Oddly Enough
November 8th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Oddly Enough :: Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron :: Oddly Enough :: Oddly Enough
Jan Straathof wrote:
> Hi Joe, you asked:
>
> [snip]
>
>>is the difference between Furniture (the class/set or abstraction) and a
>>particular piece of furniture (upon which I just stubbed my toe)
>>something other than the OD; and, if so, can you elaborate on the
>>distinction between the OD and the difference to which I am alluding,
>>the CPD (Class/Particular Difference)?
>
>The OD in Heidegger’s sense has nothing to do with set-theoretical,
>class-logical or linguistic considerations. The OD, as proposed and
>elaborated in SuZ (in 1926, but later on he changed his mind about
>the philosophical portee of this conception) must be thought in line
>of Kant’s transcendental argumentation. The OD is the ontological
>difference between [1] beings, i.e. things, stuffs, ideas, phenomena
>etc. that we encounter, experience, produce etc. in our daily life and
>[2] the transcendental condition for the occurance of these beings as
>the beings we, as a human-being ourself, albeit a very special being,
>namely as Dasein, experience. Heidegger names this transcendental
>condition “Being”, thereby bringing in focus the unique character
>of human-being as Dasein, i.e. that we humans are beings wherefor
>Being is opened up (cq. given, granted) in such a way that we are
>destined to be instigators and caretakers of the world as our world.
>
>yours,
>Jan
it seems reasonable to say “given that I experience, it is necessarily
true that I am”; but, that still leaves open the question “what am I?”.
in particular, it doesn’t seem self-evident that I am a being instead
of, say, an existing. so the question ‘what am I?’ seems even more
fundamental than the question ‘what is being?’ — which, perhaps, begs
the question of whether the question of Being can be pursued in the
first person. any thoughts on that?
but, perhaps, I should back up and ask this: is ‘being’ any more or less
than a synonym for ‘existing’? is there that which is/has being in some
sense; but, which does not have existence in any sense? is there that
which has existence in some sense; but, which does not have being in any
sense?
Regards,
Joe
[Jan, thanks for the reply. let me know if you mean by ‘transcendental
argumentation’ something other than this forensic logic (making an
inference from a fact or set of facts to the conditions that made the
fact possible).]
–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda
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http://what-am-i.net
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