Joseph Polanik the game player II
March 29th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the Game Player part IX :: Joseph Polanik the game player II
The problem with Polanik isn’t so much that he’s analytical, but that
he’s bad at even that. A consistent analytic would at least analyze
themselves into oblivion and hence corner themselves into considering
the possibility of the impossible - i.e., the non-identical actuality of
identity through the utter implosion of attempted identical identity.
But Polanik isn’t even a consistent analytic; he’s just a game player.
allen scult wrote:
> I think you hit the nail on the head, Bob. To expand(I hope):
>
> Polanik’s mode of philosophizing is definitively, exasperatingly,
> irritatingly analytical. The thing that is most difficult for
> analytical philosophers (including most all British and American
> educated people) to understand is possibility, which is at the very
> core, as well as a around the edges, as well as at the beginning and
> at the end of any attempt to think Being. How can anyone fettered to
> Polanik’s sort of syllogistic reasoning fathom the is-ness of being
> as possibility, as “not yet”? The very phenomenality of Dasein as
> futural, running ahead to its past, defies reason. That’s the idea.
> “Time is temporal”as Heidgger says in the Concept of Time, which is
> not to say tautological. Rather it’s the non-identical actuality of
> identity, Being becoming itself by being. That’s not Hegel. Rather,
> I think, it’s Aristotle.
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>> Of course what Polanik is doing could be characterized as a game but
>> given that his pattern is unabated in the face of it being directly
>> questioned I would characterize his doings differently because who
>> Polanik is being rings of some sort of disturbance … like a
>> possibility.
>>
>> Bob
>>
>>> From: Anthony Crifasi
>>> Date: 2008/03/29 Sat AM 11:23:18 CDT
>>> To:
>> Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
>>
>>> Subject: Joseph Polanik the game player II
>>> Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>
>>>> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >>>>putting all these definitions together, it is clear that you are
>>>> >>>>claiming that, from your set of premises, you deduce the skeptical
>>>> >>>>conclusion, Q: I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction
>>>> >>>>that I am not nothing.
>>>>
>>>> >>>left unaddressed and unquoted, my explicit argument against your
>>>> >>>first law of reality in my last post as well as two posts before
>>>> >>>that:
>>>>
>>>> >>it’s your argument I’m contesting; so, it is up to *you* to state
>>>> >>which reality type(s) you are talking about. what is the reality type
>>>> >>of that which asserts the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence
>>>> >>based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>>>>
>>>> >Any of them.
>>>>
>>>> >that covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1 and I-3 are
>>>> >not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal.
>>>>
>>>> okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don’t
>>>> have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
>>>> the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
>>>> logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
>>>>
>>>> now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
>>>> Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
>>>> how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
>>>> proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>>> Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous post
>>> regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as well as
>>> Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then get back
>>> to me.
>>>
>>>> if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
>>>> conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that I have just
>>>> asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
>>>> is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.
>>> Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous post
>>> regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as well as
>>> Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then get back
>>> to me.
>>>
>>>> so, from your set of premises, any I may reach a conclusion (’I have
>>>> not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’)
>>>> that is self-refuting.
>>>>
>>>> consequently, one of your premises is false. here they are:
>> >>
>>>> P1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>>>>
>>>> P2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
>>>> remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>>>>
>>>> P3. I have no evidence that anything remains identical throughout all my
>>>> perceptions.
>>>>
>>>> which one do you wish to reject?
>>> None. See previous argument.
>>>
>>> lol
>>>
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