Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron
October 30th, 2007, search relatedRelated posts :: Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron :: Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron :: Oddly Enough :: Oddly Enough - Existence of something, existence of an electron
Cologne 30-Oct-2007
Michael Eldred schrieb:
> Cologne 26-Oct-2007
>
> Joseph Polanik schrieb Thu, 25 Oct 2007 06:48:45 -0400:
>
> > Michael Eldred wrote:
> >
> > >ME: For Heidegger (and presumably for anyone thinking on it), anything
> > >at all that ‘is’ is a being, an entity.
> >
> > Okay, then. Heidegger’s vocabulary does, in fact, have a root predicate.
> >
> > >ME: Anything that ‘is’ is a Seiendes, a being, not what or who it is.
>
> ME: This should read: “Anything that ‘is’ is a Seiendes, a being, what or who
> it is.”
>
> >
> > >If this is articulated in a proposition, then it is also a predicate
> > >that predicates something about the proposition’s subject, namely, that
> > >it ‘is’.
> >
> > this is all that a root predicate does; it says that its subject *is* –
> > that it stands apart from nothingness; or, that it is not a member of
> > the empty set.
> >
> > the next question would concern the reality types (or, in more general
> > terms, the [root predicate]-types) that are available.
> >
> > >No being _is_ without showing itself _as_ such-and-such for
> > >understanding. So the being of a being and the disclosure of that being
> > >belong together
> >
> > I disagree as to both these points; but, first, you have mentioned the
> > important first-third person axis of thought.
> >
> > >Yet another aspect is that referring to beings as “that which is”
> > >already prejudices the philosophical-noetic gaze, because ‘is’ is only
> > >the third person singular of the verb ‘to be’. The traditional
> > >grammatical categories are originarily _metaphysical_ categories
> > >derived from the Greek metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, whose gaze
> > >concentrated on the relation (_pros ti_) between the understanding
> > >human being in the FIRST person and the being disclosing itself in the
> > >THIRD person. The first-third person is the predominant axis that has
> > >determined the entire history of metaphysics up to the present day
> > >(including those ‘philosophies’ that imagine they have ‘overcome’
> > >metaphysics and left it behind them). The question of the relationship
> > >between the first and second person remains to present day sorely
> > >underdeveloped, i.e. as yet phenomenologically unfolded. For this
> > >reason, and to mark this still insufficiently questioned twofold or
> > >bifurcation in being, I often explicitly refer to a being being WHAT or
> > >WHO it is.
> >
> > from the first person perspective of this being-here looking at objects
> > which are merely existential realities (physical beings, or physical
> > realities), the observing I does the discovering. the object lacks the
> > capacity to disclose itself.
>
> ME: If the “physical being” does not show itself AS such-and-such, the “I”
> cannot discover it.
>
> >
> > if you look at an inkblot and see a bat. it is not the inkblot that is
> > disclosing itself. you who look at the inkblot are self-disclosing. the
> > bat is ‘there’ because you put it there.
>
> If I look at an ink-blot, it has already shown itself AS SOMETHING; otherwise
> I could not see it. This SOMETHING is in between, i.e. situated in the
> ontological difference.
>
> >
> > at the subatomic level, particles do not even have definite values for
> > their dynamic properties — until observed. so, the particle does not
> > disclose itself. the observer discovers its values when the observation
> > forces the wave function to collapse the superposition of all
> > posssibilities into a single definite value.
>
> ME: At the “subatomic level” there is no simple looking-at (Anschauung,
> intuition) — what shows itself shows itself only in the light of the
> noetic-theoretic concepts that construe certain phenomena (in certain
> apparatuses constructed according to the physical theory) AS the appearance
> of “particles”, “wave functions”, etc.
Addendum ME: It is peculiar, not to say a philosophical scandal, that the
Anglo-Saxon mind attempting to philosophize is prepared to accept on faith that
atoms and sub-atomic particles exist. Thus we read from the blissfuly and
wilfully ignorant Judhead, “We know [sic] that the human body is composed of many
smaller particles, atoms, muons and God knows what else - let’s say for argument
a zillion atoms.” (GEVANS613 at aol.com, Fri, 5 Oct 2007 19:56:33 EDT)
This comes from someone who (dogmatically, polemically ad nauseum) denies the
existence of abstractions and who is also a maths-flunkey who wouldn’t know one
end of the Schrödinger equation from the other. (The Schrödinger wave function,
Psi, satisfies a partial differential equation of the second order. The possible
solutions for the hydrogen atom — the simplest case — depend on trios of
integers termed quantum numbers plus a semi-integral number for electron spin.)
The entire theory of quantum mechanics — on the basis of which the existence of
atoms and sub-atomics is experimentally “established”, being construed as the
agreement of certain observed phenomena in atomic spectroscopy with what is
predicted mathematically — is nothing but a highly complex system of equations.
Since I have two degrees in mathematics, and also studied physics at university,
I know something about such equations, but those common-sense, scientistically
prejudiced Anglo-Saxon minds, like Judhead’s, which scoff at the postulation of
abstract categories, are slavishly willing to swallow hook, line and sinker the
existence of electrons, quarks, muons, etc. whose “existence” is nothing other
than the solution of certain sets of highly complex equations which Judheadian
minds are incapable of grasping.
In other words, when our mindless Eliminative Materialist avers the “existence”
of a sub-atomic particle such as an electron in a hydrogen atom, he is asserting
nothing more nor less than the existence of ABSTRACT (semi-)integer solutions to
a second-order partial differential equation (that, incidentally, is beyond his
comprehension). There’s a wonderful irony in that.
Against this, the simple category of SOMETHING, for instance (basking in the
blinding light of obviousness, and therefore overlooked), and its ontological
priority to the existence of a singular instance of SOMETHING, such as an
ink-blot, is open to view for anyone thinking through the simple phenomenon –
that is, if one is prepared to employ the same care and rigour in thinking and
respect for logical order that is demanded by any set of mathematical equations,
and to look to see what is before the mind’s eye. We could not live in the world
AT ALL without understanding perfectly well, but implicitly, what SOMETHING is
and without dealing with myriad truly existent somethings. We do not, and can
not, “derive” this “abstract” category from its (infinitely many) specific
instances, because the category of SOMETHING must be already PRESUPPOSED in order
to even identify any singular something AS such-and-such. That’s trivial. (We
mathematicians, when proving theorems, often set down a lemma and write, “Proof:
Trivial”.) And yet, today’s modern, scientistic minds are unable to see this, and
dismiss the philosophical explication of what is always already (implicitly)
folded into everyday understanding as metaphysical bunkum. Such is the state of
“thinking” in the Modern Age — a nullity of arrogant ontological blindness.
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_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
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