Heidegger

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >>>>>1. If I know that predicates are attributable to me, then I must
> >>>>>know that I exist.
>
> >>>>>2. If I know that I exist, I must know that there is something
> >>>>>which remains identical throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>>>>3. But there is no evidence that anything remains identical
> >>>>>throughout all my perceptions.
>
> >>>>>4. Therefore, I don’t know that I exist.
>
> >>>>>5. Therefore I don’t know that predicates are attributable to me.
>
> >>>>>Both antecedents (in #1 and #2) are negated by modus tollens.
>
> >>I have addressed your premise 3. I have expressed my skepticism of it.
> >>let me summarize and extend my critique of this premise.
>
> >>1: it is *your* premise; and, therefore, *you* need to support it. you
> >>have not told us anything about your attempts (if any) to look for
> >>evidence. what was your evidence detection criteria? did you do a
> >>complete census of a certain domain or did you just search a
> >>representative sample of that domain?
>
> >Not just me, Joe. Hume tried too. So have a multitude of philosophers
> >since Descartes. Apparently Joseph Polanik is the first in modern times
> >to have found positive evidence for whatever entity it is that
> >supposedly remains identical throughout all human perception. Care to
> >enlighten us, as well as western history?
>
> no; that’s not my job. it’s up to you to justify your negative
> conclusion. I’m merely expressing my skepticism of your argument.
>
> you are in the position of the european zoologist who reported the
> results of a survey of the swan population 300 years ago. “I found no
> evidence of black swans. therefore (by means of evidence-based logical
> deduction), I conclude that there are no black swans.”

lol - nice try, but you missed the vital difference: it remained a
logical possibility 300 years ago that humans could encounter black
swans. But there is no logical possibility that humans can encounter
what is non-phenomenal (like your reality types 1 and 3), since whatever
is encountered is by definition a phenomenon to us. Any evidence for
your reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically impossible.

Of course we all know that you didn’t really “miss” this argument, since
it’s simply Hume’s argument against concluding to anything
non-phenomenal from the phenomenal, which I’ve cited many times now,
which you haven’t answered yet, which you are trying extremely hard to
avoid answering, which everyone is noticing.

> >Absence of evidence of Q means that Q is unsupported by evidence.
>
> yes; but, that’s all that it means logically. you take the further step
> of saying (for purposes of perpetrating a fallacy) that the absence of
> evidence of Q justifies your conclusion, -Q. some of these conversions
> may turn out to be correct. the conversion (from no evidence of P to the
> conclusion of -P) turned out to be true for phlogiston. would you care
> to make a prediction as to the magnetic monopole?

Nope, I prefer things for which not only WAS there no evidence at one
time, but for which there can be no possible evidence. See above.

> the point of this is that you’ve built a contradiction generator into
> your logic. just claim that some proposition, P, implies a preposterous
> conclusion, Q, for which you have no evidence. then claim that the
> absence of evidence of Q is proof of -Q. then conclude -P by modus
> tollens.

See above.

> here, let us focus on your claim that self-identity over time is a
> necessary condition of existence. the objection would be that you have
> not yet refuted the proposition that existence as a condition of
> perceiving.
>
> [JP, 2008-04-04]:
>
> “existence is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition of
> perceiving. a stone exists but does not perceive. for you to claim the
> reverse, that perceiving is a necessary condition of existing, you would
> have to show either that stones perceive or that stones do not exist.”
>
> [AC, 2008-04-13]:
>
> “I see that you have now accepted Heidegger’s demand to transcend all
> logic.”
>
> [JP, 2008-04-16]:
>
> toward the end of his career, Heidegger makes a startling admission. in
> discussion Descartes, Heidegger writes: “The formula which the
> proposition sometimes has, ‘Cogito ergo sum’, suggests the
> misunderstanding that it is here a question of inference. … The sum is
> not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground of
> thinking, the fundamentum.”
>
> this is, of course, all that Descartes needs to prove ‘I experience;
> therefore, I am’.
>
> once we notice experiencing anything at all, we deduce that the logical
> preconditions of experiencing have been satisfied; and, thus, we can say
> either: ‘I experience; therefore, I am’ or ‘given that I experience; it
> is necessarily true that I am’.
>
> [AC, 2008-04-16]:
>
> Please don’t talk about Heidegger - trust me, it doesn’t make you look
> good.
>
> [JP, (new material)]:
>
> focus, Anthony. this is not about whether you think I ‘look good’
> quoting Heidegger.
>
> the question is whether your claim (that the proposition ‘I remain
> self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
> of the existence of the referent of ‘I’) is consistent with the passage
> that I quoted from Heidegger.

Joseph, why did you separate my premise that identity is a necessary
condition of self-existence, from the further argument that I gave for
that premise, which was:

>>>So my argument explicitly appealed to the IDENTITY of the first
>>>person pronoun - i.e., that you have yet to produce any reason
>>>whatsoever for the continued identity of the first person pronoun if
>>>its referent were to lack a continued identity.

You see, Joe, when you separate my premises from the reasons I give for
them, then yes, they’ll look pretty weak. Googlers, take note.

> you claim that you have a ‘FURTHER’ argument for the proposition ‘I
> remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’. according to you
> this proposition (your original premise 1) is true because “Denying that
> would be denying an identical referent for the identical first person
> pronoun that I use to refer to myself at any point in my life (I was
> born, I am now X, I will die).”
>
> you claim that I have not replied to this argument; but, I have. in
> fact, I’ve given you two counter-arguments that you have yet to deal
> with.
>
> the first counter-argument challenges the assumption that the
> proposition in question is undeniable. I will summarize that argument
> below.
>
> the second counter-argument challenges the assumption that your first
> person statements support your conclusion irregardless of the reality
> type of the referent of ‘I’. I summarize that argument in the thread
> titled ‘Self-Indentity Over Time — True for All Reality Types?’.
>
> [JP, 2008-03-23]:
>
> “you have correctly identified the major consequence of denying [I
> remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions]. the referent of a
> first person pronoun used at time t1 is not necessarily identical to the
> referent of the same first person pronoun used at time t2. however, you
> have failed to explain why this is a problem.”
>
> [JP, (new material)]:
>
> you still haven’t responded to that objection.
>
> since you seem to misunderstand that the burden of proving your claims
> is on you, I hasten to point out that I’m not claiming to know for a
> fact that the referent of ‘I’ does not remain self-identical over time.
> I’m only challenging your claim that the proposition in question (’I
> remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’) can not logically
> be denied because doing so would have consequence that the referent of
> ‘I’ does not remain self-identical over time.

lol - and yet again you choose to ignore the explicit argument I’ve
given 6 or 7 times now, which was:

>>you have yet to produce any reason
>>whatsoever for the continued identity of the first person pronoun if
>>its referent were to lack a continued identity.

As you can see, the argument specifically appeals to the identity of the
first person pronoun, and the lack of any reason whatsoever for that
identity if its referent lacks identity. This is at least the 7th time
you have just ignored that argument. Googlers of Joseph Polanik, take note.

> I gave you my reason for doubting that the proposition in question is
> self-evidently true: the counseling profession is devoted to breaking
> this assumed self-identity over time. often, a counselee is helped to
> understand that “I am not the person I once was” or “I can change”.
>
> given that people grow and develop physically, emotionally and mentally,
> how do you know that the referent of ‘I’ remains self-identical over
> time? why would there be a problem if it did not?

As you can see from my argument above (and would have seen a long time
ago if you hadn’t kept ignoring it), the relevant cases from the
“counseling profession,” are the ones in which people stop referring to
themselves in the past by the first person pronoun. Those in the
“counseling profession” consider that to be a sign of a complete break
in self-identity (e.g., schizophrenia, in which the different “selves”
refer to each other in the 3rd person). Hence, those in the “counseling
profession” agree with me that the identity of the first person pronoun
is necessarily tied to self-identity.

So as you can see, none of the arguments you’ve given have addressed my
argument from the identity of the first person pronoun. Which I’ve given
7 or 8 times now. Which you’ve ignored 7 or 8 times now, including above
when you separated my premise from it. Which you’re trying your hardest
to avoid addressing. Which everyone is noticing. Googlers, take note.

> there was some discussion of how you knew that the argument based on
> your set of first person statements (I was born, I am now X, I will die)
> applied to the various reality types that ‘I’ might refer to; and, on
> 2008-03-29, you replied that your argument applied to “any of them”.
>
> I then presented two counterarguments. your reply to the first was
> inadequate and evasive; and, you ignored the second altogether. let us
> review these
>
> [JP, 2008-03-29]:
>
> okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don’t
> have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
> the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
> logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
>
> now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
> Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
> how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
> proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>
> if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
> conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that I have just
> asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
> is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.
>
> so, from your set of premises, any I may reach a conclusion (’I have
> not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’)
> that is self-refuting.
>
> [JP (new material)]:
>
> you’ve never replied to the question: is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I
> have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not
> nothing’?

You really are a genuine tabula rasa, aren’t you?

How many times have I had to point out to you that a modus tollens
hypothetically presupposes what will be contradicted in the end? So that
a modus tollens against the reality of myself will therefore presuppose
myself in order to then contradict its reality? Instead, you
inexplicably take contradiction as “self-refuting,” ignoring precisely
how the argument worked.

And now you respond as if I’d never given that answer. May I recommend
the “counseling profession,” Joe?

> [JP, 2008-04-02]:
>
> you are claiming that your argument remains true when applied to an I of
> any reality type. in a sense, you’ve made the word/symbol ‘I’ into a
> variable which ranges over a certain set of proposed reality types. you
> say the argument “covers all three of your reality types, since your I-1
> and I-3 are not phenomenal, while I-2 is phenomenal”.
>
> so, you’ve undertaken to show how you conclude (or to admit that you
> merely assume) that your argument is true for an I of an arbitrarily
> chosen reality type.
>
> ok. I choose the I-3.
>
> to back up your claim that your argument applies to an I-3, you must
> prove (or admit that you merely assume) either that there is no I-3 or
> that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its perceptions, that it
> is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so on.
>
> [NB: I am not assuming either that there is or that there is not an
> I-3. neither am I claiming that the I-3, if there is an I-3, is mortal
> or immortal, or self-identical or not self-identical and so on.]
>
> go ahead, give it your best shot. present any evidence and any arguments
> you may have for the proposition that “I-3 remain self-identical
> throughout all my perceptions”
>
> at the end of the day, however, you still have to deal with your claim
> that *any* I (of *any* reality type for which there are referents) may
> conclude ‘I have not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I
> am not nothing’.
>
> [JP (new material)]:
>
> Anthony, you’ve never addressed the question raised by your claim that
> your argument applied to all reality types: how do you know either that
> there is no I-3 or that the I-3 is self-identical throughout all its
> perceptions, that it is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so
> on?

Remember:

>>>>So my argument explicitly appealed to the IDENTITY of the first
>>>>person pronoun - i.e., that you have yet to produce any reason
>>>>whatsoever for the continued identity of the first person pronoun if
>>>>its referent were to lack a continued identity.

nah, of course you don’t remember. Googlers take note.

> >>So, Anthony, if you want to claim that I have not proven that I am not
> >>nothing; then, you have to *either* admit assuming that *you* can
> >>attribute predicates to nothingness, *or* present your proof that this
> >>is possible.
>
> >Sure, let me “prove” this using the Joseph Polanik maneuver:
>
> >1. I assert that I can attribute predicates to nothingness.
>
> >2. But I don’t have to address how I prove or know this, since all I
> >have to do is point out that Joseph Polanik hasn’t proven that this is
> >impossible, but only continually asserts it.
>
> >3. Therefore, by Joseph Polanik’s mode of argument, I can attribute
> >predicates to nothingness.
>
> this is a good start toward achieving intellectual integrity. bravo!
>
> I have no objection to 1 or 3; but, 2 is a complete fabrication.
>
> [JP, 2008-03-20]:
>
> [I make] “the assumption that one can not attribute predicates to
> nothingness”.
>
> I admit that the skeptical conclusion derived from your set of three
> premises can only be shown to be self-refuting if one assumes that that
> one can not attribute predicates to nothingness.
>
> so, unless you can find a flaw in every argument that is based on this
> assumption and which shows that your premises lead to a self-refuting
> conclusion:

lol again he mistakes the self-contradiction in a modus tollens for
self-refutation! Amazing! Googlers, take note (after note).

> 1. retract your skeptical conclusion until you revise your set of
> premises; or,
>
> 2. deny the assumption.
>
> but, there is no way to save your argument in its present form without
> denying the assumption that one can not attribute predicates to
> nothingness.
>
> [JP, (new material)]:
>
> it’s time to stop stonewalling, Anthony.
>
> why don’t you just admit that you assume that you have the power to
> attribute predicates to nothingness?
>
> if you don’t, your argument goes down with the House of Usher.

lol

>>>>>So my argument explicitly appealed to the IDENTITY of the first
>>>>>person pronoun - i.e., that you have yet to produce any reason
>>>>>whatsoever for the continued identity of the first person pronoun if
>>>>>its referent were to lack a continued identity.

Please, please address this argument, Joe? Pretty please, with sugar on top?

Posted on Tuesday, April 22nd, 2008 at 10:10 am
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