Heidegger

In a message dated 22/03/2009 09:26:23 GMT Standard Time,
_gottlos752004 at yahoo.com_ (mailto:gottlos752004@yahoo.com) writes:

Snip

GARY C MOORE:
I would like to add, though, in a highly simplistic manner, *the observable*
is *what* one sees with the eyes [or rather, what is presented AS vision
instead of BY vision as if sight presented something else than merely sight],
not the mathematical calculations one makes, however fortuitous or result-full.
One does not see *fission* in an atomic bomb but just a very different kind
of explosion than others one has seen in one’s life. This is emphasized by
the fact the Los Alamos scientists, Dr. Oppenheimer included, had very serious
doubts that there would BE an explosion, thus justifying their mathematical
calculations. So mathematical equations themselves directly produce nothing
whereas literal mechanics operated by the human hand does [I hope this is not
stupid].

Jud:
Very true Gary. But there is more to observing, feeling, smelling, tasting
and hearing an object than the simple act of seeing or beholding that which is
visible. In my opinion this was Husserl’s greatest mistake, for to *bracket
out* all a priori, experiential, noetic provenance of a matergic causal object
and rely entirely on the sensorial results of the moment in an act of a
single observation may well deliver a fleeting, arrogated, artificially
contemplative *spiritual* relationship with such an object, but it rejects a wealth of
historical data, some of which has been antecedently accrued by mankind over
thousands of years of observing a given object in relation to other objects..
(compare folk medicine and animal husbandry as examples.) As far as I know,
Husserl and company ignored phenomenological objects with respect to the
interconnectivity of all things, which for me is the locus of all understanding

Gary:
Intent is dependent upon physical acts in the present, not the goal —
[[the TELOS or SKOPOS

Jud:
Absolutely correct. For me the thinking man is a neurologically acting man
and therefore a changing man. By thinking (planning) a man changes himself (his
own neuro-corporeality.) The neuro-corporeal changes of the human agent or
beaver are reflected in the physical changes he causes to the environment.
Whether the *intent* generated is hard-wired and instinctively purposeful, as it
may well be in the case of the dam-building animal, or is an anticipated
outcome intended as part of some more complicated human design) the teleological
*target* does not exist - only the targeting organism exists.

Gary:
*Thus from passage A it transpires that the telos belongs on the predicate
side, whereas the goal [SKOPOS] is understood as a material object.* -
Engberg-Pedersen p.
28

Jud:
In the sense that teleology is a human doctrine explaining phenomena by
their ends or purposes often controlled by *God,* and neither *God* nor: *ends
or purposes* exist, then the *telos* and the *goal.* are actually descriptions
of the neurological condition of the *teleologisor.* In my ontology man
teleologically supposes and *the existential imperator* (uncaring nature)
disposes. For me existential outcomes are deterministically unavoidable but there
are no *ends* and no *purposes* involved. Change is seamless and constant. If
objects, matergy, fields (call them what you will) are never in a state of
being something, but ceaselessly becoming something - then there will never be
an end in much the same way that there has never been a beginning. Beginnings
are all relative to what has begun as a natural corollary of the existential
imperative - *that which is changeless* does not qualify as *a that* for such
*thats* could never exist in the first place.

Gary:
*predicates [KATEGOREMATA] which lie alongside [PARAKEIMENA] the things
good* [p. 27-28], that is, in the imagination something LIKE a thing [THEREFORE
the LEKTON, the *sayable*] but not a thing itself is used to qualify a
material object by *mapping* the quality as IF *next to* the thing itself

Jud:
At least the thought that a *property* lies alongside a material object
rather than is spookily inherent within it is an improvement on the Platonic
version. After all in a sentential sense it does lie alongside it in that the
subject lies to the left and the predicate lies to the right.

Gary:
I may be confusing myself here]] — that motivates the physical acts [I
maybe saying what Richard is saying but in different words] and is NOT present.
So - I hope this makes sense - the TELOS is what the mathematical equations
are FOR whereas the SKOPOS is the desired material result itself. This is also
a great illustration [the atomic bomb] of the difference between a FORMAL
virtue such as being rational versus the SUBSTANTIAL virtuous act which is
material but *neutral* until the complete consequences of an action are rationally
weighed in the sense of PERFECT good. I hope the full implication of the
last statement is obvious.

Jud:
For me any human claim about a *perfect good* that differs from the perfect
way in which all cosmic objects naturally exist as the only possible perfect
objects they are (it being impossible for them to exist in any other way) is
spurious, inauthentic and self-deceptive. Such impotently alternative versions
of *the perfect good* are pure opinion and based upon aspects of the
deterministically inevitable that are either pleasing or displeasing subject to the
fickle vagaries of social and aesthetic beliefs or sentiments shared by a
dominant section of society passed off and presented as *the voice of an
intensively forced or subtly indoctrinated people.*

Richard:(earlier)
You use a couple of terms/phrases that are troubling, and sound much like
Kants *thing in itself.* You refer to *the actual nature of physical objects,*
and the * phenomenological “reality” (i. e. that which the observer perceives
as actual or real).

Jud:
I believe there is an existential modality of every object in the cosmos
which is unique to that object irrespective of the sensorial manner in which
such an object is observed by various sentient objects such as man, animals or
insects etc.

GARY C MOORE:
I regard this as correct, but simply raise two points A] is not *uniqueness*
itself [or even *object*] a generalizing abstraction?, and B] *irrespective
of the sensorial manner in which such an object is observed* directly implies
Kants point we cannot *know* [whatever that means] the Ding-an-sich?

Jud:
Absolutely so, but an abstraction based upon the scientific surety that no
two objects (call then what you will) are exactly the same and in that sense
can be described as *unique.* What science (scientists) claim it does know is
that our sensorial equipage is sufficient to discriminate the fact that all
objects are different to each other, plus the logical fact that if an object
was *exactly* the same as another - it would be that other.

Jud: Kant’s term *thing in itself* is a clumsy one in that it is redolent of
the spooky word *self* which is anthropocentric and speaks of one’s
consciousness of one’s own human identity. As far as my use of the term
*phenomenological reality* was concerned, I was careful to define it as: * that which the
observer perceives as actual or real.*

GARY C MOORE:
I agree and hold my agreement consistent with what I said above.

JUD:
I do not accept the reification *reality* as having any meaning other than
the spurious sense in which it is connected to the results of phenomenological
perception as viewed through the distorting-mirror of our human sensorium. In
accord with your TWTWI, our sensorium has developed to concentrate
specifically on selected items of the aspectual arcanum of data received from of an
observed object that is important for human continuance, (to the exclusion of
information considered less important.)

Richard:
IMO there is no such thing as the phenomenological reality.

Jud:
Exactly! That is what I hold too. GARY C MOORE: But there is phenomenology
because there are words which means all we truly know are - *words*.

Jud:
I believe that we do not rely entirely on words alone in order to
sensorially *know* objects. We only use words when we wish to communicate our
conclusions regarding what we perceive to be the characteristics of observed objects
to others. I can *know* an object wordlessly (albeit sensorially imperfectly
according to human opinion.)

As *knowers* we humans are all evolved outcomes of a survivalist *knowing*
achieved via a sensorium which fulfils an observational process which is both
compliant with and in strict accordance with nature’s unremittingly pragmatic,
goalless unintentionally. Thus our evolved sensorium and the data it
provides for our survival can be described as existentially and deterministically
*perfect. * Surely after millennia of use in a hostile environmental field we
can describe our sensorium and the it as being at least *adequate* and
*effective* as selected by evolution over millions of years to *work.*

I have long felt a disquiet about the so-called *phenomenological*
observation of objects, but hitherto have not remarked upon it because I could not
find the words. I will now attempt to do so..

Phenomenological investigation has in my opinion (and BTW in Georges’
opinion too) been given a bad name by Edmund Husserl and his followers. The term is
often used disdainfully these days in a manner which essentially down-grades
our sensorial apprehension of objects known *only* through the senses and
even claims that in doing so we do not at the same time employ our intuition or
reasoning. There is the suggestion that a sensorial apprehension of an object
is somehow *inferior* because it only produces *mere* pictures in the brain
and that if we try to communicate our impressions of objects we are
handicapped because all that we have to rely upon are
*words.* En passant this is not always true either, for often we can just
point to an object without using any words at all. The fact that our
observational companion agrees that the object is blue often results in the remarks
such as:

*How do you know that he sees *blue* in the same way as you perceive the
colour blue?

My answer to that would be the same as the one given by Rhett Butler to
Scarlett O’Hara:

*Frankly, My Dear, I Don’t Give A Damn!*

As long as he is not an airline pilot who mistakes the colours of the
landing lights who cares if he sees the sky as what I call purple?

I must confess that I have been as unthinkingly guilty of this approach too
- but now I have begun to realise that is simply because Husserl messed up the
whole shebang and (together with Heidegger) gave phenomenology a bad name.

Let us start from square one and take another look at what is going on when
we sensorially observe or inspect an object.

I take for an example one of my children’s footballs which is before me as I
type. it is a blue Nike Total 90 Aerow II. leather ball constructed of 32
stitched panels of waterproofed leather. The panels consist of 12 regular
pentagons and 20 regular hexagonal patches sewn together into an inflated sphere.
It has the white *nike* tick motif. When I hold it I can feel its light
weight, (with a circumference of 27–28 inches), a weight 14–16 ounces), inflated
to a pressure of 8–12 psi. I tap the leather surface, hear its hollowness, and
caress my fingers over the joins in the patchwork of geometrical pieces that
form its globular shape. I can smell the newness of the leather and its
varnished finish.

As far as I am concerned I am happy that what I see is a fair representation
of the existential modality of the object I call a British football. From
experience I know that if I take it on to the field outside and throw or kick
it - it will behave in a particular manner - it will bounce in accordance to
how hard I kick relative to the nature of any solid with which it impacts. I
also know that if I stuck a knife into the ball it will deflate and the air
trapped inside will escape.

Now let me ask some questions: Does the entity I have just described exist
in the manner of my description? Does it matter to me or the sport of football
if a tortoise sees the ball as what we call grey rather than the blue colour
I see? Furthermore (and more profoundly) does it make any difference to me or
humanity in general or the football itself, if in fact as classical *a thing
in itself* it does not really exist as a *football* at all, it is not blue,
as human eyes are required to provide that description of the wavelengths of
light which bounce of its surface, it does not weigh 14–16 ounces, nor is it
inflated to a pressure of 8–12 psi. blah, blah, blah, because these are only
human useful attributions - and in effect it actually exists
tautologistically in the way it exists - free of human observation and classification in the
way it exists?

The suggestion implicit in the evaluation of those who criticise the
*brain-centred * nature of human observer is that the human sensorium is in some way
inferior and that there is some *ideal* method of observation that is
superior and only this idealised method of observation can reveal how the object
REALLY exists. In spite of the technology developed by humans to examine the
structure of the leather and the paintwork microscopically - to analyse its
cellular structure in detail, to measure the pressure and the temperature of the
air contained within the ball, or even to see into the interior with the help
of x-rays the insinuation still persists that such methods merely provide
images and perceptions of something that REALLY exists quite differently.

To me such an account now appears as being diametrically opposed to the
Darwinian explanation of evolution. If a football actually existed quite
differently to our phenomenological impression of it, could we suppose for example
that footballs are not spherical at all, they weight two tons each and in fact
they are cubiform? Are not the so-called characteristics of *thing
in-selfhood* in fact utterly trivial? The whole of the interconnected results of
thousands of years of the human study of the natural sciences and latterly physics,
quantum and macro tell us that football are NOT cubes filled with air
weighing two tons and they bounce in the characteristic, fairly predictable manner
of the inflated pig’s bladders from which they were modelled and developed.

Nature therefore has provided us with a sensorium and neurological processor
which renders the environment in which we live in such a manner as we can
successfully interact and identify and cope with it spatially and as far as
possibly safely in relation to the existential problems that we as a species
have historically and currently encountered to such an extent that we have even
made ourselves aware of the tricks that our sensorium can play in relation to
mirages and other quirks of our neuro-visual apparatus such as optical
illusions

Richard:
Such things are themselves labels seemingly for some ethereal plane of
existence into which we cannot delve. It is its own kind of chimera that is the
stuff of imagination or perhaps hope.

GARY C MOORE:
Richard, I think, has stated the actual fundamental world view division
between all mankind - *imagination or hope* - philosophy or religion. Kant stated
the question *What can I know?* in a context of four fundamental questions
which context implied, but did not explicitly state, could not and never could
be answered

1] What can I know?
2] What should I do?
3] What should I hope?
And
4] What is man?

I have never thought much about the verbs before but, in the context of
this letter, they become brutally clear. *What should I do?* and *what should I
hope?* - two *shoulds* - are motivated by a telos. Whereas *What can I know?*
indicates an act with a material goal [SKOPOS]. But what Jud says immediately
below about *phenomenological data from which there is no escape* - a truly
wonderful and fortuitous phrase! - turns to the question *What is man?* not
as something summed up and finalized by science, as some divine all knowing
point of view, but as an unanswerable question that encompasses science as its
toy. And if the creation of atomic bomb is truly fundamentally a neutral act
that some consider necessary for the PERFECT good and others do not that has
to be judged by its material consequences - which means any ethical act is
and stays neutral until a man is dead, thus explaining Aristotle’s quoting the
Greek saying *Count no man happy until he is dead* [the summation of the
whole of his life at the moment it ceases to have any value]. Is Paul the saint
with his *faith, hope, and charity* or Hannibal Lecter with his *a person can
only act according to his nature*?

Jud:
Again - I agree completely and that is why I take my hat off the Einstein -
that he was able to arrive at such convincing conclusions in spite of dealing
with the phenomenological data from which there is no escape other than
through commonsense and a certain amount of intuition.

Richard:
I even risk calling it Platonic, since there is scant evidence that there
is such a thing as the *natural nature of physical objects.* It is a made up
concept like all such concepts. I see it as a part of our human makeup, that
we must reach for the permanent and the universal, and in the world of
physicists, there is the never ending quest for a Theory of Everything. As J.. T.
Fraser, in his very interesting book: Of Time, Passion and Knowledge, puts it:
*There is a great need to pursue the classic task of the philosopher, which is
the search for the universal.* [I would add physicist to the philosopher.]

GARY C MOORE:
But there are consequences from our *material* acts*. [*Material* is really
a redundancy since there is only *phenomenological data from which there is no
escape* which applies to anything and every thing, with *commonsense* and
*intuition* falling under the fundamental principle of the imagination.]
Divorcing *consequences* from the justification of natural laws or even *natural
nature of physical objects*, they do demonstrate - or do they? - there are
results from our actions that are not fully anticipated, that is, they come
from *elsewhere*, Would that justify the concept of *objective reality*?
Unfortunately, only as a *predicate*.

Jud:
My own view is the one that Gary has just discussed in his most recent post..
(soon to be answered by me. ) For me all objects (including all humans
irrespective of their physical or mental condition) are only *real* in the sense
that they are deterministically and conatively physically *perfect* Every
entity concretely and momentarily represents the current, most suitable catenulate
outcome appropriate to their individual conative telos possible in
accordance with the outcomes of the existential imperative rather than the abstract,
human, socially desirable definition of *real* or *perfect.* Any human
intervention in order to *make perfect* what is considered by humans to be
*imperfect* is simply nature acting through agency of humans, which are as much a part
of nature as any other causal object in the cosmos. As it is *nature* or
*the existential imperative* that dictates *perfection* - there is NO OTHER WAY
in which Richard could possibly exist at this moment - other than the way
that Richard DOES exist - other wise he would exist in that other way - which
would be the only way he could possibly exist - which would be of course - the
way he exists. Therefore (from *nature’s* point of view - that is the perfect
way in which the object Richard exists in accordance with the imperative of
the interconnectivity of all causal objects.

GARY C MOORE:
Perfect answer, Doctor Lecter! The whole point of the heart of the matter
is between *make perfect* - and action continuing interminably through time -
even when you are *finished* the consequences continue on very possibly
changing your evaluation of what was *made* perfect - and *is perfect*- *is* or
*being* implying temporal permanency - *

*** Therefore let me quote another passage from Engberg-Pedersen—

*QUOTE*** ***

Jud wrote:
*all objects (including all humans irrespective of their physical or mental
condition) are only *real* in the sense that they are deterministically and
conatively physically perfect* which *represents the current, most suitable
catenulate outcome appropriate to their individual conative telos possible in
accordance with the outcomes of the existential imperative rather than the
abstract, human, socially desirable definition of *real* or *perfect.*

Gary/Engberg-Pedersen:
This I take to mean what endures only here and now has to be what it is
because it is what it is, a tautology, and could be a paraphrase of Hegel’s *What
is, is rational*. Non-existence does not exist and therefore cannot be more
perfect than what does exist, another tautology [and Wittgenstein said, *All
true statements are tautological*.]

Jud:
Exactly! Any account of the truth involves tautology if an attempt is made
to describe it (rather than merely stating it as a fact.)

Gary/Engberg-Pedersen:
Therefore there is no place certainly for *faith* or *hope*. THEY DEAL
PURELY WITH THE NEVER EXISTENT FUTURE! When we turn to the telos and EUDAIMONIA
we can now see that once EUDAIMONEIN is said to be the same as the telos it
is no longer appositely translated as *being happy*. Rather, it means
*becoming happy*. Similarly, the telos is not possessing happiness [EUDAIMONIAN
ECHEIN], but precisely, as both passage A and B have it, obtaining it [TYCHEIN].
For not only is the telos not a thing but a predicate - it is also a predicate
that will ONLY figure in the special context of choosing, desiring and the
like. Therefore, AS the single object of all a man desires and choices, which
is that they all be fulfilled or reach their various ends, it will always lie
in the future in relation to the time of the individual desiring and
choosing. It will never be possible to form a set of words which signifies the
PRESENCE of the telos.* END QUOTE***
continuous to Part 6, page 31

Jud:
Wise words indeed.

——————————————————————————
——————————-
Reifications - like biological entozoa are gut-enculturations which are not
necessarily reliant upon nor benignly disposed to the welfare of their
hosts.
——————————————————————————
——————————–

Sincerely,

Jud Evans.

Private Website: _http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspac…)

*Common sense and a sense of humour are the same thing, moving at different
speeds. A sense of humour is just common sense, dancing.*
(William James.)

Posted on Sunday, March 29th, 2009 at 6:00 am
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