Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> >>putting all these definitions together, it is clear that you are
> >>claiming that, from your set of premises, you deduce the skeptical
> >>conclusion, Q: I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction
> >>that I am not nothing.
>
> but
>
> >>Q -> -Q [Q implies its own negation] because any assertion of Q is in
> >>violation of the First Law of Reality: nothing unreal is self-aware.
>
> >left unaddressed and unquoted, my explicit argument against your first
> >law of reality in my last post as well as two posts before that:
>
> it’s your argument I’m contesting; so, it is up to *you* to state which
> reality type(s) you are talking about. what is the reality type of that
> which asserts the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
> logical deduction that I am not nothing’?

As you can see from the argument that I have given 3 times now and which
you have ignored 3 times:

>”If the “reality” here is not phenomenal, then yet again you have
>failed to provide any evidence for any such “reality.” But if the
>”reality” here is phenomenal, then you have still failed to provide any
>evidence of any identity within phenomenal “reality”.”

that covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are
not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal. Error #1 resulting from not
addressing this argument from Hume.

> unless you are prepared to claim that ‘the Nothing’ as defined by
> Heidegger can assert such a conclusion about itself, it is quite
> legitimate for the I that can assert such a conclusion to say ‘it is a
> fact that I have just asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and,
> from that fact (which is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.

As you can see below (from more than A WEEK AGO!!), my argument above
was in response to your “first law of reality”:

>> it is important to specify the reality type of the ‘I’ that asserts {1}
>> because the argument does not proceed in the same way and does not reach
>> the same result for the I-2 as for the I-3 — and the mixed case (where
>> the I-2 asserts the self-identity of the I-3 is ignored completely.
>> if it is the I-2 asserting {1} and drawing a conclusion about itself;
>> then the reply is a variant of FLR (the First Law of Reality): nothing
>> unreal is self-aware. for example, if you are saying that I-2 assert {1}
>> and that I-2 draw the conclusion “I-2 don’t know that I-2 am”; then, I
>> reply “nothing unreal is capable of asserting I-2 don’t know that I-2
>> am’”.
>
> Yet another example of a glib reply that ignores Hume’s critiques of the notions of “reality” and “unreality.” If the “reality” here is not phenomenal, then yet again you have failed to provide any evidence for any such “reality.” But if the “reality” here is phenomenal, then you have still failed to provide any evidence of any identity within phenomenal “reality”. So either way, your reply is completely without evidence.

So since the latter argument was in direct response to your “first law
of reality,” appealing to the impossibility of “nothing asserting such a
conclusion” against this very argument from me is circular reasoning.
Error #2 resulting from not addressing my argument above from Hume.

> >”If the “reality” here is not phenomenal, then yet again you have
> >failed to provide any evidence for any such “reality.” But if the
> >”reality” here is phenomenal, then you have still failed to provide any
> >evidence of any identity within phenomenal “reality”.”
>
> the attempt I make to assert that I have not proven by evidence based
> logical deduction that I am not nothing *is* itself the evidence from
> which I deduce that I am not nothing.

and to quote you exactly, your argument was this:

> and, now, the rest of the story…
>
> Q -> -Q [Q implies its own negation] because any assertion of Q is in
> violation of the First Law of Reality: nothing unreal is self-aware.

Note your “because” above - you explicitly premised your argument that Q
-> -Q on your “first law of reality,” to which (as you can see from my
week old quote above) my argument above was in reply. So to reply here
by appealing to your argument that Q -> -Q is circular. Error #3
resulting from not addressing my argument from Hume.

> >And as for your objection against the latter “identity” being a
> >necessary condition, you once again failed to address the explicit
> >argument that I gave in my last post as well as several posts before
> >that:
>
> I have shown that your set of premises leads to a conclusion that
> implies its own negation, Q -> -Q. therefore, at least one of the
> premises of your argument is false.

As you can see from my immediately preceding quote above, you explicitly
premised your argument that Q -> -Q on your “first law of reality,” to
which my argument from Hume about phenomenal and non-phenomenal reality
types was in reply. So to appeal to your argument that Q -> -Q here is
circular. Error #4 resulting from not addressing my argument from Hume.

> I am quite willing to help you locate the imposter(s); but, you will
> first have to specify the reality type of the I that initially draws a
> skeptical conclusion from your premises and subsequently concludes (from
> the fact that the first conclusion is drawn) ‘I am not nothing’.

See above.

> you keep alluding to Hume’s argument; but, it is clear that he was
> talking about the I-3. are you?

He also addressed physical reality, which is your I-1. I mentioned this
before. Error #5 from not having addressed my argument previously.

> you have illustrated the meaning of your ‘identity premise’ by saying
> there must be an identity of reference between the I that says ‘I was
> born’ and the I that says ‘I will die’. these might be taken as the
> statements of a phenomenological reality or a physical reality or an
> entity that was a composite of one of each. however, you seem to have
> rejected the idea that you were talking about the I-1.

to which I had replied before:

>> I-1 is a physical body, so given Descartes’ arguments in the First Meditation, how again do we “know” that there are any physical bodies at all? It’s astounding that at this point, after I’ve cited Descartes’ First Meditation numerous times now, you just glibly bring in I-1 without addressing his arguments there.

to which you have not replied, while nevertheless introducing the
physical reality of I-1 yet again. Error #6 from not having addressed my
arguments previously.

> so, is it the I-2 that draws your skeptical conclusion about itself?
>
> if not; then, what is the reality type (or mode of existence, etc) of
> the I that does draw a skeptical conclusion about itself.

Any of them. See above.

Six errors in one post from not having addressed my arguments
previously. I take great joy in pointing out this obvious attempt at
game playing in place of serious thought. Keep it up.

Posted on Saturday, March 29th, 2008 at 12:15 pm
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