Heidegger

Now that’s more like it, Joe. My memory is now somewhat rusty from the
last time we corresponded, so I might actually not remember exactly
which of my arguments you are ignoring in this post. However, I will try
my best for the future googlers of Joseph Polanik.

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must know
> >that I exist.
>
> >2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something which
> >remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical throughout
> >all my perceptions.
>
> >4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>
> >5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.
>
> >Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.
>
> As before, you have reached a self-refuting conclusion. the fact that
> you draw conclusion 5 proves ‘I am capable of drawing conclusions’. this
> statement contains a predicate. which proves that I attribute predicates
> to the referent of ‘I’.

which is the antecedent in premise 1. which therefore leads to an
endless logical paradox, unless and until you address premise 3. which
you haven’t done yet. which you are trying to avoid doing at all costs.
which everyone is noticing.

> All you have done is to put a wrapper ([1] and [5]) around the same
> flawed argument you already had, an argument whose relevance is highly
> questionable.

which “high questionability” you have yet to demonstrate. which would be
demonstrated by addressing premise 3. which have yet to do. which you
are trying to avoid doing at all costs. which everyone is noticing.

> >>[5] (hypothesis) given that I am not nothing, it is necessarily true
> >>that I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>[6] (supposed fact) I have no evidence that I remain self-identical
> >>throughout all my perceptions
>
> >>most people would say that [6] was an admission that hypothesis [5] is
> >>ungrounded. after all, if there is no evidence that the proposition ‘I
> >>remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is true at all,
> >>what possible basis could one have for claiming that this proposition
> >>is *necessarily true*?
>
> >LOL - my answer is and WAS: “Denying that would be denying an identical
> >referent for the identical first person pronoun that I use to refer to
> >myself at any point in my life (I was born, I am now X, I will die).”
>
> >So my argument explicitly appealed to the IDENTITY of the first person
> >pronoun - i.e., that you have yet to produce any reason whatsoever for
> >the continued identity of the first person pronoun if its referent were
> >to lack a continued identity. So since you simply ignored that part of
> >my argument in your “restatement” of my argument above right after I
> >said it, could you please explain to all the future Googlers of “Joseph
> >Polanik” why you just keep ignoring arguments that have been given?
>
> Attention Future Googlers: I often ignore irrelevant and incoherent
> arguments — even when perpetrated by a Professor of Philosophy such as
> Anthony Crifasi. thank you for your attention to this matter.

A perusal of several replies to your posts on various Google discussion
groups reveals that you are indeed truthful in your admission that you
often ignore arguments. I would invite future googlers to perform this
search to confirm Joseph’s statement on this matter.

> no one can deny the phenomenology of first-person self-reference.
> speakers just keep on cranking out first person statements such as ‘I am
> now at 3rd and Main … I am now at 4th and Main … ‘ and so on.
>
> does this mean that the referent of ‘I’ remains self-identical over
> time? you seem to be saying ‘yes’ (even though you admit there is no
> evidence that this is true) because you deny that there is any evidence
> that it is false.
>
> well, if there is no evidence one way or the other; then, I might simply
> say “no one knows, yet”.
>
> you, on the other hand, not only allege that the referent of ‘I’ remains
> self-identical over time; you allege the much stronger claim that this
> is necessarily true, given that I am not nothing.
>
> you claim that it is a necessary condition of my existence ‘that I
> remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’; but, you give no
> argument in favor of such a preposterous claim.

Future googlers note - he actually has the audacity to say this right
after I gave that very argument above. which argument was:

>> >LOL - my answer is and WAS: “Denying that would be denying an identical
>> >referent for the identical first person pronoun that I use to refer to
>> >myself at any point in my life (I was born, I am now X, I will die).”
>>
>> >So my argument explicitly appealed to the IDENTITY of the first person
>> >pronoun - i.e., that you have yet to produce any reason whatsoever for
>> >the continued identity of the first person pronoun if its referent were
>> >to lack a continued identity.

which argument he has yet to address. which argument he once again
ignored. which argument he is trying at all costs to avoid, by
inexplicably interpreting it as:

> existence is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition of perceiving.
> a stone exists but does not perceive. for you to claim the reverse, that
> perceiving is a necessary condition of existing, you would have to show
> either that stones perceive or that stones do not exist.

I see that you have now accepted Heidegger’s demand to transcend all logic.

Posted on Monday, April 14th, 2008 at 3:10 pm
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