Heidegger

Michael Eldred wrote:

>It is peculiar, not to say a philosophical scandal, that the
>Anglo-Saxon mind attempting to philosophize is prepared to accept on
>faith that atoms and sub-atomic particles exist. Thus we read from the
>blissfuly and wilfully ignorant Judhead, “We know [sic] that the human
>body is composed of many smaller particles, atoms, muons and God knows
>what else - let’s say for argument a zillion atoms.”
>
>Since I have two degrees in mathematics, and also studied physics at
>university, I know something about such equations … the existence of
>electrons, quarks, muons, etc. … is nothing other than the solution of
>certain sets of highly complex equations which Judheadian minds are
>incapable of grasping. In other words, … the “existence” of a
>sub-atomic particle such as an electron in a hydrogen atom, … [is] …
>nothing more nor less than the existence of ABSTRACT (semi-)integer
>solutions to a second-order partial differential equation

are you saying that, when I flip the switch, the room lights up because
zillions of abstract semi-integer solutions to a second-order partial
differential equation move down the wire to let there be light?

>Against this, the simple category of SOMETHING, for instance (basking
>in the blinding light of obviousness, and therefore overlooked), and
>its ontological priority to the existence of a singular instance of
>SOMETHING, such as an ink-blot, is open to view for anyone thinking
>through the simple phenomenon — that is, if one is prepared to employ
>the same care and rigour in thinking and respect for logical order that
>is demanded by any set of mathematical equations, and to look to see
>what is before the mind’s eye. We could not live in the world AT ALL
>without understanding perfectly well, but implicitly, what SOMETHING is
>and without dealing with myriad truly existent somethings. We do not,
>and can not, “derive” this “abstract” category from its (infinitely
>many) specific instances, because the category of SOMETHING must be
>already PRESUPPOSED in order to even identify any singular something AS
>such-and-such. That’s trivial. (We mathematicians, when proving
>theorems, often set down a lemma and write, “Proof: Trivial”.) And yet,
>today’s modern, scientistic minds are unable to see this, and dismiss
>the philosophical explication of what is always already (implicitly)
>folded into everyday understanding as metaphysical bunkum. Such is the
>state of “thinking” in the Modern Age — a nullity of arrogant
>ontological blindness.

previously, we’ve established that ‘being’ is a root predicate because
one can say, of anything that is, that it is a being of some sort.
similarly, anything that is falls into the category of ‘SOMETHING’.
anything that is, is a something.

now, you may be correct (in some sense, anyway) to say that the root
predicate or ultimate category has ontological ‘priority’ (whatever that
means); but, that only means it is likely to be discovered *last*.

you claim that “We do not, and can not, ‘derive’ this ‘abstract’
category from its (infinitely many) specific instances, because the
category of SOMETHING must be already PRESUPPOSED in order to even
identify any singular something AS such-and-such”. this is not only
false, it is empirically false. children learn to understand that a car
is a car long before they are capable of understanding the concept of
being understood as a root predicate attributable to all/any that is.

If you are mathematically inclined, I would appreciate any comments you
care to make about Axiom 0 (an axiom schema to be precise): there is a
predicate, P, such that, for any x that is, x is P.

[Using E = the existential quantifier and A = Universal quantifier]

Axiom 0 = (E P)(Ax)(Px)

mathematicians use a substitution instance of Axiom 0 to define the
empty set: there is a set, {}, such that, for any x that is, x is not an
element of that set — (x !

Posted on Thursday, November 8th, 2007 at 6:30 pm
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