Heidegger

—–Oorspronkelijk bericht—–
Van: heidegger-bounces at soca.ecu.edu.au
[mailto:heidegger-bounces@soca.ecu.edu.au]Namens Anthony Crifasi
Verzonden: dinsdag 2 januari 2007 16:49
Aan: Discussions pertaining to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
Onderwerp: Re: loose thoughts on physis: on the edge of thinking

—– Original Message —–
From: “Bakker, R.B.M. de”

—–Oorspronkelijk bericht—–
Van: heidegger-bounces at soca.ecu.edu.au
[mailto:heidegger-bounces@soca.ecu.edu.au]Namens Anthony Crifasi

it is *precisely*
insofar as man is a doctor that he can heal himself. But since
being-a-doctor is incidental to being-a-man, the change in question here
(self-healing) is not a manifestation of physis. In other words, Aristotle
uses the example to illustrate the self-emergence of physis because the
source of the doctor’s recovery happens to be the doctor himself, but since
the source of the recovery is really accidental to what the doctor is (i.e.,
a man), it is really not an example of physis at all, but only an
illustration. Aristotle in many places explicitly states that medicine is
techne, not physis.

True, techne and not physis. But just like a carpenter is not
able to make a table grow, the doctor is never able to produce
health. Medicine can only further, or harm health. If it is after
more than that, then its techne, which Heidegger always stresses
is primarily knowledge, know-how, and not handicraft itself, is
ill-informed. As such it can become very dangerous, not only in
the damaging of human nature, but as well in the compulsory denial
that it is doing that.
Aristotle’s example of a doctor treating himself, is meant to bring
to light the limitation of *all* techne. A doctor only seemingly
heals
himself: It is only health which ‘makes’ healthy, in the sense of an
arche
effective of itself. The same is true for all treatment of others
than oneself:

=========================
You are confusing two distinct places where Aristotle uses health as an
illustration. In the case of health as arche, it is meant to illustrate the
manner in which there is a primary way of being in relation to which all
other ways of being are said to be such:

“There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that
‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not
said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to
health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the
sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of
health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is
relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it
possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because
it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used
similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said
to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be
because they are substances, others because they are affections of
substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or
destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or
generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or
negations of one of these thing of substance itself.” (Metaphysics IV.2)

Here, Aristotle is simply noting that just as there is a primary meaning of
health in relation to everything healthy is healthy, there is a primary way
of being in relation to which other ways of being are such. This is a
completely separate discussion from his example of the doctor doctoring
himself. The latter is not about the limitations of techne or of what
“makes” health, but is simply meant to illustrate what he means by
self-emergence (specifically, of physis).
==========================

In book B, the sense of physis as being-of-itself is comprehended by
opposition to techne. All things made are not of themselves, but by
sthing/someone other. All things natural have their aitia/arche *in*
themselves.

A possible objection, answered by Aristotle, might be that the techne of
a doctor doctoring himself is *in* the doctor, so that there seems to be
no external factor, and the healing, in this case not brought about by an
external factor, therefore seems to be physis.

But despite someone recovering being a doctor himself, still his doctoring
(iatreusis) is external to his recovering (hygiasis). And therefore
Aristotle states explicitly, that physis is always “prootoos kath’hauto”,
primarily of itself, and never kata symbebekos, co-appearing. As with the
doctoring, it is with all products, he says. Which must mean, in the case
of a bed, to which, viewed merely as a bed, it is indifferent whether it is
made of wood or stone or anything else, still the carpenter is and remains
external to the matter, because it is and remains natural, of itself.
It is therefore that a bed is called wooden, and not wood itself.
This is what is implied in the second part of the hei men .. hei de sentence.
On the one hand there is the difference qua arche, on the other hand do products
possess physis as arche too, but only insofar they happen to be wooden or etc.

Not seeing the limitation of techne by physis right here, brings the already
many times stated consequences regarding technology, some will say: ad nauseam,
but *still* not dealt with.
Esp. that the essence of technology is not a matter of technical products and
production, but of thinking, i.c. one-sided thinking not able to allow for what
is of its own right. Also not ecological one-sided thinking. What physis means,
is still to be discovered, one way or another. As is stated in another context,
physis, although obfuscated, remains inevitable esp. when unremarked. As Heidegger
states, also words like nature, organism, plant, are (used as) merely technological
concepts. Nature this conceived can only add to technology.

rene

But the medicinal techne is, thus Aristotle, limited to the treatment, and
never enters the field of natural health itself. And always the treatment
has to be applied to health healing of itself (leibende Leib).
For medicine with unlimited technological claims such a body does not even
count as real. But then its results must be disastrous, and so they are, since
we are all body. Children are the most vulnerable. Living in virtual reality,
they are degenerating physically.

rene

Posted on Friday, January 5th, 2007 at 4:25 pm
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