Oddly Enough
October 17th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Oddly Enough :: Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron :: Oddly Enough :: Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron
Cologne 17-Oct-2007
Joseph Polanik schrieb Wed, 17 Oct 2007 06:23:47 -0400:
> oddly enough, I’m experiencing some difficulty grasping the concept of
> ‘the’ (is there only one?) Ontological Difference, OD.
>
> perhaps, someone can help me out.
>
> is the OD at all related to the difference between two types of nouns:
> the particular and the collective.
ME: No.
> [I will follow what I believe is a common convention of capitalizing the
> collective (or mass/class) version of a noun and (for greater clarity)
> the uncommon convention of not capitalizing the first word of a sentence
> unless it is capitalizable for some other reason]
>
> is the difference between Being and a being other than the difference
> between a particular being and Being, the set of all beings or the
> collectivity of all beings?
ME: Yes.
>
> is Existence something more than (or less than or other than) the sum
> total of all existents?
ME: Neither more than nor less than nor equal to, since in another dimension
altogether.
>
> is the difference between Furniture (the class/set or abstraction) and a
> particular piece of furniture (upon which I just stubbed my toe)
> something other than the OD; and, if so, can you elaborate on the
> distinction between the OD and the difference to which I am alluding,
> the CPD (Class/Particular Difference)?
ME: Yes. The universal is to be distinguished from the particular which, in
turn, is to be distinguished from the singular. The latter is a unique,
individual being like that chair you just stubbed your toe on. The universal
is not as it is normally taken to be in Anglo-Saxon discourse as the total
set of all the all individual entities of a certain kind, and the particular
should not be confused with the singular, as normally practised in
Anglo-Saxon discourse. Rather, the universal is that which is known a priori
and enables any singular being to be recognized AS such, and the particular
is in the first place the particularization of the universal into its kinds
(e.g. the universal, ‘living being’ into plants, animals and humans) and
secondly the instantiation of the universal as a determinate being (of a
certain kind). For example, to see any singular being AS something, you must
already know what the universal, ’something’, is. Otherwise it would be
impossible to encounter any being in the world AS something, let alone
encountering any being AS a chair. The ontological difference resides
precisely in this AS (or QUA). Beings do not simply exist; they show
themselves AS what (or who) they are. Therefore Aristotle defines
metaphysics concisely as the study of _to on haei on_, i.e. beings AS
beings, i.e. beings insofar AS they are beings.
_-_-_-_-_-_-_- artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_- artefact at t-online.de _-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
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>
>
> Regards,
>
> Joe
>
> –
> Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
> first person. — H-N Castaneda
>
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
> http://what-am-i.net
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>
