Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> >>Let me make sure I understand you. I ask why you deny that attributing
> >>predicates to nothingness is impossible; and, you reply by restating
> >>the three premises and the conclusion of your argument. okay, so you
> >>are admitting that your argument depends on assuming that attributing
> >>predicates to nothing is possible;
>
> >No, it assumes that predicates about me are indeed attributed to
> >something - namely, to ME. That’s what a modus tollens argument does -
> >it hypothetically assumes what will be negated.
>
> your argument makes several assumptions. you have three explicitly
> stated (numbered) premises and now this formerly unacknowledged
> assumption that attributing predicates to nothing is impossible.
>
> it sounds seems you are saying that, when you run thru your argument and
> reach a contradiction, the assumption you choose to deny is the formerly
> unacknowledged assumption that attributing predicates to nothing is
> impossible — thus proving that attributing predicates to nothing is
> possible.
>
> is that correct?

1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
that I exist.
2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
all my perceptions.
4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.

Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens. Googlers
of “Joseph Polanik” take note - he couldn’t figure that out on his own.

> >>>Step 1 is stated as a necessary condition of My existence - i.e.,
> >>>that I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions. Denying
> >>>that would be denying an identical referent for the identical first
> >>>person pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life
> >>>(I was born, I am now X, I will die).
>
>
> Assumption {A1}: that attributing predicates to nothing is impossible
>
> [1] I experience.
>
> this is a fact from which evidence based logical deduction can proceed
>
> [2] in asserting [1], I attribute a predicate, ‘capable of
> experiencing’, to the referent of ‘I’.
>
> [3] (therefore) I, the referent of ‘I’ when I say ‘I experience’, am not
> nothing because of [2] and {A1}.
>
> one might restate the results thus far [1]-[3] as, ‘I experience;
> therefore, I am (not nothing)’.
>
> however, since you have cast your argument in the jargon of necessary
> conditions, I’ll restate it thus:
>
> [4] given that I experience, it is necessarily true that I am not
> nothing
>
> your argument is an attempt to continue the processes of reasoning from
> this point as follows:
>
> [5] (hypothesis) given that I am not nothing, it is necessarily true
> that I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> [6] (supposed fact) I have no evidence that I remain self-identical
> throughout all my perceptions
>
> most people would say that [6] was an admission that hypothesis [5] is
> ungrounded. after all, if there is no evidence that the proposition ‘I
> remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is true at all,
> what possible basis could one have for claiming that this proposition is
> *necessarily true*?

LOL - my answer is and WAS: “Denying that would be denying an identical
referent for the identical first person pronoun that I use to refer to
myself at any point in my life (I was born, I am now X, I will die).”

So my argument explicitly appealed to the IDENTITY of the first person
pronoun - i.e., that you have yet to produce any reason whatsoever for
the continued identity of the first person pronoun if its referent were
to lack a continued identity. So since you simply ignored that part of
my argument in your “restatement” of my argument above right after I
said it, could you please explain to all the future Googlers of “Joseph
Polanik” why you just keep ignoring arguments that have been given?

> but, unlike most people, you conclude
>
> [7] (therefore) I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction
> that I am not nothing

See above.

> I have previously shown that, given {A1}, [7] is self-refuting;

Astounding. You yet again simply assert that argument without answering
the reply I gave to it at least 5 or 6 times now. This is what you have
“previously shown”:

>>> >>Q -> -Q [Q implies its own negation] because any assertion of Q is in
>>> >>violation of the First Law of Reality: nothing unreal is self-aware.

to which notion of “reality” I responded from Hume (numerous times):

>> >”If the “reality” here is not phenomenal, then yet again you have
>> >failed to provide any evidence for any such “reality.” But if the
>> >”reality” here is phenomenal, then you have still failed to provide any
>> >evidence of any identity within phenomenal “reality”.”

to which you have yet to respond. And yet you still assert the original
assertion to which I responded. Future Googlers of “Joseph Polanik,”
take note.

> rather than admit your argument has gone down with the House of Usher,
> you conclude
>
> [8] -{A1}
>
> you deny the initial assumption of the argument, effectively concluding
> ‘it is possible to attribute predicates to nothing’!
> >>so, to save the argument by which you hope to confine non-heideggerian
> >>philosophers to the quagmire of SIS, you must prove that it is
> >>possible to attribute predicates to nothingness.
>
> >Nope, wrong again. I only have to prove that the necessary condition
> >for attributing predicates to me (i.e., my identity throughout my
> >existence) is assumed without evidence. That’s what I’ve done.
>
> look again. the lack of evidence you admit at [6] means that your
> hypothesis at [5] (that it is necessarily true that I remain
> self-identical throughout all my perceptions) is assumed without
> evidence.
>
> this is something not generally considered a virtue in logical thought.

lol see above

Posted on Thursday, April 3rd, 2008 at 1:30 pm
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