Joseph Polanik the game player part X
April 27th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the continuing game player :: Joseph Polanik the Game Player part IX :: Joseph Polanik the game player II
Joseph Polanik wrote:
> ======================================================================
> Clarification 1. Actual Operation of Modus Tollens
> ======================================================================
>
> modus tollens is the name for the following logical operation:
>
> [1] P -> Q {Assumption Set 1}
> [2] -Q {Assumption Set 2}
> [3] (therefore) -P {Assumption Set 3 (Union of 1 and 2)}
>
> in english, given a conditional proposition [1] and the negation of its
> consequent [2], one may derive the negation of its antecendent at step
> [3] … on the basis of all the assumptions on which either [1] or [2]
> rested. the correct use of modus tollens means only that [3] is validly
> derived from the assumptions of assumption set 3; in particular, it does
> not mean that [3] is a free floating logical truth.
>
> ======================================================================
> Clarification 2. Status of the Conclusion Derived from Modus Tollens
> ======================================================================
>
> you are being quite misleading when you say that you assume ‘I am not
> nothing’ in order to refute that assumption via modus tollens.
>
> ‘I am not nothing’ is not assumed; rather, it is proven — based on the
> assumption {A1}: it is not possible to attribute predicates to nothing.
> [See my post of 2008-04-03, “Re: Behold the Power of Attributing
> Predicates to Nothingness!”]
>
> Let me restate it, using the following definitions
>
> E = ‘I experience’
> P = ‘I am not nothing’
> Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
>
> [1] I experience.
>
> this is a self-verifying fact.
>
> [2] in asserting [1], I attribute a predicate, ‘capable of
> experiencing’, to the referent of ‘I’. by {A1}, that to which predicates
> are attributable can not be nothing; therefore, I, the referent of ‘I’
> when I say ‘I experience’, am not nothing.
>
> {This conclusion rests on fact [1] and assumption, A1}
Wow, another example of Joseph Polanik the tabula rasa. Do you recall
that my modus tollens was directed precisely at your reasoning in your
[2] above? Of course you don’t. Here it was:
>>>>>1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must
>>>>>know that I exist.
>
>>>>>2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something
>>>>>which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
>>>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
>>>>>throughout all my perceptions.
>
>>>>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>
>>>>>5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.
And yet now you just assert your [2] above was “prove” from A1 when my
modus tollens undermines precisely that “proof.” You would avoid these
embarrassments, Joe, if you would just address my arguments, instead of
trying to avoid the issue for 8 or 9 posts, by which time you’ve
“forgotten” which arguments were directed at which assumptions.
> one might restate the results thus far [1]-[3] as, ‘I experience;
> therefore, I am (not nothing)’; or,
>
> [3] E & (E -> P) {Assumption Set: A1}
Since it is (and has been) precisely assumption set A1 that is in
question, your repeated appeal to it here is baffling.
> you proceed from here with your modus tollens:
>
> [4] P -> Q {Assumption Set [4]}
Yet another misrepresentation. As you can see above, my modus tollens
does not begin with your P.
> {the assumption is the conditional statement as a whole not Q itself.
> [4] symbolizes the claim that Q is the necessary condition for P. [5]
> and [6] deal with whether Q is true or false — which you admit is a
> different issues.}
>
> [5] (subjective fact) I have no evidence that Q is true
>
> [6] -Q {Assumes validity of the Crifasi Maneuver: Anthony Crifasi may
> convert the absence of evidence into evidence of absence; but, only when
> it suits him}
Joseph, I answered this last post. Why did you clip out that part of my
answer? GOOGLERS OF JOSEPH POLANIK NOTE - HE DID IT AGAIN. Here was my
answer:
“it remained a logical possibility 300 years ago that humans could
encounter black swans. But there is no logical possibility that humans
can encounter what is non-phenomenal (like your reality types 1 and 3),
since whatever is encountered is by definition a phenomenon to us. Any
evidence for your reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically impossible.”
Joseph, please explain to your googlers why you keep clipping out my
answers to your objections, and then pretending like I never answered them?
> [7] -P {Assumption Set: [4], [6]}
>
> obviously, the point here is that one does not conclude -P as an
> absolute truth; but, rather, as a conclusion resting on certain
> assumptions.
>
> ======================================================================
> Clarification 3: The Ultimate Choice
> ======================================================================
>
> naturally, [7] is not the finally use of modus tollens that you make.
> you can combine [3] and [7]; although, since you aren’t allowed to
> deduce a denial of facts (-E), you deduce -A1: it is possible to
> attribute predicates to nothing.
>
> but that conclusion, -A1, will still rest on {Assumption Set: [4], [6]}.
>
> so there is a choice to be made between:
>
> C1: accepting A1 and rejecting at least one of {Assumption Set: [4],
> [6]}
>
> C2: accepting {Assumption Set: [4], [6]} and its conclusion -A1.
>
> I’ve given my reasons for preferring A1 over -A1: A1 is assumed by
> predicate logic and an analogous assumption is at the basis of axiomatic
> set theory.
As you can see, my modus tollens begins precisely with predicate logic
(attributing predicates to me) and proceeds to show how that assumption
must be negated. So your “reason” for assuming your A1 here is precisely
what’s in question. So stop just bringing it up as if it’s not what’s in
question. Googlers, take note.
> what is your rationale for preferring C2 on the basis of {Assumption
> Set: [4], [6]} which have a consequence that undermines the very basis
> of rational thought?
See above.
And kindly DON’T CLIP OUT ANY PART OF MY ANSWER NEXT TIME, OR THIS
CONVERSATION IS OVER.
