Heidegger

Cologne 31-Jan-2008

Anthony Crifasi schrieb Wed, 30 Jan 2008 07:22:36 -0600:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> > ME: For Aristotle, the philosopher sees _to theion_, which is the _aei on_, the “forever
> > being”, which can be the celestial bodies forever circling in their unchanging orbits,
> > but also _to ti aen einai_ or “the what-it-was-ness”, standardly translated into English
> > as “essence” or, in other words, the _eidos_, the ’sight’ by virtue of which a being
> > shows itself _as_ a being. The philosopher is able to see what a being always was, apart
> > from the accidents of its existence as _tode ti_, i.e. as “this some-what”.
>
> AC: I agree that for Aristotle, the philosopher sees both the eternal beings
> and the eidos, but I can’t find any text in which he characterizes
> (explicitly or implicitly) the *latter* as divine, whereas there are
> numerous texts in which he describes the former as a divine and godlike
> sight.
>
> > Similarly for
> > Plato, the philosopher is the rare one able to stand steadfastly looking at the sight of
> > the _ideai_ which are present also in everyday things. The traditional demarcation line
> > between Plato and Aristotle as ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ is one of the most stupid
> > prejudices in philosophy. This traditional view depends on taking Plato’s mythical
> > parables to explain things at face value, i.e. as the ‘real thing’. For both Plato and
> > Aristotle, even the lowly potato only shows itself as a being by virtue of the divine
> > _eidos_ of what it always already was, its _to ti aen einai_.
>
> AC: Again, for Aristotle, eidos yes, but I can’t find any reference to that
> as divine at all (as opposed to the philosopher’s “sight” of eternal
> beings, specifically). As for Plato, his own student Aristotle certainly
> didn’t take his separation of the Ideas from sensible things as merely a
> mythical parable, but rather as a distinct metaphysical thesis, which he
> opposes quite strongly in Metaphysics Zeta.
>
> > ME: For Aristotelean metaphysics to be of any (theological) use to Christianity, it must
> > exploit the ambiguity in Aristotle between _to theion_ and _ho theos_. Once this
> > ambiguity is clarified — which is fundamentally the same ambiguity in Plato and
> > Aristotle between _to on_ and _einai_, between beings and being — the ontological
> > difference can be seen more clearly.
>
> AC: Well, I still can’t find any text in which Aristotle refers to either
> the eidos of everyday beings, or the sight of simply these, as to
> theion. Nor am I saying that he limits the divine to the unmoved mover -
> as you point out, for example, the celestial beings are also described
> as divine beings. But he repeatedly calls them this in virtue of their
> physical *incorruptibility*.
>

ME: Most likely you have been put off the track by Christian translators and the millennia of
Christian theological commentators on Aristotle, for it is plain enough. Aristotle
distinguishes three “speculative philosophies” (_philosophiai theooraetikai_Met. 1026a 19)
viz. physics, mathematics and _philosophia theologikae_, this third dealing with the “divine”
(_theion_ Met. 1026a 20). This last philosophy, which he also calls the _prootae philosophia_
(”first philosophy” Met. 1026a 24), is also explicated as “a science of beings insofar as they
are beings” (_tis epistaemae tou ontos haei on_ Met. 1064a29) which, he says, deals with an
_ousia_ which he calls _theion_ (”divine” Met. 1064a 36) and which is also the _prootae kai
kyriootatae archae_ “first and most powerful beginning” (Met. 1064a 37).

Now, the Christian commentators interpret this “first and most powerful beginning” as God,
thus shifting from _to theion_ to _ho theos_, but this is a sleight of hand because Aristotle
refers to the WHOLE of the philosophy of “beings insofar as they are beings” as _philosophia
theologikae_, not just some of its later books. And indeed the Metaphysics studies most of all
_ousia_, which is _to ti aen einai_ “the what-was-ness” of beings which accounts for them
being what they are, i.e. their _archae_. “The what-was-ness” of beings always was as it was,
unaffected by accidents (_symbebaekos_, “that which comes along”), and is therefore _to aei
on_ and _akinaetos_ (unmoving).

And of course, ALL beings, even the most banal and everyday, insofar as they are beings, show
their “sights”, i.e. _eidoi_. The _eidae_ must be present in everyday things for them to be AS
they are, i.e. to SHOW themselves AS they are. Moreover, banal, everyday beings, too, have an
essence, i.e. “the what-was-ness” that accounts for them being what they are, and thus
inhabited by “the what-was-ness”, they are insofar divine.

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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred (c)_-_-
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Posted on Thursday, January 31st, 2008 at 3:50 pm
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