Heidegger

MichaelE on Jud’s fundament, recently:

> ME: Your fundamental critique of the “fundamental foundations” consists
> of asserting incessantly that “abstractions do not exist”, only
> nitty-gritty arrangements of atoms and molecules do exist. Some
> critique!

Just a quick point, Michael: asserting the existence of “nitty-gritty
arrangements of atoms and molecules” is asserting ‘arrangements’ and not
just what is so arranged; because the materialist asserts that every thing
that exists exists as and only as atoms, molecules and (pen?)ultimately
sub-atomic bits and bobs, he may fail to notice that such “causal objects”
are not just (’made of’) heaps of atoms et al, but are very much
arrangements and configurations of atoms et al, and that atoms et al are
themselves extraordinarily stable arrangements of their consistent particles
and such {which is why, in part, scientists will assign the label of
existence or reality to such things as atoms — stable configurations don’t
change}. And so with atoms themselves, the only difference between an atom
of hydrogen (say) and helium (say) is an exact difference in the
configurations of their part(icle)s (further “causal objects” — electrons,
protons, neutrons, etc). And so, to distinguish this particular atom of
hydrogen from that particular atom of helium (if indeed this were possible,
practically) one would have to point to a difference in the configuration of
particles (that each “causal object” is composed of/from).

Then the question for the el-mat thinker is: are such configurations (that
enable one to theoretically and practically distinguish one atom of hydrogen
from one atom of helium) themselves “causal objects”, i.e., do
configurations as such exist (in el-mat terms)?

If yes, then there are beings in the world that exist but are not material
objects (a configuration is a configuration independently of the manner/form
in which it is presented as such and is thereby not in any way another
material thing); in that case the el-mat thinker would have to re-consider
the nature of “causal objects” (the nature of cause {or change} and object).

[An aside:

So far, I have noted, the very interchangability of the el-mat terms
“causal” and “change(ing/able)” and the absence of any consideration of the
notion of “object” leads one to suppose that these terms are not at all the
point because the el-mat thinker is perhaps merely employing terms
(abstractions) to point to the utterly mystical ineffability of that about
which he speaks, and thus such terminological usage is merely a rhetorical
device to precisely point away from language but with its aid; and in the
end (with the analytically silenced language of assertion or position: words
are merely words, etc) this terminates in merely silent pointing {which is
not philosophy in my book}).]

If no, then the difference between (say) an atom of hydrogen and an atom of
helium (say) does not exist, and in fact there would be no (existing, thus
authentic) difference at all between all/any atoms, molecules and the like,
and surely this would contradict the repeated perception of ultimate and
ineffable individuate difference in the only things that are said to exist
(the infamous “causal objects”). Difference as such (between “causal
objects”) then becomes a matter of indifference and nothing is different
than any thing else: a contradiction that should cause [sic] the el-mat
thinker to rethink his speeches as to asserting utterly implacable
unconditional differences between “causal objects”. So, either way, the
el-mat thinker should pause to think again (at least on the inelectability
of such contradictions).

Just a thought.

regards

michaelP

Posted on Sunday, October 1st, 2006 at 6:50 am
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