Necessary and (False or Vacuous) [corrected]
May 11th, 2008, search relatedRelated posts :: Necessary and (False or Vacuous) [corrected] :: Necessary and (False or Vacuous) [corrected] :: Necessary and (False or Vacuous) :: Necessary and (False or Vacuous) [corrected]
On 5/5/08, Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Schizo-Epistemology: Necessary and (False or Vacuous) [corrected]
>
> Focus! Professor.
>
> you seem to be somewhat obsessed with my opinion of Hume; but, the
> argument I presented yesterday under this same subject line raises a
> completely new question that has nothing to do with Hume. I’m reposting
> a corrected version; the original had a serious typo that would have
> changed its meaning.
>
> try to remember that anyone might this question. would you refuse to
> reply to everyone because you feel I have ignored your post about Hume?
Thank you for addressing that post this morning.
[begin repost]:
>
> Professor Crifasi,
>
> one of your crucial claims seems to be that the proposition ‘I remain
> self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
> of existence.
>
> this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:
>
> [1]: P -> Q
>
> where
>
> P = ‘I exist’ [where ‘I exist’ = ‘I am not nothing’]
> Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
>
> you also claim that Q is false; so:
>
> [2]: -Q
>
> recently, you’ve argued that you’ve been misunderstood.
>
> >>your argument for [1] seems to be that Q is undeniable.
>
> >I have never said that Q is undeniable. I have only argued that it is a
> >necessary implication of self-existence.
>
> yes; but, you also say that Q is false; and, you haven’t yet come to
> grips with the oddity of having a primary premise, [1] above, that is a
> conditional statement whose consequent is false.
>
> if the consequent of a condition is false; then, the truth value of the
> conditional as a whole depends on the truth value of the antecedent –
> in this case ‘I exist’.
The truth value of a conditional as a whole is simply the implication of
consequent by the antecedent, regardless of the truth of the consequent. If
the consequent is false, the dependence of the consequent is not thereby
false, but only the antecedent itself. Two propositions that are in fact
false can still be logically dependent.
