Joseph Polanik the continuing game player
May 25th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Tudor Georgescu wrote:
>
> >Sorry to intrude. I did not follow your discussion, but I think I
> >already have an objection. It pertains to the title of the dispute.
>
> >It says “schizo-epistemology”. I think that Heidegger’s epistemology
> >(if any) is monophrenic. But not in the psychotherapeutic meaning, but
> >it means “one mind”, namely that spirit (or soul) is one with nature.
> >Unity of awareness and reality.
>
> >My two cents are that if Heidegger had any epistemology, then it is
> >certainly a monophrenic one.
>
> the title alludes to Professor Crifasi’s use of one of the symptoms of
> schizophrenia (the loss of the first-person perspective) as evidence
> supporting his hidden assumption and interim conclusion, “I do not
> exist”. it’s as if he were suggesting that the one true philosophy would
> assist people to voluntarily adopt the perspective that the
> brain-rotting, cat-manure parasite (toxoplasma gondii) inflicts on the
> unfortunate victims of schizophrenia.
>
> ordinarily it would help if I summarized the argument thus far; but, I
> have been asking the Professor to clarify a few points before going any
> further;
Prior to which I had been asking you to address numerous responses I had
given when you denied I had given them. So I simply linked to them:
http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…
You have yet to address most of them, and have since attempted to give
the false impression that you have. Your request above will therefore be
met once there is evidence of basic reciprocity on your part. Of which,
as of yet, there is very little.
> so, in the event that the Professor deigns to clarify those
> points, the following may be subject to some slight revisions.
>
> ================================
> The Point of the Argument
> ================================
>
> Professor Crifasi is supposedly trying to reduce nubile young
> undergraduates (and other opponents) to skepticism so that they will
> become more receptive to his second argument — the one in favor of
> Heideggerian philosophy. however, that second argument is nowhere in
> evidence;
That second argument will be discussed once (1) you address the points I
have given regarding the first one, which you have refused to do:
http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…
and, and (2) you exhibit a rudimentary understanding of even basic
Heideggerian concepts, of which you have so far exhibited the opposite:
http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…
> so, this whole exercise makes one wonder if the good professor
> took lessons from the Nixon peace plan episode.
Your evasion of prior questions brings to mind other aspects of that
presidency.
> The Premises
> ================================
>
> Professor Crifasi’s major premise is that the proposition ‘I remain
> self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
> of existence.
>
> this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:
>
> [1]: P -> Q
>
> where
>
> P = ‘I exist’ [where ‘I exist’ = ‘I am not nothing’]
> Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
>
> Professor Crifasi’s minor premise is the claim that Q is false; so:
>
> [2]: -Q
>
>
> ================================
> Commentary on The Premises
> ================================
>
> {1}: the premises as stated appear to allow a modus tollens operation to
> conclude -P, ‘I do not exist’ or ‘I am nothing’. however, since premise
> [1] is a conditional, it is derivable from the negation of its own
> antecedent. check the truth table for the proposition:
>
> -P -> (P -> Q)
>
> [this is a logical truth of the propositional calculus. it is theorem 51
> in EJ Lemmon’s _Beginning Logic_ p 59]
>
> thus, despite giving the appearance of a rational *argument*, Professor
> Crifasi has simply assumed (-P & -Q).
>
> {2}: given [2], it is known that [1] can only be vacuously true or
> completely false.
This was part was explicitly addressed at the end of this the following
post:
http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…
Yet another example of ignoring my prior responses.
> ================================
> The Alleged Evidence
> ================================
>
> Professor Crifasi’s argument for [1] is based on the claim that denying
> [1] “would be denying an identical referent for the identical first
> person pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life”
> — and the associated claim that this consequence of denying [1] is
> (somehow) a bad thing.
>
> however, there is no particular problem that I can see with denying that
> the referent of ‘I’ is always
>
> there are numerous problems here. among the more obvious:
>
>
> {1}: the first-person singular pronoun is not necessarily
> self-identical.
>
> there is only one first-person singular pronoun in vernacular english
> (assuming you exclude case inflections); but, nothing prevents anyone
> from creating others; and, when necessary to avoid ambiguity, I use a
> set of first-person singular pronouns subscripted by reality type. see
> http://what-am-i.net/symbology.htm.
>
>
> {2}: People Age
>
> on my 35th birthday I say ‘I am 35 years old’. on my 45th birthday I say
> ‘I am 45 years old’. each statement is true when uttered even though the
> referent of one statement is not 100% identical in every way to the
> referent of the other statement.
>
>
> {3}: people change over time
>
> the counseling profession is devoted to breaking inappropriate
> assumptions as to self-identity over time. often, a counselee is helped
> to understand that “I am not the person I once was” or “I can change”.
>
> lacking actual arguments, Professor Crifasi’s replies invoke psychiatric
> symptomatology to justify his philosophical claims:
>
> >the relevant cases from the “counseling profession,” are the ones in
> >which people stop referring to themselves in the past by the first
> >person pronoun. Those in the “counseling profession” consider that to
> >be a sign of a complete break in self-identity (e.g., schizophrenia, in
> >which the different “selves” refer to each other in the 3rd person).
> >Hence, those in the “counseling profession” agree with me that the
> >identity of the first person pronoun is necessarily tied to
> >self-identity.
>
> >The “counseling profession” considers losses of the first person
> >perspective to be indicative of a rift in self-identity itself, since
> >their diagnosis is that there would then literally be several selves.
> >The implied assumption, therefore, is that the first person perspective
> >is necessarily tied to self-identity. You, on the other hand, have been
> >attempting to counter that the consistent use of the first person
> >pronoun is not necessarily tied to identity in the referent at all. So
> >the very “counseling profession” that you cited before disagrees with
> >you.
>
> thus, the power of the cat manure parasite to rob its victims of the
> first-person perspective is considered (by the Professor, anyway) as
> evidence that the Professor’s major premise is vacuously true rather
> than completely false. exactly how such ‘evidence’ supports said
> conclusion has not yet been adequately explained.
>
> and the Professor has made no attempt to explain how proving his own
> major premise to be vacuous (instead of false) provides any support for
> Heideggerian philosophy.
Note my numerous prior attempts regarding Heideggerian philosophy here:
http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…
I await basic reciprocity on your part.
