od
October 5th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: No related posts
as said: there are only things (beings which are - onta, res) by virtue of being.
without it they cannot even be thought. with respect to Plato, Heidegger writes that
perceiving a book, or any specific thing, always involves more than mere perception:
in order to perceive a book, one must already KNOW in some way what a book is.
such fore-knowledge concerns the essence of things, what they are. in the case of Plato: their
eide/ideai, their aspect. thus, eidos/idea is for Plato the being of beings.
beings and (their) being only exist by way of opposition, and that is: relative to each other.
it is not Plato who made this relation, it is what he opens, and dives into, in order to explain what things are.
also Heidegger - who for the first time named ontological difference as such - did not make it.
but without a philosopher, there is no way to find out that our being is ordered in that way.
Our condition nowadays is such that, in the public space where there can be no difference, being is nothing,
(it is therefore that Heidegger contends that the name ‘being’ has to disappear. (’Insight into what-is’)
New words - like Seyn, Ereignis - can only be interim. meanwhile one has to face the situation we are in:
all usage of the word ‘is’, all predication is crumbling. only earth and sky are emerging of themselves.
(metaphysics has always been between earth and sky). For the time being, we are committed to the predication
of climate change. That something is wrong with it is felt by everyone, but nobody can SAY what it is.
there just has been one philosopher pointing to what-is - the togetherness of earth and sky, mortals and gods:
the Geviert, and why it can’t arrive, come through: we are still not ready - circularity)
rene
