, exists or existence as a predicative
which adds to our knowledge, for to exist is not to say anything more about an
object at all. We already KNOW swans exist - the new information is such
that we are told that not only are swans to be seen in the existential mode of
whiteness, they can ALSO be found to thrive in Australia in the existential
modality of *whiteness * (reflecting all wavelengths of light.)
Joe:
in short, the root predicate is a logical predicate; but, it is completely
uninformative. it conveys no new information about the subject; and, certainly
no information that adds any further determinations (any further specificity)
to the subject of the statement.
if ‘exists’ is defined as a [root predicate]-type indicator (or predicate),
it conveys more information — but not information contained within the
subject. it conveys information about the mode of meta-phenomenal instantiation
(if any).
Jud:
I think you are turning into an AITist Joe.
Joe:
a few centuries ago, biologists in Europe could have easily formed the
concept of a black swan by mutating the concept of a white swan which was then
(and still is) a phenomenological reality, [root predicate]-type 2, and was/is
existentially instantiated as [root-predicate]-type 1. however, the concept
‘black swan’ would have been considered a phenomenological reality only because
there was no evidence of meta-phenomenal instantiation either as an
existential or ontological ([root predicate]-type 3) reality.
when the first travelers returned from Australia, they effectively said
‘black swans exist’ — conveying information as to the mode of instantiation
true of the subject. the concept of the subject (black swan) was not enlarged,
altered or further determined.
suppose that all the black swans in the world are wiped out; by over zealous
hunters, by disease or by some other means. ‘black swans exist’ would
continue to *allege* a mode of meta-phenomenal instantiation; but, it would be a
false statement. ‘black swans do not exist’ would convey accurate information
about the subject.
suppose after this biological catastrophe, a biologist reconstructs living
organisms from DNA samples previously taken from living black swans; and, then
holds a press conference to announce ‘black swans exist’. accurate
information is again conveyed.
the point is, this information as to the mode of meta-phenomenal information
is not contained within the subject. there is no way to inspect the concept
of the subject, a phenomenological reality, to figure out whether black swans
existed in Australia or whether they have already been wiped out or whether
they’ve already been reconstructed.
thus, within a linguistic frame of reference where ‘existent’ is a [root
predicate]-type indicator, information is conveyed by the predicate, ‘existent’.
however, this information as to the mode of meta-phenomenal instantiation is
does not further determinate the subject; so, in Kantian terminology,
‘existent’ (schematically, any predicate that is a [root predicate]-type indicator
in the linguistic frame of reference in which it is used), is not a ‘real’ or
determining predicate. however, since it is genuinely informative, it is not
merely a logical (non-determining) predicate as the root predicate would be.
consequently, one must conclude that a trionic taxonomy of predicates is
needed:
1. uninformative
2. informative but not subject determinative
3. subject determinative

Jud:
Interesting. My own position is that we can ONLY EVER generate
ontologically meaningful statements about objects that are objects (thanks Emmanuel for
licencing the occsional tautology) and as the only entities to be found in the
cosmos ARE objects (existing in various modes) we cannot really make many
mistakes if we confine ourselves to commenting upon that which can be talked
about. As Parmenides said,(in his own form of words) strictly ontologically
speaking, talking about things that do not exist is the same as not talking
about anything at all -it is just making sounds signifying nothing.
But as the old tentmaker’s son said - does anything REALLY matter?

V
Iram indeed is gone with all his Rose,
And Jamshyd’s Sev’n-ring’d Cup where no one knows;
But still a Ruby kindles in the Vine,
And many a Garden by the Water blows,

VI
And David’s lips are lockt; but in divine
High-piping Pehlevi, with “Wine! Wine! Wine!
Red Wine!”–the Nightingale cries to the Rose
That sallow cheek of hers t’ incarnadine.

VII
Come, fill the Cup, and in the fire of Spring
Your Winter-garment of Repentance fling:
The Bird of Time bas but a little way
To flutter–and the Bird is on the Wing.

Omar Khayaam.

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Reifications - like biological entozoa are gut-enculturations which are not
necessarily reliant upon nor benignly disposed to the welfare of their
hosts.
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Sincerely,

Jud Evans.

Private Website: _http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

*Common sense and a sense of humour are the same thing, moving at
different speeds. A sense of humour is just common sense, dancing.*
(William James.)

Posted on Sunday, February 22nd, 2009 at 7:01 am
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