Heidegger

Martin on is-ness

Heidegger:
An initial approach to the problem (which in accord with its sense will
later have to be deconstructed [abbauen]) can be provided in formal indication (a
particular methodological level of phenomenological explication that cannot
be treated any further here, though some understanding of it can be gleaned
from the following):

“Existence” is a determination of something.

Jud:
On the level of natural language *existence* is only determinable* in the
sense that it differentiates that which exists from that which does not.

In a Parmenidean sense, such a statement is nonsense, for to differentiate
or determine something needs another object or objects against which to offset
or characterise some other as being unlike. Because there exists no opposite
of existence, and because existence is a universal that refers to everything
that exists anywhere, existence is already determined as *that which refers
to everything that exists* and to state such a fact is a needless
re-referencing or tautologous redundancy. Therefore Heidegger is grossly mistaken -
Existence is not a determination of something, but the determination of
everything.

Heidegger:
If one wants to characterize it regionally, though in the end this
characterization proves to be a misleading digression away from the actual sense of
existence,

Jud:
Who but a linguistic ignoramus would even WISH to characterize it
regionally? Such objects of which the total consist have their own names and
descriptions.

Heidegger:
it can be taken as a certain way-to-be, as a particular sense of “is,” which
“is” essentially the sense of the (I) “am.”

Jud:
Existence CAN NOT be taken as a *certain way to be* - a *certain way to be*
does not exist - only that which is a certain way exists.

Heidegger:
We have this “am” in a genuine sense not in a theoretical intention, but in
the very actualizing of the “am,” the very be-ing of the self has the
formally indicative sense of existence.

Jud:
No object in the cosmos including humans *has* an *am.* Speaking of the
third person, humans and other objects simply *are* and exist that way.
The first person form of address employing the conjugate of BE called *am*
simply bespeaks of the singularity of the I-object and confirms it exists
here, now in the present.

Heidegger:
This gives us a clue pointing to the source out of which the sense of
existence, as the particular how of the self (or of the I), must be drawn.

Jud:
It might do for a peasant mind like yours, but for others with any
linguistic training the notion of *having an am* is probably the most juvenile
stupidity that they will ever encounter in their lives. The fact that this
absurdity has never been seriously challenged to any great extent by the effete
academia of continental Europe and elsewhere bespeaks worryingly as to the future
of the west in the face of eastern barbarism.

Heidegger:
What proves to be crucial here is the fact that I have myself [in a
fore-having!], the basic experience in which I encounter myself as a self, so that I,
living in this experience, and responding to its very sense, can ask about
the sense of my “I am.”

Jud:
And tell me you stupid old prick, who or what IS the custodian of this
*fore-having!* in the period before * I * and *self* experience such an
*encounter?*
Who is the caretaker of that part of your brain which houses this
*foreknowing* prior to the *meeting of minds between you and yourself?
>From whence cometh the information that comprises *fore-having!* this Is it
perhaps that turnip which rests upon your shoulders? And the nature of what
you, I or self had before it was a fore having -pray what was that and how
does it differ from a *now-having?*

Heidegger
“Having-myself” is ambiguous in many different respects, and this diversity
found in its sense must be made comprehensible by the varying diversity of
specifically historical contexts rather than to [generic] contexts of
classification that assume that the status of regions within an autonomous system.

Jud:
The only way that you *have-yourself* is in the masturbatory fantasies of
your own twisted mind. It makes a change from *having* your teenage female
students anyway, I suppose your Nazi Brunhilde must be grateful for small
mercies? One does not *have* oneself for the self is already the haver not the had.
The historical contexts of a human person do not exist - only the
remembering historical person remains extant

Heidegger:
In the archontic sense of the properly actualized basic experience of the “I
am,” an experience that properly concerns just me myself purely and
radically, we find that this experience does no experience the “I” as something
located in a region, as an individualization of a “universal,” as a [generic]
instance of something.

Jud:
The basic experience of the *I am* is beyond actualisation or
regionalisation, for only the human experiencing experiencer exists in the states to which
the *am* of * I am –> indicates.
Neither can existence be singularised or individuated for it is a
universalism contrived to speak of the human oneness or holism - a *one* which the
plurality of the *self* and the *I* and the *me* and *myself* has befouled in
western thought - an act of Hunnish vandalism in which you have participated
and encouraged.

Heidegger:
Rather, this experience experiences the “I” [in its proper sense] as a self
[i. e., myself, yourself, ourselves, je nach dem].

Jud:
And how else could the experiencing experiencer experience his or her own
world?

Heidegger
The sheer persistence of the actualizing [event!] that brings this
experience to complete fulfillment experientially demonstrates how foreign any region
or objective realm is to the “I”.

Jud:
There is no actualisation or *event* - there is only the human eventity
eventualisaing his/her way towards death.

Heidegger:
Any attempts to give a regional determination to the “I” (a determination
that stems from a preconception that regards the I as a stream of
consciousness or a nexus of experience) “extinguishes” the sense of the “am” and turns
the “I” into an object that can be fixed and classified by putting it into a
region.

Jud:
The *I* does not exist to be determinatively regionalised. As a nominatum it
simply does not exist. The *I* is simply a name for the human holon. What
CAN be regionalised as the meaty seat of humanness is the brain which can be
found in a round lump of flesh and bone resting pon’ the shoulders (in your
case a turnip still smelling of the pig-sties of your childhood and the
smegnum=smelling beer halls of your thuggish Nazi fellow masturbators.

Heidegger:
It follows from this that we need to develop a radical suspicion against all
preconceptions that objectify by regions, the contextures of concepts that
arise from such preconceptions, and the various ways in which they arise.

Jud:
Nobody regionalised evil more than you It was you that objectified the
Hitlerite conceptions and preconceptions that arose in the diseased brain of your
beloeved Fuehrer.

Go and rot in hell you evil bastard!

Posted on Sunday, December 2nd, 2007 at 10:50 pm
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