Heidegger

Thank you for the reply (see last part of this post). I also cited two
other replies that you recently denied I gave. Please address those in
order to avoid once again incorrectly accuse me of not having given
them. Those replies were the one to this objection from you:

>> [JP, 2008-03-29]:
>>
>> okay; so, we *are* making progress after all. now we know that we don’t
>> have to specify the reality type or mode of existence of the referent of
>> the I that draws the conclusion, ‘I have not proven by evidence based
>> logical deduction that I am not nothing’.
>>
>> now all we have to decide is whether ‘the Nothing’ (as defined by
>> Heidegger) is capable of asserting this same conclusion about itself.
>> how about it, Anthony, is ‘the Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have not
>> proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>>
>> if not; then, it inexorably follows that any I that draws that skeptical
>> conclusion may legitimately continue, ‘it is now a fact that I have just
>> asserted a skeptical conclusion about myself; and, from that fact (which
>> is evidence), I deduce that I am not nothing’.
>>
>> how about it, Professor? is Heidegger’s ‘Nothing’ able to assert ‘I have
>> not proven by evidence based logical deduction that I am not nothing’?
>>
>>
>> This was my answer to the above post:
>>
>> http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/j…

and the one to this objection from you:

>> [JP (new material)]:
>>
>> Anthony, you’ve never addressed the question raised by your claim that
>> your argument applied to all reality types:
>>
>>
>> in the case of the I-3, how do you know either:
>>
>> 1. that there is no I-3; or,
>>
>> 2. that there is an I-3 and that it is self-identical throughout all its
>> perceptions, that it is mortal (it is born and that it will die), and so
>> on?
>>
>>
>> My response to the above, as well as your latter question, is here:
>>
>> http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…
>>
>> We are now in the midst of arguing about my reply, regarding the identity of the first person pronoun and its relationship to the identity of the referent. Please link your quotes from now on (as do I) so that you do not miss my replies and mischaracterize me as not replying again.

Please address these two items, and I will promptly address your replies
below, as well as to your replies to the above.

Joseph Polanik wrote:

> Schizo-Epistemology: Of Pronouns and Reality Types
>
> Professor Crifasi,
>
> one of your crucial claims seems to be that the proposition ‘I remain
> self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
> of existence.
>
> this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:
>
> [1]: P -> Q
>
> where
>
> P = ‘I exist’ [where ‘I exist’ = ‘I am not nothing’]
> Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’
>
> you also claim that Q is false; so:
>
> [2]: -Q
>
> *****************
>
> [Reply to
> http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…]
>
> Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >On 5/5/08, *Joseph Polanik*
>
> >Anthony Crifasi wrote:
>
> >>your posts since then support a reconstruction of your argument as
> >>follows:
>
> >>>>* it is a fact that, in english, the first-person singular pronoun
> >>>>is now and has for centuries been spelled ‘I’.
>
> >>>>* it is a fact that a given person uses ‘I’ for self-referencing at
> >>>>various points in time.
>
> >>>>* these two facts must have an explanation.
>
> >>>>* the only possible explanation is Q, that that the referent of ‘I’
> >>>>is always self-identical.
>
> >>>>* but, at [2], -Q is assumed/concluded: the referent of ‘I’ is never
> >>>>self-identical.
>
> >>>>* therefore … what? that your claim to have found the only
> >>>>possible explanation for the unchanged spelling of the english
> >>>>first-person singular pronoun is false?
>
> >>>I cited Hume’s explanation here:
>
> >>>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-April/033882.html
>
> >what you ‘cited’ was a quote from Hume to the effect that the referents
> >of words were constantly changing. how can that possibly help you
> >explain how words can retain the same spelling while their referents
> >change over time?
>
> >Do you see his argument that even if there is NEVER any identity in the
> >referent (i.e., not identity for short spans of time, but rather never
> >any identity whatsoever), that such identity will still be
> >(fictitiously) ascribed when the changes from one moment to the next
> >are not abrupt and sudden (like a house demolished all at once and
> >rebuilt), but gradual and easy (like a house replaced one bit at a time
> >over years until every piece is different)?
>
> I can read the argument *Hume* makes; but, I do not know what point
> *Crifasi* is trying to make.
>
> are you claiming that *Hume* is claiming that, because the house changes
> there is no house?
>
> are *you* claiming that, because the house changes, there is no house?
>
> if not, what *are* you claiming; and, how is that claim relevant to
> explaining why I should conclude ‘I am nothing’ based on a premise that
> is either false or vacuous?
>
> in post http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/i… you are
> quoted as saying that you were ‘appealing’ to “identity of the first
> person pronoun” and you continued by alleging that I “have yet to
> produce any reason whatsoever for the continued identity of the first
> person pronoun if its referent were to lack a continued identity”.
>
> now, of course, I conceed that, in vernacular english, the spelling of
> the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, has remained unchanged for centuries.
>
> and therefore what?
>
> I don’t need a reason to acknowledge the empirical fact that, in
> vernacular english, the spelling of the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, has
> remained unchanged for centuries.
>
> what is your explanation for this empirical fact?
>
> are you suggesting that the only possible explanation for this empirical
> fact is that the referent of ‘I’ changes gradually? if not, what *are*
> you claiming; and, if so, how is that ‘explanation’ anything other than
> a very unsubtle non-sequitor? and, in any case, how is this how does
> this supposed explanation for the unchanged spelling of ‘I’ explain why
> I should conclude ‘I am nothing’ based on a premise that is either false
> or vacuous?
>
> while we are on the subject, would you kindly explain what the “identity
> of the first person pronoun” is supposed to mean?
>
> please note especially that I am only conceeding that the spelling of
> the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, has remained unchanged for centuries —
> *in vernacular english*.
>
> obviously, I varied the spelling of the first-person pronoun when
> creating my set of subscripted pronouns to reduce the ambiguity inherent
> in using a single first-person pronoun irregardless of differences of
> opinion as to the reality type of its referent.
>
> clearly, you are not required to disambiguate by using subscripted
> pronouns; but, if you use some other way, don’t you think that
> ‘dialectical etiquette’ requires you to at least tell us what that way
> is?
>
> so, that raises other questions that remain unanswered. see
> http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger….
>
> you’ve claimed that your argument (premises [1] and [2] above and the
> conclusion ‘I am nothing’ or ‘I do not exist’ by modus tollens) applies
> to each of the reality types for which I have defined a subscripted
> pronoun. but you have also claimed
>  http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/j…)
> that “Any evidence for your reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically
> impossible”.
>
> okay, so if it is logically impossible for you to have any evidence as
> to reality types 1 and 3 how do you know that premises [1] and [2] are
> true for those reality types?
>
> of course you could try the Crifasi Maneuver. you could claim: it is
> logically impossible for there to be evidence that there are entities of
> reality type 1 (physical & non-phenomenal); therefore, there is no such
> evidence. the absence of evidence that there is a physical universe is
> evidence that there is no physical universe.
>
> however, the Crifasi Maneuver is totally invalid because it is so
> egocentric. someone else could claim it is logically impossible for
> there to be evidence that there are no entities of reality type 1
> (physical & non-phenomenal); therefore, there is no such evidence. the
> absence of evidence that there is no physical universe is evidence that
> there is a physical universe.
>
> so, without using the Crifasi Maneuver, how do you show that premises
> [1] and [2] are true for those reality types?
>
> as I see it, the only way would be to prove that premises
> [1] and [2] are true for reality type 1 would be to prove one of the
> following:
>
> 1. there are no physical objects; but, if there were, premises [1] and
> [2] would be true of them.
>
> 2. there are physical objects; and, premises [1] and [2] are true of
> them.
>
> given that you’ve conceeded that it is logically impossible to have
> evidence concerning reality types 1 and 3, how do you prove one of those
> two possibilities by evidence based logical deduction?
>
> and similarly for reality type 3.
>
> ***
>
> that is the last point that I will raise in this post, Professor. you
> can either address them now or wait until you have a more complete set.
>
> Joe Polanik
>
>

Posted on Sunday, May 11th, 2008 at 6:04 am
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