Heidegger

Michael Eldred wrote:

> ME: Most likely you have been put off the track by Christian translators and the millennia of
> Christian theological commentators on Aristotle, for it is plain enough. Aristotle
> distinguishes three “speculative philosophies” (_philosophiai theooraetikai_Met. 1026a 19)
> viz. physics, mathematics and _philosophia theologikae_, this third dealing with the “divine”
> (_theion_ Met. 1026a 20).

That text states:

“Hence, there should be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics,
physics, and theology. For it is clear that if the divine is present
anywhere, it would be present in a nature of this sort, and the most
honorable science should be concerned with the most honorable of things.”

In the sentences almost immediately following the above text, he
explicitly states what “the most honorable of things” means:

“…if there were no substances OTHER THAN THOSE FORMED BY NATURE,
physics would be the first science; BUT IF THERE IS AN IMMOVABLE
SUBSTANCE, this would be prior, and the science of it would be first
philosophy and would be universal in this manner, in view of the fact
that it is first. And it would be the concern of this science, TOO, to
investigate being qua being…” (1026a28-33)

So he very clearly states here that if there were no immovable
substance, there wouldn’t even be a science of metaphysics at all, and
that physics instead would be the highest science. Only *after* saying
that does he then go on to add what you point out:

> This last philosophy, which he also calls the _prootae philosophia_
> (”first philosophy” Met. 1026a 24), is also explicated as “a science of beings insofar as they
> are beings” (_tis epistaemae tou ontos haei on_ Met. 1064a29) which, he says, deals with an
> _ousia_ which he calls _theion_ (”divine” Met. 1064a 36) and which is also the _prootae kai
> kyriootatae archae_ “first and most powerful beginning” (Met. 1064a 37).

That 1064a29 text begins:

“Since there is a science of being qua being and separate, we must
inquire whether we should posit this to be the same as physics or rather
distinct from it.”

So at this point, the question of whether there is a science of
metaphysics at all isn’t settled yet, *despite* the fact that he has
already said that there is a science of being qua being. At this point,
it still could be physics. So how does he demonstrate that the science
of being qua being is metaphysics and not physics? What he immediately
states next:

“Thus, there is a science distinct from these which is concerned WITH
SEPARATE AND IMMOVABLE BEING, IF INDEED THERE EXISTS SUCH A SUBSTANCE,
that is, one which is separate and immovable, as we shall try to show.
And if indeed there is such a nature in things, the divine, too, would
be here if anywhere, and this nature would be the primary and most
dominant principle.” (a31-b2)

In the last sentence, he states that it is precisely the existence of a
separate and immovable nature that is the locus for divinity here. So
not only is being qua being not enough to make metaphysics divine; it is
not even enough for there to even be a science of metaphysics at all
above physics, as he states yet again just a few lines later:

“If, then, natural substances are the first of things, physics will be
the first of the sciences, too; but if there is another nature or
substance which is separate and immovable, the science of it, too, must
be distinct from and prior to physics, and also universal by being
prior.” (1064b10-14)

So physics *would be* first philosophy if “natural substances are the
first of things,” and only the existence of “another nature or substance
which is separate and immovable” distinguishes a higher science.

> Now, the Christian commentators interpret this “first and most powerful beginning” as God,
> thus shifting from _to theion_ to _ho theos_, but this is a sleight of hand because Aristotle
> refers to the WHOLE of the philosophy of “beings insofar as they are beings” as _philosophia
> theologikae_, not just some of its later books. And indeed the Metaphysics studies most of all
> _ousia_, which is _to ti aen einai_ “the what-was-ness” of beings which accounts for them
> being what they are, i.e. their _archae_. “The what-was-ness” of beings always was as it was,
> unaffected by accidents (_symbebaekos_, “that which comes along”), and is therefore _to aei
> on_ and _akinaetos_ (unmoving).

In the above texts, Aristotle explicitly bases the distinctness of first
philosophy from physics on the existence of an immovable substance, not
on the fact that it studies being qua being. GIVEN that metaphysics is
distinct from physics, it then belongs to that science (instead of
physics) to consider being qua being. But he explicitly states above
that physics itself would be first philosophy if there were no
substances higher than physical ones.

> And of course, ALL beings, even the most banal and everyday, insofar as they are beings, show
> their “sights”, i.e. _eidoi_. The _eidae_ must be present in everyday things for them to be AS
> they are, i.e. to SHOW themselves AS they are. Moreover, banal, everyday beings, too, have an
> essence, i.e. “the what-was-ness” that accounts for them being what they are, and thus
> inhabited by “the what-was-ness”, they are insofar divine.

Posted on Friday, February 1st, 2008 at 8:55 pm
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