Heidegger

Michael Eldred wrote:

>>>>>> AC: What is your complete translation of 1064a29-37?
>>>>> ME: “Since there is a science of beings qua beings and standing for itself, it
>>>>> must be investigated whether this is to be posited as the same as physical
>>>>> science or rather as different. Physical science is about beings having a
>>>>> beginning/principle of movement within themselves, whereas mathematical science
>>>>> is [also] theoretical and is about something permanent, but not standing for
>>>>> itself. About being (_on_) standing for itself and immovable, therefore, there
>>>>> is a science different from both of these if there is such an _ousia_
>>>>> (beingness), and I mean standing for itself and immovable, which we shall
>>>>> attempt to show. And if there is such a nature (_physis_) in beings, here, if
>>>>> anywhere, would be the divine, and this would be the first and most powerful
>>>>> beginning/principle.”
>
> ME: Aristotle has already copiously shown that there is _ousia_
> (beingness), e.g. as the
> categories. Now he intends to show that there is a sense of beingness
> that is “forever and immovable and standing for itself”.

That’s not what your own translation says. According to the exact words
of your translation, he says that he intends to show “if there is such
an ousia … standing for itself and immovable,” not “if there is a such
a SENSE of ousia … standing for itself and immovable.” When Aristotle
is referring to the SENSES of something, he simply says so - for
example, look at the beginning of Met. V, where he states that he is
going to discuss the various SENSES of being. Your reading therefore (1)
depends on adding words that aren’t there, and (2) is inconsistent with
the manner in which he expressed himself in other texts where he WAS
doing the kind of thing that you are talking about here.

>> AC: Again, I don’t deny that there would be a “universal philosophy” and
>> therefore “first philosophy” if all beings were physical. What I’m
>> saying is that this universal and first philosophy would then be
>> physics. In other words, there would be no META-physical science at all
>> in that case, since physics would be the first science. (1064b10)
>
> ME: You just don’t get it. It IS META-physical to investigate even
> physical beings qua beings (and not qua movable beings).

Whether it *is* or not is beside the point - we are talking about what
Aristotle says. And what he says here is that physics would be the first
science if there were only physical beings. (1064b10) It is impossible
for physics to be the first science and for there to be a metaphysical
science at the same time, since he says that metaphysics must be more
universal than physics by being prior to it. (1064b14) Nothing can be
prior to the first science.

>> AC: The only reason you think that a factical or
>> ontic cause can only be an effective cause is that you don’t see how the
>> ontic includes more than what a philosopher considers an individual
>> being. Causes that aren’t considered individual beings can also be
>> thought just ontically - for example, Aquinas didn’t think that formal,
>> material, and final causes were individual beings themselves either.
>
> ME: There is no such thing as a (purely) “factical or ontic cause”
> because to be a cause is
> already a mode of being, i.e. an ontological determination.

You’re talking *traditional* ontology, not ontology in Heidegger’s
sense. You walk an undefined line between the two, thereby equivocating
on the word “ontology” throughout. Of course what *Aristotle*
considers ontology will include beings as causes, since his philosophy
is part of the metaphysical tradition, whose categories presuppose the
priority of scientific knowing (of which the philosophical priority of
knowing *causes* is a natural outcome). But both Husserlian and
Heideggerian phenomenologies specifically abstain from all such
metaphysical considerations. Heidegger does not deduce or consider
beings *as causes* at all, because for Heidegger, that is how beings
show themselves to the deprived sight of scientific knowing, not to real
ontology.

> ME: The issue is whether _eidos_ is to be understood ALWAYS as
> beingness, i.e. as an aspect
> of the beingness of beings. I say yes. If these commentators say yes,
> too, then there’s no
> dispute. Even when _eidos_ is translated as ‘kind’, i.e. apparently as
> an ontic
> classification of beings, it is still, in truth, ontological, namely,
> the sight shared by certain beings qua beings.

If an eidos is shared by beings qua beings, then it would be shared by
*all* beings, since all beings are beings. Yet there are clearly many
“kinds” of beings within the whole of beings, so eidos in this sense is
not necessarily shared by beings qua beings at all.

> ME: Physics just doesn’t think — it presupposes ontological categories
> such as cause about
> which it is unclear. You are simply clueless about the ontological
> nature of all causes,
> even the most banal, apparently ‘purely’ ontic cause. Take the utterly
> simple example: the
> rain causes the ground to get wet. According to your ontical analysis,
> presumably, the rain,
> the ground, the wet ground are simply ontic. simply beings pure and
> simple. Be that as it
> may. That the rain causes the ground to get wet is already ontological
> because the rain is
> now addressed AS or qua cause, which is a definite mode of being, i.e.
> the rain in its
> beingness qua _aitios_. Similarly, the ground is also addressed
> ontologically as owing its
> wet condition to the rain. These are just simple phenomenological finger
> exercises that you have not yet learnt.

You will have to show me the phenomenologist who considers beings as
*causes*. Husserl? Nope. Heidegger? Nope. Why? Because the consideration
of beings as causes belongs to *scientific metaphysics* not
phenomenology, which explicitly abstains from all such considerations.
What Aristotle is doing is scientific metaphysical ontology, not
phenomenological ontology. You are simply equivocating on ontology
throughout here.

> ME: “being qua being” is a meaningless, thoughtless phrase as far as I
> see. What’s it
> supposed to mean?? If it is the translation of Latin “ens qua ens”, it
> is also a scandalous mistranslation.

I want to preface this by acknowledging that my translation skills are
far below yours. That being said: between your overly literal
translation of “en tois ousin” in the face of a philosopher who was
native to ancient Greek, your addition of non-existent words to your own
translation of the 1064a text (above) to make your reading work, and the
disagreement of ancient Greek commentators with your reading and
translation of Aristotle’s immovable ousia, authoritative dismissiveness
regarding translations may not be the most appropriate attitude in this
discussion.

> ME: Of course, for Aristotle, matter is an ontological category through
> and through. And,
> within the context of his Metaphysics at the very least, even the most
> banal and apparently
> ontic is viewed with regard to its beingness. Even in being _ti_
> (somewhat) a being is
> already addressed in the category of whatness, i.e.ontologically. And
> every single ontic,
> factual being, in being somewhat and somehow and in-relation-to… and
> somewhere and at
> sometime, etc., i.e. in its PREDICAMENT, is thematized ontologically.
> The circumstance that
> these most simple of categories are invariably overlooked and taken for
> granted is just
> philosophical blindness, which is the usual state of affairs. You, too,
> have not yet learned to see them.

Matter can hardly belong to beings insofar as they are beings, since if
it were, all being would be material, physical, and mobile. Yes matter,
like anything else, can be considered insofar as its beingness, but then
you’re not talking about matter as *an ontological category* anymore. As
for Aristotle’s Categories, these are not necessarily ontological (in
Aristotle’s sense) at all - for example, since the immovable ousia has
no magnitude, it is not “somewhere” at all. Nor is it “sometime,” since
it is immovable and time is the number of motion. Again, yes even these
can be considered simply in their beingness, but then they aren’t being
considered as *ontological categories* themselves.

>>> ME: But you are not including two commentators on Aristotle (and Plato) who could
>>> clear up the confusions you obviously have about the ontological, namely, Hegel and
>>> Heidegger.
>> AC: They don’t have the advantage of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius
>> of being native to ancient Greek, which was my demand. So since the
>> latter also fulfill your demand of excluding Christian or Muslim
>> religiosity from the picture, they are the ideal test for both of us.
>
> ME: They are no test at all insofar as their interpretation of Aristotle
> is inadequate.

which is precisely the point at issue.

> We
> could go off on a wild goose chase and start debating the writings of
> Alexander of
> Aphrodisias, but that would only be shifting the scene of the problem
> and replicating,
> which, however, can only be resolved by interpreting Aristotle’s text
> phenomenologically in
> an adequate manner. The issue between us, as has become apparent, comes
> down to what an
> ontological investigation is AT ALL, and, it seems to me, you are
> completely confused about
> how deep ontology goes. There is just no way of cleanly separating the
> ontic from the
> ontological — it’s nonsense. And, as far as I can see, you’re also
> clueless about where
> ontology even starts, since you claim that this and that are merely
> onticc.

Let’s start with this: scientific metaphysical ontology is not
Heideggerian phenomenological ontology. Agreed?

>>> ME: And how can _eidos_ be understood merely ontically??
>> AC: Look at Aristotle’s simple example of a bronze ball in Metaphysics
>> XII.3. He identifies its eidos with its round shape. That’s supposed to
>> pass for ontology? Beingness as an ontic quality like shape? For
>> Heidegger, beingness could never be identified with anything like that.
>
> ME: You really are confused about ontology. Of course the ball’s round
> shape is its _eidos_
> for Aristotle, for it is its roundness that makes it a ball. Its mode of
> being is roundness,
> and it is only by virtue of this sight that it can show itself qua ball.

Roundness is not predicated of the ball insofar as it is a *being* even
in Aristotle’s traditional sense - if it were, then every being would be
round, simply because every being is a being! It’s really time to tone
down the talk of “confusion” right about now - that’s basic Aristotelian
metaphysics. The ontological consideration of a ball isn’t about what
makes a ball a ball (THAT is roundness). It’s about what makes a ball a
*being*, as everything else is a being. The science of beings as balls
would be about what makes a ball a ball, and would be limited to just
those beings that are balls, just as physics is limited to just physical
beings.

>>>> “Ontologically, every idea of a ‘subject’ – unless refined by a previous
>>>> ontological determination of its basic character – still posits the
>>>> subjectum (hypokeimenon) along with it, no matter how vigorous one’s
>>>> ontical protestations against the ‘soul substance’ or the ‘reification
>>>> of consciousness.’” (SuZ 46)
>>> ME: This is a crass mistranslation which distorts the sense entirely. It should read:
>>> “Every idea of ’subject’ — in case it has not been refined by a prior fundamental
>>> ontological determination — still performs also an _ontological_ approach to the
>>> subjectum (hypokeimenon), no matter how vigorous the protestations are ontically
>>> against a ’soul substance’ or the ‘reification of consciousness’.”

Here’s Stambaugh’s:

“Every idea of a subject - unless refined by a previous ontological
determination of its basic character - still posits the subjectum
(hupokeimenon) ontologically along with it, no matter how energetic
one’s ontic protestations against the “substantial soul” or the
“reification of consciousness.”

>>> Heidegger is saying here that the ontological aspect (of the subject) cannot be got
>>> rid of, even when it is intended ‘purely’ ontically.
>> AC: Your rendition would have Heidegger insisting here that an ontological
>> approach to the subject is unavoidable no matter how vigorously we
>> protest ontic versions of the subject (like a soul substance). What
>> sense does that make? Why would protestations against ontic entities
>> like a soul substance or the reification of consciousness ever be
>> thought *opposed* to an ontological approach towards the subject?
>
> ME: You are again reading upside down - ’soul substance’ is an
> ontological category.
> Heidegger is insisting that any idea of subject is implicitly
> ontological.

He’s clearly *criticizing* any idea of subject that still implies the
subjectum (hypokeimenon), since he says that this will be the case when
“it has NOT been refined by a prior fundamental ontological
determination,” a determination which he is promoting. So he is saying
that the idea of subject still implies the subjectum (bad) no matter how
much we ontically deny a ’soul substance’ or the ‘reification of
consciousness’. Many philosophers thought they could get around a
subjectum merely by ontically denying a soul or a reified consciousness
(e.g., Husserl). So for Heidegger, implying a subjectum is bad (solved
by prior ontological determination), and this problem is not
circumvented by just ontically denying a soul or reified consciousness.

>>>> AC: This simply presupposes that the original philosopher didn’t understand
>>>> these ontically from the start, which is precisely the point at issue.
>>> ME: He would not have been a philosopher if he had done so, because philosophy is the
>>> uncovering of the being of beings. And how the hell do you understand principles
>>> (_archai_), elements (_stoicheia_) or causes (_aitia_) ontically??!! By referring to
>>> facts??
>> AC: For example, look at his third meaning of archai at Met. 1013a5. That’s
>> clearly ontic (the keel of a ship, the foundation of a house, the heart
>> or brain of an animal…). Or his next meaning - a father or mother is
>> an archai of a child as generator. These are clearly ontic meanings of
>> archai, though I would also argue that his first two meanings are ontic.
>
> ME: Not at all. AS _archai_, the keel, foundation of a house, father or
> mother, etc. are
> ONTOLOGICAL because _archae_ is their mode of being, their beingness, in
> each case.

In each case, the archai is an individual being - the archae of the ship
is a being - the keel; of the house, a being - the foundation, etc. The
archae of each thing is not beingness, but a being. To be the archae of
the ship does not belong to the keel insofar as it is a being, since if
that were the case, ALL beings would be the archae of the ship, since
all beings are beings. These meanings of archae are therefore not
ontological, since they are not about these beings insofar as they are
simply beings.

>> AC: As for aitia, look at the very next chapter, the first meaning - the
>> bronze of a statue or the silver of a cup. This is clearly ontic,
>> despite the fact that Aristotle says elsewhere that this cause is NOT “a
>> this” at all. The third meaning (effective cause) you have already
>> granted to be ontic. Again, these are the clear cases, though I’d also
>> that the other two meanings are also ontic.
>
> ME: ditto balderdash. And I have in NO WAY granted “(effective cause)
> … to be ontic”.

You said that the ontic reading of the immovable ousia would limit the
understanding of it to only an effective cause.

> You
> don’t get it that ALL the definitions in Delta and ALL the examples,
> even the seemingly most
> banally ontic, are ONTOLOGICAL. E.g. the silver of the cup AS _aitios_
> is addressed in its
> beingness qua (material) cause — _to on haei on_ — the being in its
> beingness, its
> _ousia_.

You are confusing what makes the silver silver, and what makes the
silver a cause, with what makes the silver a *being*. Nothing is a
material cause simply insofar as it is a being, since if that were the
case, all beings would be material causes since every being is equally a
being! Michael this is basic! You are fundamentally misunderstanding
what Aristotle means when he says he’s going to consider beings simply
insofar as they are beings. If the consideration of the silver insofar
as it is being included the consideration of silver as a material cause,
then everything would be a material cause simply because it is a being.
Only the most universal attributes are included in the consideration of
beings as beings, precisely because all beings are beings. And don’t
confuse this with the consideration of the silver as a being (which IS
ontological in Aristotle’s sense), since the silver as existing and the
silver as a material cause are different. One is about silver a material
cause (unlike many things which aren’t and can’t be material causes);
the other is about silver simply as a being, like anything else.

>> AC: As for stoicheia, look at the next chapter, the very first meaning - the
>> first constituents of a thing, like the parts of water being water.
>
> ME: Again balderdash. The _stoicheia_ as parts of a whole invoke the
> ontological _eidae_ of
> part and whole. You are overlooking everything ontological in even the
> most banal and
> imagining that you end up with the purely ontic.

The parts of water are not elements of water insofar as they are beings,
but insofar as they are first constituents of something. Not every being
is a first constituent, so being a first constituent doesn’t belong to
simple beingness, and therefore doesn’t belong to the consideration of
being insofar as its simple beingness! It *does*, however, belong to the
consideration of first causes.

>>> ME: The 55 is not ontologically derived but empirically observed in the motions of
>>> heavenly bodies and is thus not terribly interesting philosophically. The important
>>> ontological point for Aristotle is that the _telos_ of the motion of the heavenly
>>> bodies, their _eidos_ as immovable mover, is the circle, which is at the same time _to
>>> kalon_, the fair.
>> AC: How does that address the huge problem that his numbering of the
>> immovable ousia causes for your ontological reading of it as the
>> beingness of beings? If the immovable ousia were equivalent to
>> ontological beingness, why would he ever number this - or rather, what
>> could it possibly *mean* at all to number this without immediately
>> descending into ontic beings instead of beingness? If the immovable
>> ousia is an ontic being, then his numbering makes perfect sense, since
>> each first motion needs a mover, so if there are 55 first motions
>> observed, then it can be deduced that there must be 55 first movers for
>> them. But 55 beingnesses of beings … huh?
>
> ME: Each empirically observed celestial movement has the same _eidos_,
> namely the circle.
> There is no way to deduce ontologically the number 55. Nor is there any
> ‘ontic’ ‘deduction’; you just have to count them empirically.

What is “them”? The spheres? But he says that there aren’t just 55
spheres, but also 55 immovable movers (Met. 1074a15). He counts the
spheres empirically, but then deduces that there must be the same number
of immovable movers. So if immovable mover here meant beingness, then
you would have Aristotle affirming 55 beingnesses. This non-sensical
result disappears, of course, if the immovable mover is what I and
almost every commentator in history have taken it to mean - an ontic being.

Posted on Tuesday, February 19th, 2008 at 1:25 am
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