Joseph Polanik the game player II
March 29th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the Game Player part IX :: Joseph Polanik the game player II
I think you hit the nail on the head, Bob. To expand(I hope):
Polanik’s mode of philosophizing is definitively, exasperatingly,
irritatingly analytical. The thing that is most difficult for
analytical philosophers (including most all British and American
educated people) to understand is possibility, which is at the very
core, as well as a around the edges, as well as at the beginning and
at the end of any attempt to think Being. How can anyone fettered to
Polanik’s sort of syllogistic reasoning fathom the is-ness of being
as possibility, as “not yet”? The very phenomenality of Dasein as
futural, running ahead to its past, defies reason. That’s the idea.
“Time is temporal”as Heidgger says in the Concept of Time, which is
not to say tautological. Rather it’s the non-identical actuality of
identity, Being becoming itself by being. That’s not Hegel. Rather,
I think, it’s Aristotle.
Allen
>Of course what Polanik is doing could be characterized as a game but
>given that his pattern is unabated in the face of it being directly
>questioned I would characterize his doings differently because who
>Polanik is being rings of some sort of disturbance … like a
>possibility.
>
>Bob
>
>>From: Anthony Crifasi
>>Date: 2008/03/29 Sat AM 11:23:18 CDT
>>To:
> Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
>
>>Subject: Joseph Polanik the game player II
>
>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>
>>> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>
>>> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>
>>> >>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>>putting all these definitions together, it is clear that you are
>>> >>>>claiming that, from your set of premises, you deduce the skeptical
>>> >>>>conclusion, Q: I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction
>>> >>>>that I am not nothing.
>>>
>>> >>>left unaddressed and unquoted, my explicit argument against your
>>> >>>first law of reality in my last post as well as two posts before
>>> >>>that:
>>>
>>> >>it’s your argument I’m contesting; so, it is up to *you* to state
>>> >>which reality type(s) you are talking about. what is the reality type
>>> >>of that which asserts the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence
>>> >>based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>>>
>>> >Any of them.
>>>
>>> >that covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are
>>> >not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal.
>>>
>>> okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don’t
>>> have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
>>> the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
>>> logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
>>>
>>> now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
>>> Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
>>> how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
>>> proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>>
>>Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous post
>>regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as well as
>>Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then get back
>>to me.
>>
>>> if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
>>> conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that I have just
>>> asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
>>> is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.
>>
>>Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous post
>>regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as well as
>>Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then get back
>>to me.
>>
>>> so, from your set of premises, any I may reach a conclusion (’I have
>>> not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’)
>>> that is self-refuting.
>>>
>>> consequently, one of your premises is false. here they are:
> >>
>>> P1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>>>
>>> P2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>>> remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>>>
>>> P3. I have no evidence that anything remains identical throughout all my
>>> perceptions.
>>>
>>> which one do you wish to reject?
>>
>>None. See previous argument.
>>
>>lol
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>heidegger mailing list
>>heidegger@an-archos.com
>>http://an-archos.com/mailman/listinfo/heidegger_an-archos.com
>>http://heidegger.an-archos.com/
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>heidegger mailing list
>heidegger@an-archos.com
>http://an-archos.com/mailman/listinfo/heidegger_an-archos.com
>http://heidegger.an-archos.com/
