Heidegger

Joe:

> >>do you claim the power to attribute predicates to nothing(ness) or do
> >>you not?

mP:

> >For me, predicating be-ing is ‘impossible’ in the sense of being
> >pointless; such an act could only begin to be worthwhile if such an
> >attempt at the (analytically) impossible led to an understanding and
> >analysis of its impossibility and thus led on to a discussion as to the
> >be-ing of predicating itself.

Joe:

> it is one thing to claim the power to attribute predicates to
> nothing(ness); and, it is another thing to note the circumstances in
> which one appears unable to attribute predicates to that which is.
>
> in the post to which you are responding, I spoke only about the former.

Joe, how disappointing that you find only the above to respond to in my
fairly lengthy spiel concerning the very inappropriateness of attempting to
predicate be-ing (which is, if you like, no-thing-ness, non-being, nothing
in that sense); you seem to totally ignore the point I keep on making (that
certain modes of speech are inappropriate for questioning be-ing); ah well.

One is not “unable to attribute predicates to that which is”. As I said in
the last posts, one can say what one likes about anything, including be-ing;
I could say “be-ing is blue and round and weighs exactly one ounce” or
“be-ing is fast and bulbous and likes Frank Zappa” or “be-ing is not
nothing”, etc, ad nauseam. But being able to concretely attribute predicates
to be-ing (or nothing in the sense of not-a-being) is not the same as it
being possible analytically. My point is and has been that predication is
only appropriate when one predicates beings; thus my point is once again a
confirmation of the ontological difference (the difference between be-ing
and beings), because be-ing (and nothing as not-being) is not a being and
predicating is saying something about some thing (some being). Predicating
be-ing would thus be saying something about no thing (or nothing in its
everyday sense) at all and thus could be analytically construed as saying
nothing or even being nothing as a saying (a non-saying)…

Joe:

> in a post from some time ago (2008-04-16):
>
> “in Heidegger’s analysis of ‘be-ing’, he concludes that predicating
> ‘be-ing’ turns ‘be-ing’ into a being; and, he suggests that this is a
> bad thing. if that is the case; then, then Heidegger has found the point
> at which he should start to observe Wittgenstein’s advice: whereof one
> can not speak thereof one must remain silent. but, instead of following
> that advice, Heidegger just kept on cranking out statements predicating
> be-ing.”
>
> in any event, if I ask you about your stand on predicating nothing(ness)
> and your reply claims that it is ‘impossible’ to predicate be-ing’;
> then, I have to wonder whether these two concepts are related in your
> view. are they?

Yes, as long as one understands ‘impossible’ analytically and not
concretely, and one understands the intimate relation between be-ing and
nothing(ness) particularly in an environment of strictly predicational
speech (strict in the sense that such speech sees no limit or
inappropriateness to its power in capturing and appropriating anything its
(thinking) (he)art desires to capture and own. What such speech wittingly or
unwittingly fails to notice is that it, in order to be able to predicate at
all, strictly or loosely, is its self owned by what is not predicatable
{since, if you like, it is the very power of predicatability}). Of course, I
am talking here of _logos_ and its meaning in relation to its grandchild,
logic (and of course, thereby, predicational speech). I repeat: the be-ing
of logic is nothing logical.

regards

michaelP

> Joe

Posted on Sunday, June 8th, 2008 at 6:04 am
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