Heidegger

Schizo-Epistemology: Of Pronouns and Reality Types

Professor Crifasi,

one of your crucial claims seems to be that the proposition ‘I remain
self-identical throughout all my perceptions’ is a necessary condition
of existence.

this proposition may be symbolized, as follows:

[1]: P -> Q

where

P = ‘I exist’ [where ‘I exist’ = ‘I am not nothing’]
Q = ‘I remain self-identical throughout all my perceptions’

you also claim that Q is false; so:

[2]: -Q

*****************

[Reply to http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger…]

Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>On 5/5/08, *Joseph Polanik* Anthony Crifasi wrote:

>>your posts since then support a reconstruction of your argument as
>>follows:

>>>>* it is a fact that, in english, the first-person singular pronoun
>>>>is now and has for centuries been spelled ‘I’.

>>>>* it is a fact that a given person uses ‘I’ for self-referencing at
>>>>various points in time.

>>>>* these two facts must have an explanation.

>>>>* the only possible explanation is Q, that that the referent of ‘I’
>>>>is always self-identical.

>>>>* but, at [2], -Q is assumed/concluded: the referent of ‘I’ is never
>>>>self-identical.

>>>>* therefore … what? that your claim to have found the only
>>>>possible explanation for the unchanged spelling of the english
>>>>first-person singular pronoun is false?

>>>I cited Hume’s explanation here:

>>>http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger_an-archos.com/2008-April/033882.html

>what you ‘cited’ was a quote from Hume to the effect that the referents
>of words were constantly changing. how can that possibly help you
>explain how words can retain the same spelling while their referents
>change over time?

>Do you see his argument that even if there is NEVER any identity in the
>referent (i.e., not identity for short spans of time, but rather never
>any identity whatsoever), that such identity will still be
>(fictitiously) ascribed when the changes from one moment to the next
>are not abrupt and sudden (like a house demolished all at once and
>rebuilt), but gradual and easy (like a house replaced one bit at a time
>over years until every piece is different)?

I can read the argument *Hume* makes; but, I do not know what point
*Crifasi* is trying to make.

are you claiming that *Hume* is claiming that, because the house changes
there is no house?

are *you* claiming that, because the house changes, there is no house?

if not, what *are* you claiming; and, how is that claim relevant to
explaining why I should conclude ‘I am nothing’ based on a premise that
is either false or vacuous?

in post http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/i… you are
quoted as saying that you were ‘appealing’ to “identity of the first
person pronoun” and you continued by alleging that I “have yet to
produce any reason whatsoever for the continued identity of the first
person pronoun if its referent were to lack a continued identity”.

now, of course, I conceed that, in vernacular english, the spelling of
the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, has remained unchanged for centuries.

and therefore what?

I don’t need a reason to acknowledge the empirical fact that, in
vernacular english, the spelling of the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, has
remained unchanged for centuries.

what is your explanation for this empirical fact?

are you suggesting that the only possible explanation for this empirical
fact is that the referent of ‘I’ changes gradually? if not, what *are*
you claiming; and, if so, how is that ‘explanation’ anything other than
a very unsubtle non-sequitor? and, in any case, how is this how does
this supposed explanation for the unchanged spelling of ‘I’ explain why
I should conclude ‘I am nothing’ based on a premise that is either false
or vacuous?

while we are on the subject, would you kindly explain what the “identity
of the first person pronoun” is supposed to mean?

please note especially that I am only conceeding that the spelling of
the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, has remained unchanged for centuries —
*in vernacular english*.

obviously, I varied the spelling of the first-person pronoun when
creating my set of subscripted pronouns to reduce the ambiguity inherent
in using a single first-person pronoun irregardless of differences of
opinion as to the reality type of its referent.

clearly, you are not required to disambiguate by using subscripted
pronouns; but, if you use some other way, don’t you think that
‘dialectical etiquette’ requires you to at least tell us what that way
is?

so, that raises other questions that remain unanswered. see http://an-archos.com/pipermail/heidegger….

you’ve claimed that your argument (premises [1] and [2] above and the
conclusion ‘I am nothing’ or ‘I do not exist’ by modus tollens) applies
to each of the reality types for which I have defined a subscripted
pronoun. but you have also claimed
 http://heidegger.an-archos.com/archive/j…)
that “Any evidence for your reality types 1 and 3 is therefore logically
impossible”.

okay, so if it is logically impossible for you to have any evidence as
to reality types 1 and 3 how do you know that premises [1] and [2] are
true for those reality types?

of course you could try the Crifasi Maneuver. you could claim: it is
logically impossible for there to be evidence that there are entities of
reality type 1 (physical & non-phenomenal); therefore, there is no such
evidence. the absence of evidence that there is a physical universe is
evidence that there is no physical universe.

however, the Crifasi Maneuver is totally invalid because it is so
egocentric. someone else could claim it is logically impossible for
there to be evidence that there are no entities of reality type 1
(physical & non-phenomenal); therefore, there is no such evidence. the
absence of evidence that there is no physical universe is evidence that
there is a physical universe.

so, without using the Crifasi Maneuver, how do you show that premises
[1] and [2] are true for those reality types?

as I see it, the only way would be to prove that premises
[1] and [2] are true for reality type 1 would be to prove one of the
following:

1. there are no physical objects; but, if there were, premises [1] and
[2] would be true of them.

2. there are physical objects; and, premises [1] and [2] are true of
them.

given that you’ve conceeded that it is logically impossible to have
evidence concerning reality types 1 and 3, how do you prove one of those
two possibilities by evidence based logical deduction?

and similarly for reality type 3.

***

that is the last point that I will raise in this post, Professor. you
can either address them now or wait until you have a more complete set.

Joe Polanik

–
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. — H-N Castaneda

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
 http://what-am-i.net
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Posted on Sunday, May 11th, 2008 at 6:04 am
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