Heidegger

Michael Eldred wrote:

>> AC: First and most importantly, I’d be happy for a rebuttal to the
>> specific
>> argument I gave regarding the text at 1064a28-36, which was:
>>
>> 1. Aristotle begins by unequivocally affirming that there is a science
>> of being in its beingness (1064a28), so that is settled.
>> 2. Just a few lines later, Aristotle clearly implies that he has *not
>> yet* shown that there is immovable ousia, so THAT is still in suspense.
>> (1064a36)
>>
>> Given those two items, how can immovable ousia in #2 possibly be the
>> same as the beingness in #1? The only possible explanation that accounts
>> for BOTH of the above items is that immovable ousia (#2) refers to a
>> specific being - the immovable first cause (whose existence is argued in
>> the next book of the Metaphysics), not beingness.
>
> ME: “The only possible explanation”?? That’s just tunnel-mindedness. I
> already suggested another reading in my last
> post, viz. that the investigation of _ousia_ has to be deepened with
> regard to the question concerning the possibility
> of an immovable _ousia_ in one or several of its meanings.

What is your complete translation of 1064a29-37?

>> AC: Secondly, regarding the title of theological philosophy for the
>> whole of
>> the metaphysics, he states in the very next book (XII):
>>
>> 1. The subject of this (metaphysical) inquiry is ousia. (1069a18)
>> 2. He is seeking the principles and causes of ousia. (following line)
>> 3. There does exist an immovable ousia (ch. 7)
>> 4. The principle and first of beings is immovable AND IS THE CAUSE OF
>> THE FIRST MOTION (1073a25)
>>
>> Text #4 clearly rules out interpreting the immovable ousia here as
>> beingness, since he explicitly identifies it with the cause of the first
>> motion (which is that of the outer sphere). This is therefore a
>> reference to the unmoved mover whose existence was just argued a few
>> lines earlier. He also calls it the principle and first of beings. So
>> that’s why the WHOLE of metaphysics is theological philosophy - because
>> what any Aristotelian science aims at uncovering is not only its proper
>> subject matter (#1), but also the principles and causes of its subject
>> matter (#2), and he explicitly states that the principle and first of
>> beings is the immovable mover (#4 - again, explicitly identified by him
>> here with the first cause of motion).
>
> ME: You seem to be understanding this “first cause of motion” as an
> effective cause, but that is by no means obvious,
> and certainly NOT to be taken for granted (see below).
> …
>> AC: The classic ontic reading of Aristotle’s immovable ousia that I am
>> defending is very capable of getting somewhere with the problem -
>> namely, it would immediately make being more universal than physical
>> being (since there would be more beings than just physical ones), so
>> that the science of being (simply) would then HAVE to be relegated to a
>> *more universal* science than physics. Without that, the science of
>> being would not be more universal (as Aristotle demands), since its
>> subject matter (being) would be co-extensive with physical being.
>
> ME: That strategy in itself gets nowhere at all with the problem
> because it rules out dogmatically the possibility of
> considering physical beings as being inhabited by an immovable _ousia_
> in a certain way. If there were no immovable
> being in the ontic sense, then there would only be physical (and
> perhaps mathematical) beings ontically and that would
> be the WHOLE, and the metaphysical investigation of this whole would
> be. _katholou_, i.e. toward the whole or
> ‘universal’.

There would, in that case, be no *META-physical* investigation, since
the investigation of being belongs to the science that considers the
WHOLE, which would in that case be physics. He says that metaphysics is
universal by being prior to physics (1064b13), but no science would be
prior to physics if physics is the first science (1064b11). So there
would be no more universal science of meta-physics at all in that case.

>> AC: The reading that I am defending does not deny that Aristotelian
>> metaphysics explicates non-physical beings in their beingness. What it
>> states is that metaphysics ALSO investigates non-physical beings
>> ontically - i.e., not with regard to their simple beingness, but
>> specifically insofar as they are factical *causes*, FIRST causes. That
>> investigation is in Metaphysics XII. This is in no way excluded by the
>> fact that metaphysics also investigates these causes (along with
>> everything else) in their simple beingness.
>
> ME: This is utter nonsense. Book XII Lambda is through and through an
> ontological investigation, namely of _ousia_ in
> VARIOUS senses, and _aitios_ (cause) is for Aristotle an ONTOLOGICAL
> category with a fourfold meaning (which you
> implicitly are reducing to onefold, namely, EFFECTIVE cause). Now you
> are falling back again into the split between
> ontic and ontological which would break the Metaphysics apart. What do
> you mean by “factical *causes*”? “Factical”
> suggests something ontic, a being, as an _effective_ cause.

Where did I ever say or imply that? I readily grant that Aristotle says
it causes motion precisely as a final cause (1072b2).

>> AC: Aristotle explicitly says at Physics 198a29: “But a mover that is
>> not
>> movable is not a cause within physics, for it moves without having in
>> itself motion or a principle of motion, but is immovable.” The manner in
>> which he reconciles this with the fact that the immovable mover lives
>> and thinks begins at Metaphysics XII.7, which we can discuss if you
>> like.
>
> ME: Presumably because the “immovable mover” has a principle/beginning
> of movement within itself, but this is not the
> principle/beginning of its OWN movement, but of that of other beings.

Yes that’s how I read it.

> An “immovable mover” is after all, without doubt,
> a beginning (principle) of movement.

I never denied that - it’s obviously the first *mover*. I thought you
were trying to argue that the immovable mover can’t be what demarcates
metaphysics from physics because it has an internal principle of motion,
and is therefore a cause within physics. That’s why I responded with the
above text from Physics 198a29.

> You’re always claiming that Aristotle “explicitly says” this or that,
> as if no thinking were necessary to understand
> what the text says. It indicates a very naive view of hermeneutics.
> And to boot, you are always using translations
> (instead of the ‘horse’s mouth’ of the primary text) which themselves
> cannot be anything other than interpretations.

When hermeneutics means that we read a foreign language from a distance
of over 20 centuries without checking ourselves against other ancient
commentators who had a much more contemporaneous knowledge of the
language (such as Alexander of Aphrodisias or Philoponus on “en tois
ousin”), then I think we’re mistaking hermeneutics for something else.

> ME: So far, the only medieval commentary I have argued against is the
> Thomist one as presented by Horst Seidl and I do
> so for the reasons given above regarding the philosophical task as I
> see it in order to justify the title _philosophia
> theologikae_ for the Metaphysics as a whole. I deepen my critique of
> an ontic interpretation of the “immovable mover”
> below, providing instead an ontological reading that follows the
> convolutions of Aristotle’s path of thinking.

Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysics isn’t the only one which
reads Aristotle in the way that I have been describing. The Islamic
commentators, Averroes and Avicenna, read the passages we have been
discussing in precisely the same way. I assume you would critique their
conclusion similarly (as a product of their religiosity), which is why I
have been emphasizing Alexander of Aphrodisias.

….
>>> ME: Let us return to one of the sites where Aristotle introduces
>>> the designation of _philosophia theologikae_ for
>> the
>>> WHOLE of his metaphysical investigation, namely Book Epsilon Chap.
>>> 1, which is repeated in a slightly different
>>> version in Book Kappa. He says at 1026a5-6:
>>> _kai dioti kai peri psychaes enias theooraesai tou physikous, hosae
>>> mae aneu taej hylaes estin_
>>> “And therefore also some of the theory of the psyche is of physical
>>> beings insofar as they are NOT without
>>> matter.”
>>> This is already a clue because we can conclude, conversely, that
>>> some of the theory of the psyche/soul is of
>>> physical beings insofar as they ARE WITHOUT matter. And this is
>>> where the _theion_ (”divine” 1026a20) comes down
>>> to earth and is _en tois ousin_ “in beings”. You will surely not
>>> deny that the psyche in Aristotle’s thinking is
>>> “in beings”, namely, in the body (_sooma_) of a living thing which
>>> is living by virtue of having the psyche in
>>> it. The psyche, however, according to Aristotle, is of two parts,
>>> namely, _nous kai orexis_ (”mind and appetite_
>>> 1071a3). Now, it is _nous_ which has the sight of the _eidos_ in its
>>> sights, and Aristotle says that it is
>>> precisely the _eidos ae to enantion_ (”the sight or its opposite”
>>> 1070b32) which is _to kinoun_ (”the mover”
>>> 1070b31) in the realm of thought. The “opposite” is the _steraesis_
>>> (”lack” 1070b19) which is one of the three
>>> beginnings/principles of “all beings” (_pantoon_ 1070b18), namely,
>>> _to eidos kai hae steraesis kai hae hyle_
>>> (”the sight and the lack and matter” 1070b19). An example is _eidos,
>>> ataxia toiadi, plinthoi_ (sight, this
>>> disorder, bricks 1070b29) for _to kinoun oikodomikae_ (”the mover
>>> the art of house-building”, 1070b29). It is the
>>> _eidos_ (sight) which as _energeiai_ (”at work” 1071a8) is
>>> _chooriston_ (”separable” 1071a9). It is the _eidos_
>>> which exists _aneu hylaes_ (”without matter”1070a17) in the _nous_
>>> (”mind” 1070a27).
>>>
>>> And guess what? It is the presence of the _eidos_-seeing or
>>> ’sight-seeing’ _nous_ in the human psyche, which for
>>> Aristotle is the presence of the _theion_ (divine) in the physical
>>> beings called human beings, and the presence
>>> of _ousia_ (beingness) as_eidos_ in ALL beings which for Aristotle
>>> is the presence of the _theion_ (divine) in
>>> ALL beings.
>>>
>>> Remember the final definition of _ousia_ in Delta 8? It is _eidos_,
>>> namely, the beingness (_ousia_) of beings, an ONTOLOGICAL
>>> signification.
>>>
>>> And it is the _nous_ (as a part of the soul) and its seeing of the
>>> _eidos_ which forms the transition for
>>> Aristotle to think the immovable mover, _to akinaeton kinoun_, in
>>> Book Lambda as the _ho theos_ (”the god”
>>> 1072b31). In its _energei_ (”at-work-ness” 1072b22) the _nous_ “has”
>>> (_echoon_ 1072b23) “what is thought and
>>> beingness” (_tou noaetou kai taes ousias_ 1072b22). And that is why
>>> it “seems that mind is, among all phenomena,
>>> the most divine” (_kokei men gar [nous] einai toon phainomenoon
>>> theiotaton_ 1074b46) The god for Aristotle is the
>>> pure energy of thinking thinking.
>>
>> AC: You can’t be unaware of how the reading of Aristotle that I’m
>> defending
>> explains this? The essential difference between “the eidos -seeing or
>> ’sight-seeing’ _nous_ in the human psyche” and the _eidos_ of every
>> other material being is precisely that nous is the only component of the
>> human psyche that is not the activity of any material organ (On the
>> Soul, III.4-5). So there’s an obvious affinity with the theion there. As
>> for the ousia “in all beings,” I’ve already shown by an explicit example
>> that the phrase, en tois ousin, was also used in ancient Greek
>> literature to mean “among all things,” in which case Aristotle was
>> talking about whether there is an immovable ousia among all the things
>> that exist, not actually in things themselves. So yes, both human nous
>> and the immovable ousia are theion, precisely because in both cases
>> Aristotle is speaking ontically - a specific immaterial power of the
>> human psyche, and a specific immaterial being.
>
> ME: Once again the ontic/ontological split. You can’t be seriously
> claiming that talking of “a specific immaterial power
> of the human psyche” is “speaking ontically”??!! And once again, you
> are changing the topic and ignoring my argument: do
> you seriously deny that, for Aristotle, the _eidos_ (one meaning of
> _ousia_ as beingness) is present in ALL beings ??!!
> And it is precisely _eidos_ (along with _steraesis_ and _hylae_) on
> which Aristotle concentrates in Lambda in preparing
> the ground for the introduction of the god in Chap. 7. But despite
> these defects, you have now at least given in a
> millimetre and admitted the presence of something “divine” “in
> beings”, at least in human beings, namely the faculty of
> _nous_ IN human beings which sees the _eidae_.

Of course, but that goes nowhere towards proving your more general claim
about the “divine” “in beings,” since the reading that I’m defending
easily accounts for why he refers to “nous in human beings” as divine -
not because the eidos that it sees in all beings is divine, but because
the faculty ITSELF is godlike and divine. So yes, humans have a divine
part *in* them, but they are the ONLY physical beings (terrestrial ones)
that do. I can’t think of any text in which Aristotle refers to the
eidos in any other terrestrial being as divine, unless we include the
1064a text regarding immovable ousia and assume that en tois ousin there
cannot mean what I have demonstrated that it can mean in ancient Greek
philosophical contexts.

>> AC: And before throwing out the Christian boogeyman again, you should
>> know
>> that the above reading of nous is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias too.
>> I haven’t checked Simplicius yet.
>
> ME: If Alexander of Aphrodisias is so confused about the ontological
> difference as you are (I don’t know if he is), it
> would be better to leave him aside and instead to think through
> Aristotle’s path of thinking between the start of Lambda
> and its Chap. 7.

There are many prominent contemporary Aristotle scholars and translators
who, like you, mistrust the medieval Christian commentators, like Martha
Nussbaum and Richard Sorabji. Even these, however, acknowledge Alexander
of Aphrodisias as the greatest commentator of the ancient peripatetic
school and the last “authentic” commentator, precisely because he was
non-Christian, Greek, and very early on in the commentary tradition.
(Other prominent Aristotle scholars, like Myles Burnyeat, do not have as
low an opinion of later commentators.) So it’s a bit one-sided to
dogmatically dismiss the medieval commentators while blissfully leaving
aside the ones that could throw that very dismissal into serious doubt,
as I think they would. Serious scholarship would demand investigating
both before jumping to conclusions.

> Aristotle doesn’t just postulate the existence of a god but attempts
> to ground it through an
> investigation of _ousia_ in its VARIOUS ONTOLOGICAL senses. This is
> what he announces in the first line of Book Lambda.
>
> Remember that in Book Epsilon the issue is whether there is an _ousia_
> that is _aidion kai akinaeton kai chooriston_
> (”forever and immovable and separable” 1026a10).
>
> I intended to trace the path of thinking in Book Lambda from the start
> through to Chap. 7, but it became too long, so
> here is a shorter summary with the salient points:
>
> NB: ALL THREE epithets occur once again at the start of Lambda Chap. 1
>
> The focus of Aristotle’s investigation of _ousia_ is not on a taxonomy
> of different kinds of beings, but on how the
> being of beings is to be explicated through analyzing them into three
> _aitia_ (”causes” 1069b33) or _archai_
> (”principles/ruling beginnings” 1069b33) or _ousiai_ (1070b14) or
> _stoicheia_ (”elements” 1070b11) He uses all four
> terms. These three are 1) _eidos_ (sight, ‘form’) 2) _steraesis_
> (lack, privation) 3) _hylae_ (matter) (1070b18)
>
> It is obvious that these three _ousiai_ are not ontic beings, but name
> the beingness of beings, so that the
> investigation in Book Lambda is ontological through and through.

Ontic existence is not limited to individual existing beings. Quantum
“particles” are not considered actual beings in contemporary physics.
Neither is the space-time continuum or gravity or strings. Yet these
hardly constitute an analysis of beings on an ontological level. So the
fact that form, matter, and privation aren’t actual beings themselves
hardly means that they constitute an ontological analysis of beings.

> Therefore, how Aristotle thinks “the god” in Chap. 7 is
> also ontological through and through, and is based on an ontological
> path in thinking which comes to elucidate how the
> god IN ITS BEINGNESS is to be explicated, and by no means as a kind of
> ‘proof’ of its ‘ontic’ existence, an endeavour
> which is simply not a match for the depth of Aristotle’s thinking. In
> other words, as will become apparent, your
> ontic/ontological split is utterly untenable.
>
> In addition to the three _ousiai_ already mentioned, Aristotle also
> has a fourth cause, namely, the _prootou kinountos_
> (first mover 1070a2). The first mover is that through which somewhat,
> namely _hylae_, is changed into somewhat, namely
> _eidos_ (1070a2). He provides examples of these four:
> “health, sickness, body; the mover medical know-how” and
> “sight, disorder, bricks; the mover building know-how” (1070b29)
> and says that “in a certain way” there are only three causes or
> beginnings because the _eidos_ is the mover as know-how
> (1070b33). In other words, the mover can be EITHER an EFFECTIVE cause
> OR the _eidos_ as FINAL cause, and in a certain
> way they can be regarded as the same.
>
> Hence we see Aristotle arguing a PRODUCTIVIST ontology in terms of
> which beings qua beings are thought in how they come
> about through a change. This productivist understanding continues to
> apply even when the _archae_ of the change/movement
> is within the being itself, as in the case of physical beings.
>
> With regard to the question concerning an _ousia_ that is _aidion kai
> akinaeton kai chooriston_ (”forever and immovable
> and separable” 1026a10), the crucial element among the three is
> _eidos_. Aristotle says that the ’sight’ is (a)
> _akinaetos_ (1069a34), which stands to reason.

The reference there is not to his own position, but to that of other
thinkers (Platonists), which he criticizes in the next book.

> He also says that it and the other two _ousiai_ are (b) _choorista_
> (”separable, able to stand for itself”, 1070b36). _Chooriston_ is not
> easy to understand because it is so often
> interpreted as meaning only ’separable from matter’, but this
> interpretation fits only certain contexts. In the present
> context, when Aristotle says that the _eidos_ is _chooriston_,

You mean at 1069a34? (I can’t find any statement that _eidos_ is
_chooriston_ at 1070b36.) Again, that reference is to the Platonist
position that he criticizes in the next book.

> he means that it can stand for itself as when a human
> being generates another human being standing for itself, or when the
> _eidos_ of the house comes to stand for itself as
> the finished house (i.e. a being in the mode of being of the _eidos_
> as _telos_).
>
> So it is the _eidos_ which already satsifies TWO of the requirements
> for the _ousia_ being sought, and the _eidos_ has
> to be understood ONTOLOGICALLY, not ontically.

If your primary text for this is 1069a34, then this reading can’t
possibly be correct. He’s not referring to his own position there.

> The third epithet, _aidion_ “forever”, is more difficult. First of
> all, Aristotle notes that the _eidos_ comes to stand
> in its ‘energy’ (’at-work-ness’, ‘actuality’, _energeiai_ 1071a8) when
> the change or movement of generation (producing
> or progeneration) is finished, e.g. the finished house or healthy man
> or a new human being as _telos_, but then he
> remarks that whether the _eidos_ _hypomenei_ (”remains” 1070a25)
> “still has to be investigated” (_skepteon_ 1070a26).
> But for the moment he notes that “nothing prevents this in some cases,
> e.g. the psyche/soul is so, not all of it, but
> the mind” (1070a27)
> Hence, the _eidos_ “remains” in the “mind”, the _nous_, for it is the
> _nous_ which sees/thinks the ’sight’/_eidos_.
>
> So we can see that the _eidos_ as an _ousia_ (i.e. as an aspect of the
> beingness of beings) is (a) immovable (b) able to
> stand for itself and (c) “remains” (but is not yet “forever”).
>
> Now we are somewhat more prepared to turn to the famous Chap. 7 of
> Book Lambda (XII) in which “the god” finally
> ‘appears’. At the start of this chapter Aristotle is discussing
> “something forever moved in a movement without pause”
> (_ti aei kinoumenon kinaesin apauston_ 1072a22) “in a circle”
> (_koklooi_ 1072a22) of the “first heaven” (_prootos
> oupanos_ 1072a24) which must be “forever” (_aidios_ 1072a23), from
> which Aristotle infers that “there is some mover
> which, unmoved, moves forever, being both _ousia_ and _energeia_
> (_kinoun esti ti ho ou konoumenon kinei, aidion, kai
> ousia kai energeia ousa_ 1072a25). Thus we have the famous unceasing
> circular motion of the heavenly bodies by an
> unmoving _ousia_ and at-work-ness.(But is this an EFFECTIVE cause? No.
> Read on.)

Again, when did I ever say or imply that the first mover causes motion
as an effective cause? That is hardly necessary to the reading I’m
defending.

> Aristotle next says “it moves thus” (1072a26) and immediately says
> “the desired (_orekton_) and the thought (_noaeton_
> what is thought) move without being moved. What is first desired and
> thought are the same” (1072a27-28) So here we have
> a first movement being initated by something desired and thought which
> is itself unmoved, i.e. a first FINAL cause. What
> is first desired and thought is “the fair” (_to on kalon_ 1072a28)
> “The _archae_ namely is thinking. And thought
> (_nous_) is moved by what is thought (_noaetou_)” (1072a30). And what
> is thought first of all is “the first _ousia_”
> (1072a32) which is “the fair” (1072a35).
>
> So “the fair” is the “for-the-sake-of-which” (_hou heneka_ 1072b2),
> itself “immovable”, for which all else moves. So the
> heavens move for the sake of the fair. They move most simply in the
> “first kind of movement” which is “locomotion” and
> they move “in a circle” for this is the fairest kind of locomotion and
> the _telos_ and _eidos_ of their locomotion. The
> fair (_to kalon_) is the thought, itself unmoved, for the sake of
> which the heavens move. Thinking thinks the thought
> “so that thought and thinking are the same” (_hooste tauton nous kai
> noaeton_ 1072b22). This thought thought of the fair
> is the first unmoving _ousia_ and energy for the sake of which all
> else moves.
>
> The thought thought of the fair is precisely that long-sought-for
> _eidos_ from Book Epsilon which is (a) immovable (b)
> standing for itself and (c) forever, i.e. this is the _ousia_ we have
> been looking for. The _eidos_ of the fair (_to
> kalon_) is the first or primary thought of thinking in its energy and
> is the primary _ousia_. Aristotle says that _nous_
> is in-energy, is ‘actual’ in thinking its thought, and this energy,
> at-work-ness or actuality is “divine” (_theion_
> 1072b24). We human beings can only think this thought, thus seeing the
> _eidos_ of the fair, “sometimes” (_pote_
> 1072b25), whereas “the god” (_ho theos_ 1072b25), as the energy of
> _nous_ itself, thinks it “always” (_aei_ 1072b26).
> The god as _ousia_ is nothing other than the energy of the thinking of
> the thought of the fair. The god is therefore,
> for Aristotle, NOT AN ONTICALLY EXISTING BEING, but an ONTOLOGICAL
> beingness, namely the en-erg-etic _eidos_ of the
> “always” thought thought of the fair for the sake of which all else
> (the physical beings) moves.

There are several huge leaps here. First, you assume from the start that
Aristotlian eidos is an ontological principle. The fact that a
philosopher talks about “being” and identifies necessary components of a
being’s being doesn’t at all mean that the analysis is ontological,
since the history of western thought is full of ontic principles and
causes that have been repeatedly proposed as necessary conditions and
components of a being’s existence in an ontic sense. Nor are ontic
entities limited to what a philosopher considers individual beings -
e.g., contemporary physics is filled with strange “entities” that
“constitute” beings and yet aren’t considered actual individual beings
themselves. But physics is hardly ontology.

Secondly, if Aristotle had meant what you say above, he wouldn’t have
stated it in a way that was obviously so cryptic that it fooled every
single commentator for two millennia, INCLUDING those “untainted” by
Christianity who were immersed in his own native Greek, and were
therefore infinitely more familiar with the ancient philosophical
nuances of “ousia” and “eidos” than we could ever be. If the history of
Aristotelian commentary had begun with the Christians (or even the
Muslims), then you would have a stronger case. But it didn’t, and
scholarship would demand that you contend with this before simply
dismissing centuries of commentary.

Thirdly, he goes on to count the immovable movers - he proposes that
there are around 55. (1074a10-16) That makes absolutely no sense if
immovable mover here means ontological beingness and not an ontically
existing being.

> Such a beingness is the
> first cause of all beings’ movement, and this cause must be understood
> as (the best) FINAL cause, NOT as an EFFECTIVE
> cause.This god as the thinking mind thinking the thought of the fair
> is, as this pure energy, “life most good and
> forever” (_zooion aidion ariston1072b29). And we human beings are
> ourselves divine insofar as we can see the _eidos_ of
> the fair, i.e. think the thought of this best and first
> for-the-sake-of-which.
>
> Thus it can also be seen more emphatically why metaphysics as the
> “theological philosophy” is one and the same as the
> investigation of beings qua beings, i.e. beings in their beingness.
> All beings are divine insofar as they move for the
> sake of the sight of the fair. It is above all the thinking of the
> _eidos_ as one of the three _ousiai_ of all beings
> (next to _steraesis_ and _hylae_) which is already divine, and is most
> divine in thinking the first and best _eidos_,
> i.e. _to kalon_, “the fair”. Godliness itself is only this energy or
> at-work-ness of thinking of the fair in its
> “forever”.mode. Notice that this “forever” is a TEMPORAL
> determination, one that fits the Christian concern with the
> Eternal. Finite temporality, by contrast, is the lot of human being
> which, nevertheless, is “sometimes” able to think
> the divine sight of the fair.

Posted on Thursday, February 14th, 2008 at 12:35 pm
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