Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> >>now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
> >>Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
> >>how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
> >>proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>
> >Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous
> >post regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as
> >well as Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then
> >get back to me.
>
> wrong. it is a self-contained question. the question, Anthony, is simply
> this: is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not proven by evidence
> based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>
> in your last post you admitted that the skeptical conclusion, ‘I have
> not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’
> could be asserted by any I irregardless of reality type. consequently,
> the relevance of previous commentary involving pronouns subscripted by
> reality type is suspended *until* we advance to a consideration of the
> voices of the ‘is’; at which point, the question of whether such a
> pronoun has a referent will surely be raised again.

Then either prove “by evidence based logical deduction that I am not
nothing” WITHOUT appealing (explicitly or implicitly) to your first law
of reality that “nothing unreal is self aware,” or if you can’t disprove
it without presupposing to that law, then see my previous Humean
argument against that law.

> >>if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that
> >>skeptical conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that
> >>I have just asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from
> >>that fact (which is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.
>
> >Since this is based on your “first law of reality,” see my previous
> >post regarding Hume’s argument against your “first law of reality” as
> >well as Descartes’ argument against your I-1 physical reality, and then
> >get back to me.
>
> wrong again. the skeptical conclusion any I may deduce from your stated
> premises is self-refuting. the case for this conclusion is stated in
> language that is independent of any previous discussion we have had
> involving subscripted pronouns.

See above.

> >>consequently, one of your premises is false. here they are:
>
> >>P1. I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>P2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
> >>remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>P3. I have no evidence that anything remains identical throughout all
> >>my perceptions.
>
> >>which one do you wish to reject?
>
> >None.
>
> you have chosen not to contest the case against your set of premises,
> the case based on showing the self-refuting properties of your alleged
> conclusion;

This was “the case based on showing the self-refuting properties” to
which you refer above:

>>Q -> -Q [Q implies its own negation] because any assertion of Q is in
>>violation of the First Law of Reality: nothing unreal is self-aware.

See the “because” above, Joe? You wrote that. Hence, you explicitly
premised your “case based on showing the self-refuting properties” of my
conclusion on your first law of reality. So it is circular reasoning to
appeal to that case at this point, unless of course you address my
Humean argument against that First Law of Reality.

Checkmate.

Posted on Saturday, March 29th, 2008 at 7:40 pm
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