Heidegger

Cologne 01-Nov-2007

Joseph Polanik schrieb Wed, 31 Oct 2007 05:31:16 -0500:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> >It is peculiar, not to say a philosophical scandal, that the
> >Anglo-Saxon mind attempting to philosophize is prepared to accept on
> >faith that atoms and sub-atomic particles exist. Thus we read from the
> >blissfuly and wilfully ignorant Judhead, “We know [sic] that the human
> >body is composed of many smaller particles, atoms, muons and God knows
> >what else - let’s say for argument a zillion atoms.”
> >
> >Since I have two degrees in mathematics, and also studied physics at
> >university, I know something about such equations … the existence of
> >electrons, quarks, muons, etc. … is nothing other than the solution of
> >certain sets of highly complex equations which Judheadian minds are
> >incapable of grasping. In other words, … the “existence” of a
> >sub-atomic particle such as an electron in a hydrogen atom, … [is] …
> >nothing more nor less than the existence of ABSTRACT (semi-)integer
> >solutions to a second-order partial differential equation
>
> are you saying that, when I flip the switch, the room lights up because
> zillions of abstract semi-integer solutions to a second-order partial
> differential equation move down the wire to let there be light?

ME: No. But we can only “see” electrons AS the abstract semi-integer solutions
to a second-order partial differential equation; that is their IDEA which also
exists within this mathematical casting of being — just as we can only see a
being as something through the IDEA of something. The IDEA is not a subjective
“idea” in our tiny little heads, nor is it “objectively” out there in the
world, but is subject-object, i.e. in between in the ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE.
And that is the great deficiency of thinking in the modern age — that it
moves obliviously back and forth between subject and object, remaining always
clueless about what is in between.

According to the theory (from _theoria_, the seeing or ’speculatio’ of being
for Gk. philosophy) of quantum mechanics, the electron IS a wave function,
i.e. the electron exists AS a wave function which is a solution to a
second-order partial differential equation. That is, the electron can only be
SEEN through this equation, which expresses conditions of possibility (cf.
Kant’s transcendental CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY which are PRIOR to any
EXPERIENCE) for an electron’s potential energy and its momentum. (The second
derivatives are rates of change of the rates of change of position
co-ordinates, x, y, z.) The Schrödinger equation specifies the potential
energy and momentum of a being postulated as an electron, whose sensuous
INDICATIONS are SEEN through this equation as little dark bands on an atomic
spectrometer whose very construction as an apparatus is determined thoroughly
by the theory, i.e. by the mathematico-physical casting of being in the modern
age. Descartes was the first thinker to set down the mathematico-physical
casting of being in his Regulae, an absolutely SEMINAL work for our modern age
world.

>
> >Against this, the simple category of SOMETHING, for instance (basking
> >in the blinding light of obviousness, and therefore overlooked), and
> >its ontological priority to the existence of a singular instance of
> >SOMETHING, such as an ink-blot, is open to view for anyone thinking
> >through the simple phenomenon — that is, if one is prepared to employ
> >the same care and rigour in thinking and respect for logical order that
> >is demanded by any set of mathematical equations, and to look to see
> >what is before the mind’s eye. We could not live in the world AT ALL
> >without understanding perfectly well, but implicitly, what SOMETHING is
> >and without dealing with myriad truly existent somethings. We do not,
> >and can not, “derive” this “abstract” category from its (infinitely
> >many) specific instances, because the category of SOMETHING must be
> >already PRESUPPOSED in order to even identify any singular something AS
> >such-and-such. That’s trivial. (We mathematicians, when proving
> >theorems, often set down a lemma and write, “Proof: Trivial”.) And yet,
> >today’s modern, scientistic minds are unable to see this, and dismiss
> >the philosophical explication of what is always already (implicitly)
> >folded into everyday understanding as metaphysical bunkum. Such is the
> >state of “thinking” in the Modern Age — a nullity of arrogant
> >ontological blindness.
>
> previously, we’ve established that ‘being’ is a root predicate because
> one can say, of anything that is, that it is a being of some sort.
> similarly, anything that is falls into the category of ‘SOMETHING’.
> anything that is, is a something.

ME: OK, but without losing from view that any “root predicate” is not “root”
compared to the root phenomenon. The phenomena are ontologically prior to what
is said about them, i.e. predicated of them.

> now, you may be correct (in some sense, anyway) to say that the root
> predicate or ultimate category has ontological ‘priority’ (whatever that
> means); but, that only means it is likely to be discovered *last*.
>
> you claim that “We do not, and can not, ‘derive’ this ‘abstract’
> category from its (infinitely many) specific instances, because the
> category of SOMETHING must be already PRESUPPOSED in order to even
> identify any singular something AS such-and-such”. this is not only
> false, it is empirically false. children learn to understand that a car
> is a car long before they are capable of understanding the concept of
> being understood as a root predicate attributable to all/any that is.

ME: Here you are confusing the order of inquiry into a phenomenon with its
thinking-through and presentation as such a thinking-through. This distinction
is elementary and also crucial for philosophical thinking, stemming from
Aristotle, and present throughout the philosophical tradition. Everyday
understanding must ALWAYS first be led past the given empirical phenomena in
which it is at first immersed to see what is always already given a priori.
This is _epagogae_, literally, “induction”, which, of course, British
Empiricism has always got wrong. Your argument here is analogous to claiming
that Pythagoras’ famous theorem were “derived” by empirically measuring lots
and lots of right-angled triangles. But pure mathematics, such as geometry,
is, as the epithet “pure” says, prior to experience (see below). Note that I
am not arguing against kids being inducted (_epagogein_) into mathematics by
first making a mathematical theorem or procedure plausible through sensuous
Anschauung (intuition).

>
> If you are mathematically inclined, I would appreciate any comments you
> care to make about Axiom 0 (an axiom schema to be precise): there is a
> predicate, P, such that, for any x that is, x is P.
>
> [Using E = the existential quantifier and A = Universal quantifier]
>
> Axiom 0 = (E P)(Ax)(Px)

ME: There is a lot to say about this “axiom”, firstly, that it is an axiom,
which commonly means a proposition valued as being self-evidently true.
Furthermore, a predicate is that which is said of a subject, the subject being
a _hypokeimenon_ about which something can be said. So a predicate presupposes
the elementary structure of the _logos_ (proposition) investigated by Plato,
namely, saying something about something, or predicating something AS
something. In other words, any predicate presupposes a being about which it is
or can be said. So one can translate your Axiom 0 into “There is something to
be said that can be said of all beings, x.” In this way, however, the sense of
being itself remains unexplicated, i.e. it is implicitly understood and
presupposed. It is trivial to predicate of a being that it is, but the genuine
task begins only when we attempt, in thinking, to explicate what being itself
means, and THAT cannot be captured by the subject-predicate structure of the
_logos_.

>
> mathematicians use a substitution instance of Axiom 0 to define the
> empty set: there is a set, {}, such that, for any x that is, x is not an
> element of that set — (x !
> Axiom 0 doesn’t specify which predicate is to be substituted for ‘P’;
> so, one may choose. since this chosen predicate is attributable to all
> that is, it is the root predicate in a taxonomy of all that is.
> obviously, different individuals may choose different root predicates;
> but, an argument using one vocabulary should be translatable into
> another vocabulary as look as they have the same structure — the
> number and definitions of [root predicate]-types.
>
> for example, I use ‘real’ and cognate terms for the root predicate; and,
> I recognize the three reality *types* that I’ve previously mentioned:
>
> 1: existential reality — physical objects such as stones, chairs,
> human bodies and toe fungus.

ME: I.e. sensually perceptible beings, or beings given to the human senses.
(Aristotle: _aisthaeta_)

>
> 2: phenomenological reality, any subjective experience (whether or not
> it has a metaphenomenal correlate that is either existential or
> ontological).

ME: I.e. beings given to the mind’s eye, which can be called to the mind’s eye
and which could ALSO be experienced sensually in a (present) situation
(Aristotle: _phantasia_; Heidegger: “Vergegenwärtigung” or “calling to
presence”)

>
> 3: ontological reality — metaphenomenal entities that are not
> physical/existential realities; for example, souls, minds, beings,
> spirits, ghosts etc. (if there are any of these at all).

ME: I.e. beings given solely to the mind’s eye (Aristotle: _noaemata_) which
only give “signs” or “indications” of themselves in sensuous experience (such
as electrons or the soul). The access to such beings is above all through
THINKING (_noein_, _nous_). Hegel calls such beings beyond the senses
Reflexionsbestimmungen or Wesenheiten (determinations of reflection or
essentialities). For Hegel (thinking through these phenomena in his ontology,
the _Logik_) a Kraft (force) or a Ding (thing) is a Reflexionsbestimmung,
whereas Etwas (something/somewhat) is given immediately to presence and can be
experienced “an sich” or implicity by human understanding without further ado
(whereas the experience of Etwas explicitly or purely “für sich” requires a
phenomenological thinking-through).

> someone who used ‘exist’ and cognate terms for their root predicate
> would have different names for these types (and might even call them
> ‘modes’ rather than types of existence).
>
> Heidegger seems to use ‘being’ as his root predicate.

ME: “Being” is not Heidegger’s “root predicate”; it is his root phenomenon
which, following Aristotle, can be said/predicated in many ways (_pollachoos
legetai to on._) These “many ways” are folds in the manifold of the phenomenon
of being.

> he uses
> ‘existence’ as the name for something specific to humans; but, it is not
> clear whether the reality to which it corresponds is a phenomenological
> reality or an ontological reality or an entity that is the conflation of
> the two.
>
> in any event, the point to note (at the moment) is that the root is not
> itself a property of the reality in question. the root predicate is what
> Kant called a logical predicate; meaning, that saying ‘it is real’ or ‘I
> am a reality (of some sort)’ does not add any information to the
> statement ‘it is’ or ‘I am’.

ME: Kant still thinks within the bounds of traditional logic with its
predicates and subjects, whereas Hegel’s ontology is at pains to translate
predicates back into phenomena. Being for Hegel is therefore the phenomenon of
pure, indeterminate immediacy that can be experienced only through thinking,
and is not sensually given. Each of the terms, “pure”, “indeterminate” and
“immediate” has a precise philosophical meaning. Firstly, “pure” (rein) for
Hegel means the same thing it means for Kant, namely, “a priori” or “prior to
sensuous experience” which (experience) has to be, and is simply GIVEN to the
senses. Secondly, “indeterminate” (unbestimmt) is a negation, namely the
negation of any definition that would enable a definite being to gain contour.
Thirdly, “immediacy” (Unmittelbarkeit) is another negation, namely, of any
mediation. Pure being is given without any mediation, i.e. without anything at
all having to be presupposed, i.e. posited beforehand. For, the beginning of
any thinking-through of the ontology of the world has to be without
presupposition. That is precisely why Hegel rejects the ego as a possible
starting-point.

Such pure, indeterminate immediacy is being, which is the same as nothing.
Being and nothing flip-flop immediately (i.e. without mediation) into each
other; there is no difference between them. Only once this flip-flopping turns
into becoming does any being arise. This happens through a determination or
limit being inscribed in pure indeterminate immediacy to give an immediately
defined SOMETHING of a certain quality. Similarly, for Heidegger, too, being
and nothing are the same. Neither is sensually present. In contrast to Hegel,
however, Heidegger introduces temporal determinations to this being=
nothingness, so that the open space of presence for presencing gains a
temporal ontological structure. This is the clearing (Lichtung) for presencing
and absencing.

>
> hence, even if we got passed the issue of how best to translate german
> reflexive verbs into english, neither useage is fundamental enough to be
> applicable. the root predicate neither shows itself nor appears. when
> observed, a ’something’ will appear as itself having certain properties
> by which we classify it into reality types and (if enough information is
> obtained) by which we identify what it is.
>
> the act of attributing the root predicate to any x that is, is an act of
> inference or judgement not one akin to perception by which I notice the
> properties that an object appears to have or discloses itself to have.
> so, the fundamental category of ’something’ is not blindingly obvious.
> it requires a careful analysis even to come to the concept of a root
> predicate; and, even then, one must choose *which* predicate to use as a
> root predicate.

ME: To say that the fundamental, elementary category of ’something’ is
blindingly obvious is not to claim that it is easy to see. In truth, like
Plato’s _idee tou agathou_, it is hardest to see because it is so simple. The
category of ’something’, which is not merely a predicate but a phenomenon, is
so elementary for human openness to the world, and always already understood
from the start, that it is overlooked, i.e. it remains implicit, never getting
unfolded or explicated by thoughtful reflection. It is _thoughtlessly
presupposed_ by sensuous perception, and such thoughtlessness is even
empirically the precondition for us perceiving without hindrance. Therefore,
for empirical understanding, it seems that what is empirically given to the
senses is most fundamental, things like chairs, tables and trees. But
philosophical reflection upon this shows that empirical understanding is
deceiving itself on this point (cf. the first section of Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Spirit, on “Sensuous Certainty”). Philosophical thinking uncovers the
ontological presuppositions which sensuous perception willy-nilly and blindly
presupposes.

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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
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Posted on Thursday, November 1st, 2007 at 5:00 pm
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